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Abstract
The increasing globalisation of business activities since the Second World War 
might seem to indicate the end of economic diversity within and among nations, 
and to point towards the standardisation of business recipes across the 
industrialised world. However, various cross-cultural studies have revealed 
considerable differences among organisations even within the fairly narrow 
context of Europe (for example. Lane, 1989; 1992), which are attributed to 
differences in the institutional environments in which the organisations are 
embedded. Institutional theorists argue that contingency theorists' emphasis on the 
influence of the task environment of an organisation, and cultural theorists' focus 
on the influence of ideational factors, are not sufficient to explain the continuing 
diversity of organisations across nations.
This research analyses the influence of the institutional environment on the 
business recipe of private sector organisations. It thus combines institutional 
theories of organisations and the concept of business recipes. The companies 
analysed are Esso in Britain and Germany. Given that Esso in both countries is 
part of the Exxon Corporation, the research not only considers the influence of the 
national institutional environment, but also offers insights into the workings of a 
multinational organisation. In-depth case studies of both companies were 
undertaken by way of interviews and documentary research. These case studies 
were contextualised by research into areas such as the nature of the petroleum 
industry, the economic context of the companies, and the history and policy of 
Exxon Coiporation.
The case studies reveal that despite each company's common dependence on 
Exxon and a fair degree of similarity in the teclinical factors of their environments, 
they have distinctive features in their business recipes, and these can be attributed 
to the configurations of the respective institutional environments. The study 
illustrates the need for the managers to cope with conflicting institutional 
pressures, especially from their parent company and the national institutional 
context. Overall, the findings support the view of institutional theorists (for 
example Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1992a) that economic diversity among countries 
will persist as long as the configurations of key national institutions differ.
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1 Introduction
During the last fifty years since the Second World War, the world of business has 
become increasingly interdependent and complex, with information technology 
furthering the establishment of networks throughout the globe. Furthermore, this 
period has been characterised by increasing attempts to facilitate business 
development across national borders. A fitting example of this was the creation of 
the Common European Market in 1992 that gave birth to a vast European free- 
trade zone among the twelve member states of the European Community.
These developments might seem to indicate the end of economic diversity within 
and among nations, and to point towards the standardisation of business recipes 
across the industrialised world. However, even in a fairly narrow context like the 
European Market, little convergence towards a common business recipe seems to 
have occured. On the contrary, various cross-cultural studies (see, for example, 
Maurice et al, 1980; Lane, 1989; 1992; Whitley, 1992a) have revealed that 
considerable differences among organisations within Europe still persist and 
attribute these to the different institutional environments in which the latter are 
embedded.
Institutional theorists (for example Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995) posit 
that organisational structures and processes are influenced by institutions within 
and outside organisations. Institutions, in this context, are viewed as manifestations 
of societal values (Lane, 1989). Institutionalists thus oppose on the one hand the 
'undersocialised' view of contingency theorists in their focus on the importance of 
the task environment of an organisation. On the other hand, they reject the 
'oversocialised' perception of organisations by theorists in the culturalist tradition 
who emphasise the influence of ideational factors.
This research set out to examine the extent to which the business recipes of 
organisations are influenced by their national institutional context. In order to be 
able to address this question, firstly, in-depth research into the nature and role of 
institutions was needed. An outline of institutional theories of organisations is 
given in Chapter Two. Institutional theorists have in the past based their theory on 
the broad assumption that some organisations are subject to a rather technical 
environment, mainly private sector organisations, whilst others are influenced by an 
institutional environment, mainly public sector organisations, (see, for example, 
Zucker, 1987). This has led to the fact that most institutional analyses (especially 
within the USA) have been undertaken on public sector organisations. It thus
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seemed important to analyse how far private sector organisations are subject to 
institutional pressures. Furthermore, most institutional theorists focus on analysing 
the effects of institutions on factors such as organisational structure or industrial 
relations (Lane, 1989; Maurice et al., 1980; S orge and Warner, 1986). Hence, it 
seemed important to provide further insights into the influences of institutions by 
analysing their effect on the strategic level of organisations, as manifested in 
organisations' business recipes. Whilst this is more difficult to research than 
structures or processes, it seemed a very interesting and challenging research task 
which would penetrate an area not yet sufficiently addressed by institutionalists. In 
order to understand the origin and characteristics of business recipes, research was 
needed into the concept of business recipes. An outline of this concept and the 
literature on it is provided in Chapter Three.
On the basis of the above broad definition of the research task, a research 
methodology was developed, which is described in detail in Chapter Four. In order 
to explore the influence of national institutions it seemed most appropriate to study 
organisations in at least two different countries. The countries chosen were Britain 
and Germany. Previous comparative analyses of these countries (for example 
Lane, 1992; Sorge and Warner, 1986) have revealed interesting differences, and 
analysable results could thus be expected.
It seemed most appropriate to undertake in-depth case studies with a limited 
number of organisations, which, as explained above, should be private sector 
organisations. The organisations chosen were Esso in Britain and Germany where 
access was possible because of existing contacts with the German Esso AG. These 
organisations are both subsidiaries of the Exxon Corporation and have both been 
active in the refining and marketing of oil products in their countries for over a 
century. The companies' mutual dependence on Exxon was expected to ensure to 
the greatest possible extent that differences found between them would be rooted 
in the institutional environment rather than in variations in the policies of the parent 
company or in sector-specific factors. Lastly, with both companies being part of 
the Exxon corporation, this research offered the opportunity of analysing the 
impact of the multinational corporation on the organisational business recipes of 
subsidiaries. Given the interdependence and increasingly global character of 
business, it seemed a very critical issue to reveal the extent to which the business 
recipes of the Exxon affiliates are 'global' in character.
As part of the research task and in preparation for the case studies, in-depth 
research was undertaken on the nature of the oil industry, the history and policies
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of Exxon, the energy policies of Britain and Germany, the economic context in 
which Esso AG in Germany and Esso Petroleum in Britain are embedded, as well 
as the national institutional environment of the two countries. This research is 
described in some detail in the Appendices and used in the analysis of the case 
studies in Chapter Seven.
In order to build up a picture of the business recipes of Esso AG and Esso 
Petroleum, interviews were undertaken with senior management in both countries. 
Research into business recipes is difficult as it requires the researcher to obtain a 
picture not only of the formal strategy of an organisation but also of the underlying 
rationality which leads to this strategic behaviour. A major challenge of this 
research was thus to reveal this underlying rationality. In this context, not only was 
it important to reveal the influences managers perceived as critical, but also it was 
essential to find out whether these assumptions by the managers were 
representative of their strategy formulation. This was done mainly by way of semi­
structured interviews which allowed the researcher to obtain a fairly 
comprehensive picture of the key features and underlying beliefs of the companies' 
business recipes. These interviews were supplemented by the analysis of 
documentary evidence provided by the two companies. The case studies of Esso 
Petroleum and Esso AG are summarised in Chapters Five and Six.
The contrast and comparison of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum enabled the 
researcher to reveal differences and similarities in the business recipes and to relate 
these to the institutional environment of the organisations. This also provided the 
opportunity to explore how managers manage the potentially conflicting 
institutional influences exerted upon them. The analysis of the case studies is 
provided in Chapter Seven.
To sum up the structure of this thesis, initially an outline of institutional theories of 
organisations is provided in Chapter Two. In Chapter Three, the concept of 
business recipes is presented. Chapter Four describes the research task of this study 
defining key research questions, as well as explaining the methodology employed. 
In Chapters Five and Six the case studies of Esso Petroleum and Esso AG are 
presented with summaries of the overall business recipes of the companies 
provided at the end of each chapter. The findings are then analysed in Chapter 
Seven. Chapter Eight summarises the conclusions to emerge from this study.
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2 Institutional Theories of Organizations
The purpose o f this chapter is to provide an outline o f Institutional Theories o f 
Organizations, one o f the underlying theories o f this research, focusing on studies 
since the 1970s. The chapter is divided into five parts. Firstly, an introduction to 
the theory is given contrasting it with other theories and tracing its short history. 
The second section provides an outline o f Institutional Theories. In the third 
section, special issues regarding the theories are discussed. Fourthly, an outline 
o f various cross-cultural studies in the institutional tradition is provided, with a 
fina l conclusion following in the fifth  section.
2.1. Introduction
Institutional theories of organisations have evolved mainly since the 1970s. 
Although some early theorists like Selznick (1957) or Commons (1924) 
emphasised the presence and influence of institutions in society (for a 
comprehensive review of early institutional thought, see Scott (1995), only in the 
1970s were institutional theories of organisations fully developed as an alternative 
theoretical conception to other mainstream theories of organizations. Since their 
early years, institutional theories have undergone various changes. In fact, as Scott 
(1995) explains, current strands of institutional theories can be regarded as 'Neo- 
Institutional' as their focus has shifted from formerly the regulative and normative 
character of institutions to the cognitive side. This chapter will focus on the current 
theorists in the institutional tradition.
Institutional theories of organizations explain organizational structures and 
processes as influenced by institutions within and outside organizations. 
Institutions, in this context, are seen as manifestations, or 'tangible expressions' 
(Lane, 1989; 28) of societal values. Especially European theorists in the 
institutional tradition stress the particular importance of how institutions evolved 
historically - on the basis of value systems - and how this shapes their role in 
society (see eg. Clegg, 1990; Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1992a; 1992b). Institutional 
theories are thus different from both contingency theories and the purely culturalist 
perspective. With regard to the former, institutionalists oppose the idea of 
contingency theorists that structures and behaviour of organisations are universally 
shaped by certain contingent factors such as size or the degree of dependency, in 
short, the 'task environment'. In the eyes of institutional theorists, the success of 
organizations is not merely dependent on the economic efficiency of the latters' 
work processes. As Granovetter (1985) puts it referring to Wrong (1961),
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contingency theories offer an 'undersocialised' account of organizations. As far as 
the culturalist tradition is concerned, institutionalists reject the exclusive emphasis 
on ideational factors, which culturalists pursue. In this context, the latter focus 
especially on the influence of collective norms and values regarding kinship 
relations or religion, on organizations. Again in the words of Granovetter (1985), 
the culturalist perspective offers an 'oversocialized' view of the world, neglecting 
the role of institutional configurations such as the state system, the educational 
system or the mass media (Child and Tayeb, 1983).
In the eyes of institutionalists, organizations are partly shaped by the institutional 
framework in which they are embedded (see eg. Granovetter, 1985; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977), and by internally generated rules and procedures (Zucker, 1987). 
Organizational success is viewed as partly determined by the ability of 
organizations to adapt to institutionalised rules and procedures through the latter 
of which they gain legitimacy in the eyes of society. In this context, institutionalists 
consider institutional factors such as the influence of the state, how whole nations 
came to industrialise, the nature of the political or educational system as well as 
national public opinion.
2.2 The Institutional Theories of Organizations
Although they agree on common basic assumptions, theorists in the institutional 
tradition take different views on specifics. Various theorists have summarised and 
categorised the main institutional theories (see eg. Clegg, 1990; Scott, 1987a; 
1995; Zucker, 1987). Common to all theories is that 'institutionalisation' is 
regarded as a process and property variable (Zucker, 1977). In the former 
meaning, institutionalisation describes the process by which individuals arrive at 
common understandings and interpretations of particular actions and situations 
thereby establishing social norms and rules of behaviour. The second definition 
refers to the fact that the rules thus created by human beings are, once established, 
regarded as exterior (Zucker, 1977), as external realities, as "objective structures' 
which constrain action (Zimmerman and Pfitzner, 1970: 37)' (Zucker, 1977: 727). 
The thus evolving social order represents the scope within which individuals are to 
act if they want to be understood and accepted. Institutions themselves are the 
incorporations of the rules created. They exist at all levels and in different forms, as 
Scott defines (1995: 33): 'Institutions consist of cognitive, normative and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers - cultures, structures and 
routines- and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.'
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Scott (1987a) distinguishes four different strands of institutional theories including 
early theorists in this field. Zucker (1987), focusing on current research, 
differentiates between two approaches. This approach was later adopted by Clegg 
(1990). In a recent work, Scott (1995), in line with his above 'omnibus definition of 
institutions' (ibid: 33) separates institutional theories on the one hand according to 
their regulative, normative or cognitive character, and on the other hand according 
to the varying carriers or means of transmission and the various levels of 
jurisdiction - from the subunit of an organisation to the world system - 
respectively. All in all, he arrives at a comprehensive model of 'Institutional 
Creation and Diffusion' (Scott, 1995: 142) which depicts well the complexity of 
institutional processes within a given society. A full account of institutional 
theories in this way is beyond the scope of this study. In the following, we will thus 
follow Zucker's distinction (1987) into two main strands however drawing 
arguments from other theorists' works. In this connection, the focus will be on 
those aspects of institutional theories which are relevant for the following study.
In her summary of institutional theories, Zucker (1987) distinguishes the 
'Environment as Institution' approach from the 'Organisation as Institution' 
approach. These differ in terms of where institutionalisation takes place: in the 
'Environment as Institution' approach, theorists view the environment of an 
organisation as containing institutionalised rules and norms of behaviour which the 
organisation may adopt in its structures and processes. In the 'Organisation as 
Institution' approach, organisations are perceived as generating rules and new 
cultural elements or imitating norms generated by other organisations. Most 
theorists in the institutional tradition have applied the 'Environment as Institution' 
approach in their studies (see eg. Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1992a; 1992b). The 
'Organization as Institution' approach has been analysed or applied less frequently 
(see eg. Zucker, 1977). However, the underlying assumptions of the organisation 
as generating institutionalised rules and norms can be found in various studies (see 
Oliver, 1991; Granovetter, 1985) - also in those related analyses describing the 
existence of distinct organizational 'cultures' (eg. Schein, 1985). In the following, 
the 'Environment as Institution' approach and the 'Organisation as Institution' 
approach will be outlined. Whereas Zucker draws a clear line between these two 
models, however, we will subsequently arrive at a synthesis of these approaches 
thus adopting Scott's (1995) interpretation of institutional theories.
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2.2.1 The 'Environment as Institution’ Approach
Theorists using this approach regard institutionalisation as taking place outside the 
organisation which plays a mainly adaptive role. In modern societies, the 
institutional environment derives its power from being part of a collective, the 
state-system with the state as central coercive power (Zucker, 1987). The 
development of the state-system has led to the establishments of a rational-legal 
order. Within this order 'organized agents (...) assume jurisdiction over large 
numbers of activity domains (Swanson, 1971)' (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 347). 
The degree of institutionalisation of the system varies according to the degree to 
which the rational-legal order penetrates society. As Meyer and Rowan (1977: 
347-348) explain, 'the stronger the rational-legal order, the greater the extent to 
which rationalized rules and procedures and personnel become institutional 
requirements. ' In this context, critical for the understanding of the configuration 
and influence of the state-system as well as other existing institutions is how they 
evolved historically (see eg. Clegg, 1990; Lane, 1989; 1992; Whitley, 1992a; 
1992b).
By conforming to certain rules and norms the organisation becomes isomorphic 
with its institutional environment and with other organisations within this 
environment, thereby gaining legitimacy and ensuring its long-term survival and 
access to resources. In the words of Meyer and Rowan (1977: 349), they thereby 
'remain successful by social definition'. In this context, three isomorphic processes 
can be distinguished (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983): coercive, normative and 
mimetic. Coercion is exercised formally or informally by other organisations or by 
society via rules, laws or sanctions. A characteristic example of coercive 
isomorphism is the implementation of measures required by law. Mimetic 
isomorphism takes place at a cognitive level through the adoption of taken-for- 
granted, culturally supported norms of behaviour. An example of this is the 
adoption of similar practices by organisations within the same field. Normative 
isomorphism results mainly from the professionalisation of society (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) and depicts the processes by which organisations adopt certain 
procedures, policies and structures advocated by professional bodies such as trade 
associations, universities or consultancies.
Organisations become isomorphic with their environment irrespective of whether 
the rules and procedures adopted increase the efficiency (for a further discussion 
on the definition of'efficiency' see section 2.3.1) of their work processes. In fact, 
the procedures formally adopted for the purpose of gaining legitimacy might even
16
lead to a decrease in efficiency, or in the extreme case, to the sell-out of the 
organisation's goals (Perrow, 1986). Organisations facing this dilemma tend to 
'decouple' elements of their structure from their technical activities and from other 
structural elements. This is visible, for example, when comparing the formal and 
informal structure of organisations. Organisations thus seem alike and gain 
legitimacy from seemingly complying with institutional rules, however the way they 
actually - informally - work might be different. As Meyer and Rowan put it (1977; 
357), 'the organizations in an industry tend to be similar in formal structure - 
reflecting their common institutional origins - but may show much diversity in 
actual practice,'
A further point to be made is that institutional frameworks, once established, can 
prove as an impediment for change for the organizations and the whole society 
embedded in it. Only severe crises might then lead politicians or organisations to 
realise that the underlying institutions are obsolete and have to be replaced (eg. 
Lane, 1989).
In his recent work, Scott (1995) describes the 'Environment as Institution' 
approach as the 'Top-Down'approach, or 'Macro-Perspective' of institutional 
theories. It serves to explain on the one hand why organisations within a certain 
field or at a certain level have similar structures and processes. On the other hand, 
it offers an explanation for the difference between formal and informal structures 
and processes of organisations (Scott, 1995: 140-141; see also Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Scott, 1994). Lastly, it shows the relevance of the historical evolution of 
institutions for the latters' present character and influence and consequently for the 
organisations affected by institutionalised rules (eg. Lane, 1989; 1992).
Conception o f the Institutional Environment
The definition of the institutional environment is subject to variations among 
institutional theorists. The interpretations of effects of the institutional environment 
vary somewhat, depending on which level of analysis is applied.
According to Scott (1995: 55) the level of institutional analysis can be regarded as 
'the range of jurisdiction of the institutional form' analysed. However, institutional 
processes are complex and interwoven and any separation into particular 
'environments' is problematic. Furthermore, researchers have come to realise that 
pressures within an institutional environment can be complex or even inconsistent 
(see eg. Oliver, 1991; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Scott, 1995). Nevertheless,
17
theorists have undertaken analyses at different levels. Within the 'Environment as 
Institution' approach these are: the world system, the societal system, the 
organisational field and the organisation population (Scott, 1995).
With regard to the world system as institutional environment, Meyer (1994: 40) 
distinguishes worldwide effects on the status and rights of individuals from those 
on organisational complexity. In terms of the former, he explains that various 
recent developments have happened world-wide and thus had effects on individuals 
and thus organisations and societies around the globe. According to Meyer, 
examples of these are the human rights movement or the increased rights for 
women. However, Meyer suggests that regarding organisational complexity, 
organisations might be more affected by national sector- or industry-wide 
institutions than by those at the world-system level. Nevertheless, as he 
acknowledges, some institutional rules might be difhised worldwide by consultants, 
business schools or within multinational firms. With regard to multinationals, also 
Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) point to the diffusion of rules within the 
corporation.
Regarding society as institutional environment, several studies have used this 
perspective, either in comparison or analysing merely organisations within national 
boundaries (see eg. Lane, 1989; Maurice et al, 1980; Sorge and Warner, 1986). In 
these perspectives the centre of analysis is mostly the state which, being 
hierarchically superior to the organisation, can impose institutional constraints by 
way of coercion.
A third level of analysis used by institutional theorists is that of the 'organisational 
field' as first proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). An organisational field are 
'those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource or product consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products' (ibid: 
148). Central to the definition of organisational fields is that the organisations of 
which the field consists share common rules and values, or as Scott puts it (1994a: 
207-208), a 'common meaning system'. Organisational fields might partly consist of 
organisations belonging to one sector or industry, however, other organisations 
such as pressure groups or state agencies might have to be included. All in all, 
organisational fields 'must (therefore) be defined on the basis of empirical 
investigation' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148).
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Lastly, a further possible level of analysis is the 'Organisational Population' which is 
the focus of the Population Ecology Theory of Organisations. Populations are 
groups of organisations which face the same environmental constraints, which '(...) 
are relatively homogenous in terms of environmental vulnerability' (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977: 166; quoted in Scott, 1995: 56). In this context, it must be added, 
however, that the Population Ecology Theory has become subject to severe 
criticism (see Young, 1988). Accordingly, its definition of 'organization 
populations' is difficult to sustain.
2.2.2 The 'Organization as Institution' Approach
As previously noted, there are not many acclaimed applications of the 
'Organizations as Institutions' approach. In fact, Zucker (1987), focusing on the 
development of internal structures and work processes, seems to be the only 
theorist who has attempted to theoretically elaborate this approach. Thus, this 
section will mainly rely on her analysis. Nevertheless, many analyses of the 
behaviour and structure of organizations imply that the latter develop, or generate, 
their own distinct rules and procedures, and thus can be considered as broadly 
applying or supporting this view (see eg. Grinyer and Spender, 1979a; 1979b ; 
Oliver, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
According to theorists holding this view, institutionalisation takes place within the 
organisation. By generating or adopting institutionalised elements, organisations 
become more persistent and stable as the institutional elements are highly resistant 
to change (Zucker, 1977; 1987). This feature, however, might lead to both more 
and less efficiency. The rules adopted are likely to first lead to more efficient work 
processes in that evolving routines facilitate and accelerate work processes. 
However, these routines might lead to inefficiencies as their inherent stable 
character might prove as an impediment for the perception and/or adoption of new, 
more efficient procedures (Zucker, 1987; see also for a related view, Grinyer and 
Spender, 1979a; 1979b).
As Zucker (1987: 446) points out, institutions within organisations are developed 
either by the organization itself or imitated from similar organisations. The concept 
of coercive isomorphism, as held by 'Environment as Institution' theorists (eg. 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is precluded in the 'Organization as Institution' 
approach as the use of coercion onto the organization would imply that more 
attractive alternatives existed, and deinstitutionalization of internal organizational 
institutions would take place (Zucker, 1987: 446). As Zucker (ibid) explains.
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structures and processes created within organizations are 'more readily 
institutionalized than those embedded in alternative informal social coordination 
structures (Zucker 1977: 728-29, 1983: 16-18). Hence organizations are important 
sources of institutionalization of new action.' Indeed, structures and processes once 
institutionalised can lead to the creation of new, related institutions thereby 
'(infecting) other elements in a contagion of legitimacy' (Zucker, 1987: 446). 
Institutionalised rules within organizations thus, on the one hand, promote stability 
and, on the other hand, cause change in the immediate environment of and within 
the organization.
The generation of distinct rules within organizations is dependent on the 
configuration of the technical or institutional environment of the organizations (see 
eg. Oliver, 1991; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). As Tolbert (1987) suggests on the 
basis of findings from American law firms, the existence of intra-organizationai 
institutionalised rules is more likely if the organization faces a heterogenous 
environment with different or conflicting pressures. Nevertheless, as Zucker (1987: 
456) points out, the existence of internal rules is generally very likely due to firstly, 
the decoupling of structures and processes in the face of institutional pressures (see 
section 2.2.1); secondly, due to the fact that the ability of organizations to imitate 
one another is limited; and thirdly, because the role of the manager as creator of 
the institutional rules has to be viewed as critical.
In Zucker's eyes, the interpretation of organizations as collective actors, not only 
as adapting to their institutional environments but also to generating their own 
institutions is essential for three reasons (1987: 454): Firstly, she posits that a focus 
on the institutional environment alone means that it becomes problematic to 
explain the creation of a new social order. Secondly, the importance of the 
existence and resolution of various social realities forcing the individual to choose 
between them, would then be neglected. Thirdly, by not acknowledging the 
existence of institutionalised rules in organizations and thus by neglecting the 
generating ability of the collective, organizations are regarded as not affected by 
the interactions of the individuals of whom they consist.
According to Scott, the 'Organisation as Institution' approach is the 'micro­
perspective' or 'bottom-up' approach to institutional theory. It serves to explain 
differences among organisations as 'distinctive cultures are created as an adaption 
to particular personalities or as solutions to environmental pressures' (Scott, 1995: 
141).
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The recognition that organizations are generators of their own distinct institutions 
and not merely adaptive to external pressures suggests a different, more complex 
picture of institutional processes than proposed by theorists focusing on the 
'Environment as Institution' approach. As shown in the following, these approaches 
combined provide a more complete and -as evidence suggests- more realistic 
picture of the interactions of organizations and their environments.
2.3 Issues in Institutional Theories of Organizations
Issues in Institutional Theories are primarily related to the 'Environment as 
Institution' approach. In recent years, this approach has increasingly been criticised 
for its 'oversocialised view of individual behavior' (Zucker, 1987: 454). The 
'Organization as Institution' approach can, in fact, partly be interpreted as a 
response to this criticism. It represent an alternative approach which, however, 
must not be seen as exclusive but may well be combined with the 'Environment as 
Institution' approach.
The following three issues, thus, in their criticism of the 'Environment as 
Institution' approach, represent indirect support for the existence of institutions 
within organizations as well as for the argument to see these two approaches as 
complementary and not exclusive. As an extension to Zucker's (1987) elaboration 
of the 'Organization as Institution' approach (see section 2.2.2) it will be argued 
that the institutions within organizations are not only related to work routines and 
organizational structure but also to the strategic activities and behaviour of the 
organization.
2.3.1. Technical versus Institutional Influences on Organisations
A major contribution of Institutional Theories of Organisations as opposed to other 
mainstream theories is that they draw attention to the fact that organisational 
structures and processes are not merely subject to 'technical factors' such as size, 
degree of dependency, or the number of competitors. Rather, institutional theories 
point to the importance of institutionalised rules and values which shape 
organisations embedded in a particular context. According to Scott (1987b: 126), 
the technical, or task, environments can be defined as 'those in which organisations 
produce a product or service that is exchanged in a market so that they are 
rewarded for effective and efficient performance.' Institutional environments 'are 
characterised by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual 
organizations must conform in order to receive legitimacy and support.'
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Two main assumptions have been derived by theorists from the separation of 
technical and institutional factors. Firstly, an organization's legitimacy can be 
expected to be built not only on its ability to coordinate work processes efficiently, 
but also - and in some contexts even more so - on the extent to which they comply 
with the rules and norms existing within the wider institutional context in which 
they are embedded. Isomorphism with the environment can thus be of technical and 
institutional character: organisations which are subject to technical influences will, 
along with other organisations in the same field, strive for more efficiency (for 
further discussion of the notion of 'efficiency', see below) of their structures and 
processes. Organisations facing institutional pressures will organise their activities 
in line with institutionalised rules and norms to comply with what is institutionally 
perceived as the proper and appropriate 'way of doing things'. Secondly, a related 
point is that , as technical and institutional pressures are assumed by various 
theorists (eg. Meyer and Rowan, 1977) to be of different nature and 'demanding' 
different ways of behaviour of the organisation, the adoption of institutionalised 
norms may lead to technical inefficiencies (see above). This might lead the 
organisation to decouple its formal structure from its technical activities thus 
causing a divergence between formal and informal activities and procedures.
The distinction between technical and institutional pressures has led numerous 
theorists to assume that there are some organisations which are subject to 
institutional environments and others which are influenced by technical 
environments. Private, or market-oriented, organisations were generally regarded 
as shaped by technical pressures thus striving for efficiency, whereas public 
organisations - educational organisations, hospitals and the like - were depicted as 
institutionally determined, aiming at institutional legitimacy (see eg. Zucker, 1987: 
145). Most case studies in institutional theory have accordingly been undertaken 
on public organisations. This rigid distinction between different environments and 
groups of organisations is clearly misleading. Firstly, the separation of technical 
and institutional influences can prove difficult as technical requirements might be a 
result of institutionalised values, or as new technical achievements might later on 
become institutionalised (Scott, 1983). Furthermore, as Scott points out (1983; 
1987b; 1995), technical and institutional environments should not be regarded as 
dichotomies, as mutually exclusive. Scott posits (1983: 159) that all organisations 
are, to some degree, institutionalised: 'Both types of environments vary from 
strong to weak, and all organizations are subject, at least to some degree, to both 
technical and social/cultural forces.' In a later work, Scott (1987: 126) depicts this 
interdependence of technical and institutional influences by way of a matrix
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structure of influences. He distinguishes four categories: organisations determined 
by both stronger technical and stronger institutional environments (eg. banks), 
organisations subject to stronger technical and weaker institutional environments 
(eg. manufacturing organisations), organisations influenced by weaker technical 
and stronger institutional environments (eg. schools or churches) and, finally, 
organisations with both weaker technical and weaker institutional influences (eg. 
restaurants).
Recently, this basic distinction between technical and institutional environments has 
come under criticism. As Whitley (1992a) posits, technical or market- efficiency is 
itself institutionally determined and can thus not be separated from institutional 
pressures. In his study on the business recipes in East Asian countries he thus 
abstains from 'drawing a distinction between technical and institutional 
isomorphism'. Rather, his suiwey '(...) focuses on the ways that different 
institutional environments generate different kinds of technically efficient business 
recipes (...). Social institutions, in this view, are key phenomena in the constitution 
of different competitive orders and should not be counterposed to market 
efficiency.'
Whitley's claim seems justified for the following reason: if the technically efficient 
structuring of work processes is assumed to be market-determined then it can be 
argued that the market itself and thus all the processes and rules within the market 
are institutionalised actions and rules. From these rules is derived the expectation 
of society that a manufacturing organisation has to be structured in a technically 
efficient way. Other, non market-oriented organisations, such as schools or 
churches, are, on the contrary expected to comply with societal rules. Although the 
nature of the expectations is different, their origin is both institutional. Whitley's 
criticism that all processes in a society are socially constituted, seems to lead into 
the direction of the 'societal effect' approach by Maurice et al. (1980) and Sorge 
and Warner (1986). The latter theorists link structures and processes within 
manufacturing organisations to a wider 'societal logic'. Procedures within the 
organisation are intertwined with societal institutional processes, there are no 
dependent and independent variables, rather, everything is part of a complex 
interactive process.
With his criticism, Whitley draws attention to the relative meaning of 'efficiency'. 
What one society might consider as efficient might not be so in the eyes of another 
society. We thus have to be aware that the assumption that institutional rules might 
lead to inefficiencies is only correct if we disassociate the meaning of the term
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'efficiency' from the societal contexts in which they are embedded. In this context, 
it has to be remarked that the term 'efficiency' is used by various theorists in many 
different ways, and that the theorists generally fail to provide a working definition 
of the term (see eg. Meyer and Scott, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Whitley, 
1992ay
Scott (1987b: 126) seems to link efficiency in its extreme form to the definition 
provided by economists in their interpretation of competitive markets. Meyer and 
Rowan (1977: 355) refer to possible additional costs incurring as a result of the 
implementation of institutionalised rules which, in their eyes, lead to a decrease in 
efficiency. As Institutional Theories of Organisations attempt to mainly explain the 
behaviour of organizations or groups o f organizations in response to or in 
interaction with the institutional environment, we can assume that theorists in this 
tradition do not deal with the concept of allocative efficiency which would 
incorporate the needs and welfare of consumers *. It thus seems plausible to 
assume that institutional theorists refer to the notion of'economic efficiency' which 
is defined as (Parkin, 1990: 307) the 'situation in which the cost of producing a 
given output is minimised.' Producers aim to achieve economic efficiency as it 
implies profit maximization. To attain economic efficiency, they have to ensure that 
the inputs needed for production are not overpriced and used in 'cost-minimising 
proportions' (ibid). Furthermore, they have to achieve technological efficiency, ie. 
that from a given input the maximum output possible is produced. In this context, 
however, it has to be noted that technological efficiency implies the production of 
what is technologically feasible to produce. This might not necessarily be 
economically efficient. However, 'something that is economically efficient is always 
technologically efficient' (Parkin, 1990: 221).
If we understand 'efficiency' in the sense of 'economic efficiency', then clearly, 
organisations which adopt institutional rules might run the risk of them being 
inefficient in the purely economic sense. Examples of this would be the 
introduction of ecologically friendly technological processes which might increase 
the cost of production; or, Shell and Esso's abandoning of the plan to dispose of 
'Brent Spar' in the North Sea due to public pressure which, economically (as well 
as ecologically according to the companies) is the most favourable option. And 
although different societies might posit different, socially constructed, notions of 
efficient work processes, relatively speaking, we could then compare the society's
* Although the comparative analysis of allocative efficiency as constrained by institutions would 
certainly represent an interesting research task.
24
notion to the economic definition and thus evaluate the relative efficiency of work 
processes and structures. This would help us understand the - institutionally 
determined - relative success of various organizations within a country, or between 
countries (see eg. Lane, 1989). The latter seems especially constructive, as 
organisations increasingly compete internationally and their 'competitiveness' and 
(economic) efficiency become more and more relative within a wider, global 
context.
In this connection, however, we have to note that even if a measure implemented 
seems at first sight economically inefficient, it might still be 'economically 
beneficial', if we understand 'efficiency' in a different way. This is clearly shown by 
Abrahamson. In his analysis of the diffusion of inefficient innovations, he states 
(1991:609, emphases added):'Fads and fashions may benefit organisations if they 
are symbolically efficient; if, for example, they project an image of innovativeness 
(Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984). Although these expressive functions have intrinsic 
value, they may also be economically beneficial. An innovation that makes an 
organization appear innovative or ethical, for instance, may help it either to raise 
capital from other organizations or to attract customers. ' Therefore, the distinction 
between technical and institutional pressures should not be opposed entirely as 
done by Whitley (1992a), as it illustrates well the possible relative efficiency of 
organisations in different contexts. In this study, therefore, the distinction will be 
applied.
2.3.2 Adaption Versus Active Agency and Self-Interest
Early institutionalists tended to view the institutional environment as determining 
the structures and processes of organisations in such a way that organisations had 
no possibility but to comply. Organisations were expected to adopt institutionalised 
rules and norms thus becoming isomorphic with their environments and to each 
other. This deterministic view has been criticised by several theorists (see 
eg.Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Perrow, 1986; Scott, 1995; 
Zucker, 1987). Since those early assumptions, empirical evidence has led theorists 
in the institutional tradition to realise that organisations sometimes differ in their 
structures and processes and that thus the degree of adoption of institutionalised 
rules is different among organisations, being subject to organisation-specific 
circumstances. Furthermore, in contrast to the deterministic view, research 
revealed that the likely response of organisations to environmental pressures does 
not necessarily have to be adaption. Rather, organisations seem to have different
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possibilities of response to these pressures , either alone or collectively with other 
organisations. These recent notions will be outlined in the following.
Likelihood o f Institutional Interpenetration o f Organisations
Various theorists have analysed why organisations differ in their degree of 
institutional interpenetration. A variety of these studies will be outlined below and 
their main implications summarised subsequently.
Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) point out the possible resistance of organisations to 
institutional pressures analysing the behaviour of subsidiaries of multinational 
companies in national institutional environments. In their view, these subsidiaries 
face dual presssures as they have to comply with the national institutional 
environment as well as with the norms of behaviour within the corporation. 
Depending on factors such as the extent to which its headquarter keeps control 
over its subsidiary, the dependency on other subsidiaries, the nature of the industry 
as such, the cultural distance between the headquarters and the subsidiary or the 
nature of the national institutional environment a full isomorphism with the national 
environment becomes more or less likely. In addition, Rosenzweig and Singh draw 
attention to the fact that not all parts of the organisation may be affected equally 
strongly by institutional pressures.
Oliver (1991) develops five different types of strategic responses an organisation 
can pursue facing institutional pressures. As she points out, the compliance of an 
organisation with its institutional environment depends on both its 'willingness and 
ability to conform (...). The scope conditions under which organizations are willing 
to conform are bounded by organizational scepticism, political self-interest, and 
organizational control (.,.). The scope conditions under which organisations are 
able to conform are bounded by organizational capacity, conflict, and awareness' 
(Oliver, 1991; 159; emphases added). With her analysis, Oliver clearly draws 
attention to the fact that the nature of institutional pressures can differ, and do not 
necessarily require the organisation's compliance. This part or full resistance on the 
part of the organisation may, for example, be the result of conflicting institutional 
pressures in the way that various interest groups posit different norms and beliefs. 
The organisation upon which the pressure is exerted, then has to decide 
consciously which norms to follow. On the other hand, it might sometimes be 
favourable for the organisation to follow norms that are not actively or coercively 
imposed, in order to gain public support. Also in this case, the company will act 
consciously under consideration of its own capabilities and self-interest.
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The fact that the adaption of institutionalised rules and norms is subject to the 
organisation's willingness to conform is underpinned by the study by Aldrich and 
Fiol (1994). They show that newly established organisations have possibilities 
other than pure adaption to institutionalised rules and norms by actively reshaping 
their institutional environments.
Furthermore, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) show with their study of the diffusion of 
civil service reform in the United States, that the adoption of an institutionalised 
rule is subject to its degree of institutionalisation. The authors distinguish two ways 
of how a measure becomes highly institutionalised. On the one hand, 
institutionalisation can be achieved by legal imposition, on the other hand by 
diffusion and widespread acceptance.
According to Zucker (1987: 451) the interpenetration of organisations by the 
institutional environment is subject to internal goals and values, the legitimacy of 
external control and the relative control or power of the organisation. Zucker 
posits that an organisation with internal goals and values which are strikingly 
different from those of its environment is most likely to change its values and adopt 
those institutionalised within its environment. Secondly, organisations might 
attempt to actively manipulate its institutional environment in which case the 
legitimacy of external control might be modified. Lastly, the influence of the 
institutional environment is negatively related to the organisation's control over its 
own boundaries. A vertically integrated organisation, for instance, is less subject to 
pressures exercised by the environment than those not integrated.
As the above outlined studies show, it is wrong to assume that organisations 
necessarily adapt to institutional pressures. Rather, it seems more appropriate to 
picture the process of institutional interpenetration as one where external pressures 
confront internal values and structures. The latter are shaped by various specific 
factors such as the organisation's being part of a multinational or a newly 
established industry. In these cases, as Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) as well as 
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) reveal, the probability of the organisation's adaption cannot 
be based on the same assumptions as could be the adaption by an entirely local or 
established firm, and thus requires an alternative interpretation. Moreover, the 
nature of the institutional pressure as well as the result of adapting to it must be 
considered. Flere, the organisational self-interest comes into play. In this context, 
the adoption of state-imposed mles is not likely to be rejected because it is very 
likely to result in a loss of legitimacy. To this must be added, though, that
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organisations might be able to influence the state bodies prior to the 
implementation of a rule, and that consequently, this rule might already be shaped 
according to the needs and capabilities of the organisation (see eg. Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1988; see also following section). Lastly, it must be considered that the 
departments of an organisation might be affected by institutions to a varying 
degree depending on their task.
Possible Responses to Institutional Pressures
The possible responses of an organisation to institutional pressures have been 
outlined comprehensively by Oliver (1991). She distinguishes five types of strategic 
responses an organisation can pursue in the face of institutional pressures: 
acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and/or manipulate. However, as Scott (1995: 
124-125) points out, despite a likely variation in the organisation's response, the 
responses to institutional pressures are themselves institutionally determined. As he 
states, 'it is also important to recognize the extent to which institutional 
environments influence and delimit what strategies organizations can use. Just as 
institutions constitute organizations, they also constitute what are their appropriate 
ways of acting, including acts that are responses to institutional pressures (...). Not 
only structures but also strategies are institutionally shaped.'
However, organisations might, in turn, be able to proactively shape this very 
institutional scope within which they are to act. An example of this is given by 
Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) who in their study on the University of Wisconsin 
show that an organisation might be capable of influencing an institutional rule prior 
to its imposition. In their study, Covaleski and Dirsmith reveal that the institutional 
expectations were from the start actively shaped by both officials of the State of 
Wisconsin and its university so that the 'resulting societal expectations were quite 
specific, proceduralized, and enforceable' (ibid: 583). In this case, the university, 
through its active participation in the development of the rules ensured that the 
institutional scope emerging was also in its own interest and feasible.
Finally, in terms of organisational responses we must consider that organisations 
tend to respond on a collective basis regarding issues of greater concern. 
Accordingly, Scott (1995: 124-125) extends Oliver's (1991) argument by adding 
the importance of collective responses by a number of organisations to the 
individual organisational responses as outlined by Oliver. The groups of 
organisations Scott describes might either be part of a whole sector or a trade 
association. All in all, he supposes that collective responses are probably 'more
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often the rule than the exception' (Scott, 1995: 124-125). However, as he 
concludes, collective and individual responses are not exclusive concepts but may 
both be followed.
All in all, it can be concluded, as Scott puts it (1995: 132), that 'organizations are 
affected, even penetrated, by their environments, but they are also capable of 
responding to these influence attempts creatively and strategically. By acting in 
concert with other organizations facing similar pressures, organizations can 
sometimes counter, curb, circumvent, or redefine these demands. And collective 
action does not preclude individual attempts to reinterpret, manipulate, challenge, 
or defy the authoritative claims made on them. Organizations are creatures of their 
institutional environments, but most modern organizations are constituted as active 
players, not passive pawns.'
2.4 Cross-Cultural Comparisons in the Institutional Tradition
Several cross-cultural studies have applied a largely institutional approach in order 
to explain differences among the organisations analysed. A great number of these 
have used the 'Environment as Institution' approach and thus explained national 
variations in organisational structures and processes as rooted in the institutional 
environment in which they are embedded (see eg. Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1992a; 
1992b, 1992c). Furthermore, most studies have analysed organisation stmctures 
and internal features such as education of staff or management-subordinate 
relations. Only few studies have dealt with organisational strategies or business 
recipes. In the following, an outline of a selection of cross-cultural studies will be 
given.
In his study on East Asia, Whitley (1992a) compares business recipes of the 
Japanese, Korean and Chinese societies. As he defines, 'these business recipes, or 
systems, are particular ways of organizing, controlling and directing business 
enterprises that become established as the dominant focus of business organization 
in different societies. They reflect successful patterns of business behaviour and 
understandings of how to achieve economic success that are reproduced and 
reinforced by crucial institutions' (ibid: 125). Whitley's focus of analysis is the 
nature of firms as economic actors encompassing the skills and activities 
coordinated by firms, the nature of market organization including market 
relationships among firms or with suppliers and the nature of internal authoritative 
coordination and control systems of firms. Whitley shows how variations in these 
elements lead to nationally distinctive business recipes among the countries
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analysed. He thereby contradicts perceptions of 'universally successful' business 
recipes across all societies. Indeed, Whitley argues that 'successful forms of 
business organization develop interdependently with dominant social institutions 
and therefore differ significantly where these do' (1992a: 122). And he goes further 
in deriving from this basic assumption that the efficiency of management structures 
and practices itself is relative, being subject to societal rules and norms of 
behaviour, As explained in a previous section, Whitley thus opposes the distinction 
between technical and institutional environments drawn by institutionalists.
Finally, Whitley states that the distinctiveness of societal business recipes depends 
on the homogeneity of the institutions within the societies analysed. In contrast to 
the East Asian countries where business recipes seem to differ between but not 
within societies, in Western Europe and North America, the importance of 
industry-specific features seems to lead to a different picture. However, as Whitley 
points out (1992a: 135), 'the variability of industry recipes depends on the 
differentiation of industrial contexts (...) thus, as many contexts are similar so too 
can industry recipes be expected to be similar to an extent.' He thus relates the 
prominence of dominant societal business recipes to the nature of major social 
institutions such as the state, the educational system or the labour market.
Lane (1989) analyses how manufacturing companies in Britain, France and 
Germany differ in their organisational structures and processes and how the 
differences are rooted in 'cultural specificity, expressed in, and reinforced by, 
different institutional frameworks' (Lane: 292). The interdependence between 
organisational structures and processes and the institutional environment, however, 
cannot be depicted in a 'linear cause-effect pattern.' Rather, as institutions 
continuously influence and reinforce each other, 'it is more appropriate to speak of 
a circular (pattern) of continual mutual interaction.' In line with Whitley (1992a; 
1992b), Lane points to the critical importance of history in explaining national 
distinctive structures and processes.
Lane argues that despite the superficial similarity between Britain, France and 
Germany and their common membership of the (then still) European Economic 
Community a more thorough analysis shows that 'there has occurred relatively little 
convergence towards a common European type, but that superficially common 
structural arrangements hide enduringly distinctive national ways of going about 
and organizing industrial production.' These distinctive ways have historically 
evolved and are rooted especially in the period of industrialisation. Brtain came to 
industrialise fairly slowly and without greater societal upheavals so that
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institutional rules could persist. The long laissez-faire tradition of British policy­
making has led to an institutionalised system based on individualism and self­
regulation. Germany, on the contrary, has gone through various major crises and 
was restructured completely after the Second World War. These national 
upheavals led to the repeated destruction and new development of institutionalised 
patterns.
Finally, Lane raises the question of how industrial change can be effected 
considering the highly complex and distinct national institutional patterns. She 
elaborates two problems in this context. Firstly, the historical origin of institutions 
and their taken-for-granted character render change impossible unless the whole 
institutional fabric is destroyed (ibid: 293). This, however, is difficult as their 
interdependent character requires an event equal to a 'national crisis' to effect 
changes. Secondly, the interdependence and complexity of institutional structures 
render it difficult to decide where to start changing, or as she puts it, 'where to 
break into the circle' (ibid: 194). Nevertheless, as she reveals, varying examples 
have shown that the implementation of foreign practices and thus the break 
through the national patterns can be successful, as happened in the case of the 
adoption of (modified) Management by Objectives practices in Germany and 
France.
In a related study on business systems in the manufacturing sectors of Britain and 
Germany, Lane (1992) shows how the nature of firms and the way they grow, the 
organisation of the market, the systems of control and coordination and 
employment and personnel practices are shaped by national institutions such as the 
state, the financial system and the educational system, among others. Lane points 
out that the roots of the differences lie in the way the systems evolved historically 
(see also Lane, 1989). In this context she explains that since World War II, the 
German state system has been built on democratic principles with an underlying 
system of consensus. The latter becomes obvious in many ways, through the party 
system which fosters coalitions, through the non-adversarial relationship between 
trade unions and employers, or through a comprehensive network connecting 
industry with trade associations and Chambers of Commerce. Another distinctive 
feature of the German system has been the stable economic framework provided by 
the state. In Britain, the state has traditionally been very centralised and since the 
1980s, the power of local governments has been undermined even more. The 
electoral system prevents coalitions and results in policies which potentially can 
change drastically from one government to the next. Government policies have 
traditionally been short-termist and piecemeal, especially in the area of Industrial
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Policy (see also Lane, 1989). The legitimacy of government policies is not very 
high as their decisions do not necessarily have to be based on a majority vote or 
agreed upon with other parties, such as trade unions and the like. Overall, this 
leads to a fairly unstable environment for businesses which has resulted in firms 
strongly believing in a 'hands-off policy.
Lane arrives at the conclusion that German, relative to British, firms in the 
manufacturing sector, benefit from an institutional context in which capital, 
personnel and technical know-how is easily accessible and the productive 
combination of these factors is encouraged. British firms, on the contrary, are 
overall more institutionally isolated. In Lane's eyes, the comparison of Britain and 
Germany underpins clearly the increasingly held notion that institutional 
frameworks can be a determining factor regarding the competitive advantage or 
disadvantage of an organisation, and thus has to be regarded as an additional factor 
of production *.
In a comparative study of British, French and West German manufacturing units, 
Maurice, Sorge and Warner (1980) use what they name a 'societal effect' approach. 
In contrast to these theories they posit that organisational structures and processes 
are interdependent with distinct societal factors. The distinction between the 
environment and the organisation, as undertaken in most comparative studies, has 
to be abandoned as intraorganisational features are socially constituted. The 
authors' data is structured into three different areas - the configuration of the 
organisation, including how the labour force is divided into categories and how 
these are numerically related, the work structuring and organisation and the 
qualification and career systems. Maurice et al. relate differences between these 
variables in the contexts analysed to societal features, or the 'macro-area' (p. 80).
In a later study, Sorge and Warner (1986) develop the societal-effect approach 
further constructing a comprehensive theoretical framework of analysis. With the 
latter, they explain differences between manufacturing organisations in Britain and 
West Germany. Their focus of analysis are the respective factory organisations, the 
education and training practices and industrial relations. Sorge and Warner view 
the distinct features of the factories analysed as part of a wider social network of 
interdependent factors: '(...) there appears to be a close interaction between factors
* Although, at the moment, the question is whether the German institutional framework still 
leads to a comparative advantage. It seems that at the current times of increasing international 
competition, Britain has a good chance of creating internationally competitive industries, due to 
its lower costs and lesser degree of regulation.
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in different spheres of society which follows a logic upon which the identity of a 
particular society is built' (p. 184). This societal logic is characterised by a high 
degree of stability, so that 'differences (between the countries) may change over 
time, but they will not be diminished.'
The societal effect-approach differs from those applied by Lane and Whitley in that 
all factors are assumed to be interdependent. Whereas Lane and Whitley do focus 
on the importance of a few, distinct institutions and compare the vaiying influences 
of these on organisations among societies, the concept of Maurice and his 
colleagues is much wider and more intertwined.
2.5 Conclusions
In their focus on institutional structures and their influence on and within 
organisations, Institutional Theories of Organisations combine parts of both 
contingency and ideational theories. In doing so they avoid the one-sided 
perspectives of the latter approaches. On the one hand. Institutional Theories are 
cultural in that they acknowledge the existence of belief systems within societies or 
cultures. These, however, are viewed as manifested in the institutional frameworks 
outside and within organisations. On the other hand, institutionalists do 
acknowledge that producers strive for efficiency, however, theorists posit that 
economic efficiency might not be the primary goal of organisations, and that the 
latters' underlying economic rationality may be socially constituted (see Whitley, 
1992a). Institutionalists thus expect a possible resemblance of organisational 
structures and processes to be due not to contingency or ideational factors alone 
but posit that they are based upon a similarly evolved and constituted institutional 
framework. Equally, societies might resemble each other in certain aspects, 
however might be entirely different in others. Because Institutional Theories avoid 
the pitfalls of Contingency and Ideational Theories in this way, they provide an 
especially sound basis for cross-cultural comparisons as they neither give an 
'undersocialised' nor an 'oversocialised' account of cross-national variations and 
resemblances.
As to the different notions of Institutional Theories, the literature reviewed in this 
chapter has shown that it does not seem sufficient to regard organizations and their 
environment as separate and neither to see organisations as mainly adaptive to 
environmental pressures. Rather, organisations might be able to shape the 
institutional scope within which they are to act by negotiating and cooperating with 
other organisations or with the state on the basis of their own generated rules and
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norms. We thus have to depict organisations and institutional agents as involved in 
a 'complex interactive process' (Scott, 1995: 143) with different levels of 
institutionalised rules, where the institutional pressures confront the beliefs and 
processes of individual organisations and groups of organisations. As Scott puts it 
(ibid, emphases added), 'under some conditions, organizational models are 
produced by interaction and negotiation processes involving institutional agents 
and organizational participants. '
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3 The Concept of Business Recipes
The purpose o f this chapter is to outline the notion o f organisational Business 
Recipes, the second underlying theory o f this research, as a response and 
alternative to other mainstream theories on business strategies and the behaviour 
o f organisations. After a brief introduction, a general outline o f the theory is 
provided. Subsequently, an overview o f the empirical evidence supporting the 
notion is given. Finally , a conclusion is provided as to the appropriateness and 
applicability o f this concept.
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, organisational and economic theories viewing managers as rational 
actors whose purpose is limited to making analytical decisions about their 
company's strategic activities, have come under increasing criticism. Theorists such 
as Huff (1982) or Spender (1989) have drawn attention to the complexity of the 
managerial task and the uncertainty that make a systematic analysis as proposed by 
'classic' theories (Spender, 1989) unrealistic. Research into the cognitive character 
of managerial activity, viewing managers as creators of their own rationality, has 
become more and more popular during the past two decades. Theorists in this 
tradition (see eg. Huff, 1982; Calori et al, 1992; Grinyer and Spender, 1979a;b) 
emphasise the social construction of organisations and the impact of shared beliefs, 
eg. at the industry or society level, on the managers' beliefs and consequently on 
the structures and activities of organisations. These theorists agree on basic 
assumptions, however, the foci of their analyses vary as well as the terms they 
choose for the phenomena observed or theoretically elaborated. In the following, 
the term 'business recipe' will be used to define the general notion of cognition at 
all levels. Reference to particular levels of cognition will be made if appropriate.
A full review of studies on business recipes is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead, a review of those theorists will be provided whose studies have been 
critical in bringing forward this notion as well as being complementary in terms of 
the aspects of cognition upon which they concentrate.
Hellgren and Melin (1992) have provided a classification of the different strands of 
theories concerned with business recipes. They divide these into two categories; 
those theories that emphasise the importance of the wider institutional and social 
context in which the organisations are embedded (eg. Whitley, 1992a; 1992b), and 
those that stress the existence of collective cognitive beliefs which shape the
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behaviour of groups of organisations as well as individual organisations within the 
group (eg. Huff, 1982; Spender, 1989). In Hellgren and Melin's words the first 
classified notion 'describes mainly an institutional configuration, while (...) (the 
second notion) describes the ideational and cognitive structure of an organisational 
context' (Hellgren and Melin, 1992: 194).
This classification, however, seems misleading. All theorists base their concepts on 
the creation of reality the actors pursue. This involves the interpretation of cues 
received from the environment, and the externalisation of this interpretation via 
action. The interpretation might thus become part of an abstract, objective reality 
as others adopt it as the 'way of doing things'. In this context, Whitley's analysis of 
business systems is rooted as much in the creation of reality as is the existence of 
collective beliefs at the organisational or industry level. Both belief systems can 
lead, and have led to the establishment of organisations as manifestations of wider 
beliefs. At the society level, for instance, beliefs have led to the establishment of 
distinct national educational institutions (eg. Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1992a; 1992b) 
or the state system. At the industry level, organisations such as trade associations 
have been established. A distinction on the grounds that Hellgren and Melin (1992) 
propose thus does not seem appropriate. Rather, the categories established by the 
authors belong to a whole group of influences from subgroup-level to society- and 
world system-level which all, in one way or another, shape the structures and 
processes of groups and individuals. The difference lies more in the level of 
influence, or 'frame of reference' (Calori et al, 1992) analysed than in the 
configuration of these influences, as beliefs and institutions manifesting these 
beliefs exist at all levels.
3.2 The Concept of Business Recipes
Theorists in the cognitive tradition build their concepts on the assumption that 
managers are facing an uncertain and complex environment. The manager's main 
activity is thus not the systematic analysis of data, as economic theories suggest. In 
fact, as Grinyer and Spender put it (1979b: 114), 'management's information is 
invariably fragmentary, ambiguous, and riddled with uncertainty; and this proves to 
be a damning critique of the systematic approach.’ In order to be able to make 
decisions, the manager has to compensate for the lack of information he faces. 
Spender (1989: 58) suggests that the manager goes through a two-step process to 
formulate a viable strategy: firstly, he or she resolves the uncertainty, creating a 
rationality which represents the frame for the second step where, within this 
rationality, he or she analyses the strategic options of his or her organisation. Porac
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et al (1989) posit a similar model when they explain that there is a material and 
cognitive level of transactions with the market. In this context, the manager is seen 
as creating his or her own mental model regarding business competition, including 
the selection of rivals, and the definition of market boundaries. Subsequently, he or 
she then undertakes material or technical decisions such as the selection of the 
product range, of raw materials etc. (eg. Porac et al, 1989). During the first step, 
the manager thus creates his or her own understanding of the environment of the 
company and the role of the company within this defined environment. Thus, the 
fact that the assumption of systematic analysis is unrealistic does not imply the 
irrationality of managers. Rather, the latter act within the limits of their own 
cognition and the context of action in which they are embedded (Calori et al, 
1992). They create their own rationality of their situation.
In order to be able to resolve the uncertainty and create a rationality, managers, 
according to Spender (1989) and Grinyer and Spender (1979a; 1979b) have to rely 
on their 'managerial judgement'. This judgement represents 'that which leaps 
beyond what can be legitimately justified by the evidence, making up for its 
deficiencies' (Grinyer and Spender, 1979b: 115). The managerial judgement, in this 
context, is rooted in general patterns of belief concerning the organisation and its 
environment. These patterns are partly based upon personal, or idiosyncratic, 
beliefs of the manager, partly held at a wider, collective level.
Authors analysing managers' cognition have focused on different levels of 
collective beliefs. As Beyer (1981: 166) points out, within organisations there 
exists a 'relatively coherent set of beliefs that bind people together and that explain 
their worlds in terms of cause and effect relations' (quoted in Calori et al, 1992: 
62). These cognitive dimensions at the organisational level might be subject to 
variations within organisations. However, as Calori et al (1992: 63) stress, the set 
of beliefs within organisations can be expected to be more coherent than those 
between organisations. The existence of collective beliefs applies equally to the 
industry level (Huff, 1982; Spender, 1989). According to Spender (1989), 
industries are characterised by a common set of beliefs, the 'industry recipe', which 
distinguishes this particular industry from others. Calori et al (1992) name this set 
of beliefs the 'industry frame of reference'. Apart from this, managers might draw 
their judgements from beliefs in other industries (Huff, 1982). Furthermore, 
collective beliefs have been found in subgroups within the industry (Huff, 1982; 
Porac et al. 1989; 1995). Lastly, collective beliefs exist at the society level 
(Whitley, 1992a; 1992b).
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The notion of collective beliefs at whichever level is based on the assumption that 
individuals communicate and exchange their beliefs and experiences, or in the 
words of Grinyer and Spender who refer to the industry recipe, that 'there are 
extremely powerful patterns of interorganizational communication' (Grinyer and 
Spender, 1979b: 117). As the authors point out, evidence in numerous cases 
suggests that contacts among senior executives of companies are widespread. 
Furthermore, trade associations and government bodies represent a forum for the 
exchange of information. As Huff (1982) notes in addition, media and professional 
bodies, such as consultants, encourage the further spread of information and 
beliefs.
Irrespective of where the pattern of beliefs is located, authors agree that their 
purpose is to provide a limited view of the otherwise too complex world. To the 
strategic manager, they are a valuable source of consultation. The patterns of belief 
consist of ideas which are considered as relevant to the context in question thereby 
serving as a 'powerful orienting framework' (Grinyer and Spender, 1979b: 117). In 
this context, the collective beliefs, or recipes, should not be interpreted as 
prescribing which action to take. On the contrary, as Grinyer and Spender point 
out in their analysis of industry-level beliefs, 'the strategic decision process must 
remain at the level of the firm, reflecting its policy objectives, limited resources, 
and historical, position. But the outcome is a plan whose fundamental rationality is 
shared within the industry, beyond the specific company' (ibid: 118). Firms, being 
member of a collective, in this case an industry, can thus pursue different strategies 
which, however, are based on the same rationality or 'recipe' shared among 
members within the group. From this follows that the recipe has to be broadly 
defined in order to accommodate varying interests and ideas. Indeed, as Spender 
explains (1989: 190), the recipe is most likely to be inconsistent as this enables it 
to accommodate changes in beliefs, as industry is learning, and to remain flexible.
Collective beliefs at industry level are, according to various theorists, a particularly 
important concept. As Huff (1982: 124) posits, industry-wide experiences can lead 
to the generation of 'a particularly rich set of strategic concepts. It is this set of 
concepts that has both the variety and the niche-specific focus to allow more 
sophisticated variants of strategy to emerge.' The consideration of industry- 
experience thus leads to more elaborated and refined strategies, which, in the 
defined market, are more likely to succeed. From the point of view of the manager, 
the industry-wide beliefs are regarded as professional common sense (Spender, 
1989). Grinyer and Spender define the industry recipe as 'those rules of thumb 
which are generally accepted by competent managers as the common-sense way of
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doing business within their particular industry. Such rules cover marketing, pricing, 
customer relations, product support, product quality, production methods, 
industrial relations, training, financial controls and so forth; i.e. whatever is taken 
to be important in that industry' (1979b: 196). As the industry recipe represents a 
view of the world shared by most members within the industry the manager feels 
assured and comfortable when basing his decisions on it (Grinyer and Spender, 
1979b: 176).
As far as the influence of industry-wide beliefs is concerned. Spender goes so far as 
to state that the industry level becomes the 'organization's primary analytic 
environment. The broader socio-economic environment is secondary, acting on the 
firm through the recipe, the industry's collective response' (Spender, 1989: 66). 
This, however, seems to be a too limited view of influences on managerial 
perception. Although in the case of general strategic differentiation, organisations 
have been shown to resort to subtle changes in their product range as compared 
with their rivals (Porac et al, 1995), fundamental innovations are most likely to be 
influenced by or imitated from other organisations outside the industry (Huff, 
1982). The society-level consists of many such industries and organisations which 
represent a whole variety of possible strategic responses to the complexity of the 
environment. Apart from these, the personal history of the strategic manager plays 
an important role. In this context, although it is possible that the manager has 
gained experience within only one company or within other organisations 
belonging to the same industry or group, this does not necessarily have to be the 
case. Therefore, rather than depicting the industry recipe as a mediator or 'channel' 
between the broader socio-economic environment and the individual organisation, 
it should be understood as one pool of shared knowledge from which the manager 
can draw and which certainly offers especially attractive solutions to the problems 
he or she faces. Apart from this pool of beliefs, however, there are others which 
the manager might consult in the process of strategy formulation (cf. Calori et al, 
1992; Huff; 1982).
To conclude, in order to build their own rationality upon which to found their 
strategy, the managers are likely to draw from their own personal experience, from 
collective beliefs at the organisation level, from industry or group-wide beliefs, and 
from society-wide beliefs. Not merely the industry recipe, but all these various 
patterns of beliefs together 'can be visualized as a multiplicity of constraints 
defining a feasible solution space within which the firm's strategy must be located. 
Thus, as Normann (1976) also argues, the business idea or recipe based strategy
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can only, in the final analysis, be expressed as a pattern of tangible activity' 
(Grinyer and Spender, 1979b: 130).
A number of issues arise from the concept of business recipes:
Organisational Reorientation
Theorists in the business recipe tradition draw attention to the fact that the 
failure or success of an organisation is likely to be subject to the viability (for a 
discussion regarding the notion of success and viability, see section 3.4) of the 
underlying 'recipe' (Grinyer and Spender, 1979a; 1979b) or 'strategic frame' 
(Huff 1982). As Grinyer and Spender (1979b: 118) explain, models of 
organisational reorientation, based on empirical data, have shown similar 
features 'in that they involve cyclical patterns of commitment, elaboration of the 
recipe adopted by the firm, and its ultimate demise.' A new recipe might 
develop by innovating, which, however, is difficult and risky. Most companies 
thus tend to imitate other, successful organisations (Grinyer and Spender, 
1979b; Huff 1982).
• Rivalry and Competition
According to theorists in the business recipe tradition, competition is a 
cognitive construct created by organisations within a - cognitively constructed 
- market (see eg. Huff, 1982; Porac et al., 1989; 1995; Whitley, 1992a; b). It 
thus does not exist merely because firms are similar, which would objectify the 
notion of similiarity, but because they perceive each other as similar on the 
basis of certain characteristics (Porac et al., 1995). In this sense, market 
structure thus becomes 'an endogenous product o f  managerial minds' (ibid: 
224).
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3.3 Empirical Evidence
Theorists in the business recipe tradition base their concepts on the assumption that 
managers define cognitively their market environment and derive from this 
construction the role of their organisation within the market. From this assumption 
follows that the examination of managers' beliefs and perceptions is critical to 
understanding the working of organisations and markets (see eg. Huff, 1982; 
Spender, 1989). Accordingly, the whole concept is based upon empirical evidence 
as conclusions on managerial cognition are drawn upon the basis of case studies.
As explained above, various authors have found evidence for the existence of 
'recipes' or 'frames of 'reference' (Calori et al, 1992) and their influence on 
managerial thinking. In this context, shared beliefs were found regarding the 
definition of markets and of competitors, the latter on the basis of few central 
criteria (Porac et al, 1995), of appropriate strategies regarding factors such as 
capital and cash flow decisions, production and distribution (Hellgren and Melin, 
1992; Spender, 1989), of the structure of the market (Porac et al, 1989; 1995) or 
of the future of the industry (Calori et al, 1992). Furthermore, evidence has been 
found that recipes are subject to change over time (Grinyer andSpender, 1979a; 
Hellgren and Melin, 1992; Huff, 1982).
Especially noteworthy is the study by Calori et al (1992) who analyse the influence 
of collective beliefs at different levels on the perception of managers in France and 
Britain, On the basis of evidence found, the authors develop an integrative model 
of possible influences on managerial perceptions as to the structure and dynamics 
of their industry. Calori et al reveal in their results Industry Frames of Reference as 
well as Main Country Frames of Reference. With regard to the former, managers in 
all industries 'employ some common concepts to make sense of the structure and 
dynamics of their different industries' (Calori et al, 1992: 68). With regard to the 
Main Country Frame of Reference, despite the changing business environment in 
Europe, the authors reveal 'systematic differences between French and British 
managers' (Calori et al, 1992: 72) regarding the structure as well as dynamics of 
their industries. Calori et al. see the roots to these differences at a 'more macro- 
cultural level' (ibid).
The authors explain the differences revealed with 'three complementary 
explanations (...): first, that industry structure is an important influence on 
managerial thinking; second, that differences which exist in political and macro- 
economic systems between countries also influence managerial thinking (...). Third
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that influences of national cultures are also quite evident (...)' (Calori et al. 1992: 
76). All in all, the data collected shows that managerial thinking is subject to 
different frames of reference, at the industry as well as at the country level, 
however, that it is also limited by these frames.
3.4 Critical Evaluation of the Business Recipe Concept
The notion of business recipe explains well the complexity and uncertainty of the 
managerial task. As especially Spender (1989) elaborates, the concept of business 
recipes is as ambiguous and complex as the world managers face and thus can 
adjust to different constructed realities. As he explains (1989: 7), 'I wanted a term 
that was loose and ambiguous, open to some re-interpretation, able to adapt itself 
to the specifics of situations much as a creative chef adapts to missing ingredients.'
Conclusions drawn from the authors are based on empirical evidence since, as they 
all emphasise, it is crucial for the understanding of strategic activities, structures 
and processes of organisations to examine what managers actually think and 
perceive. Thus, the notion of business recipes has empirical foundation (see eg. 
Calori et al, 1992; Huff, 1982; Hellgren and Melin, 1992; Grinyer and Spender, 
1979a; Porac et al, 1989; 1995; Spender, 1989; Whitley, 1992a; b).
Moreover, the concept of business recipes is able to explain why organisations 
within an industry or group make similar strategic choices (see eg. Huff, 1982) and 
become similar in their operations and processes (Porac et al, 1989). In this 
context, the concept is able to explain not only why firms pursue similar strategies 
when the latter have been proven to be successful. But also, the notion of business 
recipe delivers an explanation for an industry's demise and adoption of overall 
unsuccessful strategies (Huff, 1982). Moreover, the concept shows why 
organisational strategies or recipes remain persistent over time (Porac et al, 1989). 
Furthermore, the concept explains the difficult and challenging process of the 
development of a new underlying rationality, or recipe (Huff, 1982; Grinyer and 
Spender, 1979a; 1979b). Finally, the notion acknowledges that managers are not 
only influenced but can influence collective beliefs themselves by introducing 
strategic measures which, most likely if they achieve success, are subsequently 
adopted and might become part of or the new rationality for action. It thus depicts 
rationality construction as an interactive process which explains why some 
organisations' concepts might be especially influential within an industry context at 
some point in time.
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The concept of business recipes, however, has a major limitation deriving from the 
fact that it has so far focused on criticising other mainstream economic and 
management theories regarding the nature of managerial activity and strategy 
formulation. Theorists in the business recipe tradition have mainly attempted to 
deliver evidence for their assumption that managers are not rational actors, or that 
the process of strategy formulation is not necessarily systematic. The actions of 
managers have been explained as based on reality construction where experience is 
shared among various actors and collective beliefs develop (eg. Grinyer and 
Spender, 1979b). Competition has been defined as constructed by managers (eg. 
Porac et al, 1989), and market structures and rationalities have been shown to be 
socially determined (Whitley, 1992). Despite the analysis at different levels - from 
society-level (Whitley, 1992a) to manager-level (eg. Grinyer and Spender, 1979a), 
various important issues have as yet not been addressed by business recipe 
theorists. These are outlined below:
With their emphasis on the cognitive nature of human action, business recipe 
theorists suggest a complex modelling of social action and interaction between 
managers, groups of organisations and society, where all action is based on 
complex mental models of the actors involved and 'external' factors do not exist. 
However, this extended and complex view of the concept has so far been avoided. 
In fact, theorists have resorted to explaining only part of the process - eg. the 
process of strategy formulation (Huff, 1982) or competition (Porac et al, 1989) - 
as cognitively constructed, however these theorists have not yet dealt with the 
further implications of their concept.
In fact, the factors and influences beyond these limits are, as in other - criticised - 
theories regarded as exogenous, as objective reality. Examples of this view are 
Huff (1982) and Grinyer and Spender (1979b) who explain how business recipes 
fail and need to be changed because of 'changes in the environment', however, 
these latter changes are not further examined or defined. Furthermore, Porac et al 
(1989) in their analysis of the mental models of managers mention other actors 
apart from competitors, such as suppliers or customers as part of the -cognitively 
constructed - market. According to the theorists, from these other actors as well as 
from the competitors the managers receive cues the meaning of which they have to 
interpret and incorporate in their rationality. However, the authors do not elaborate 
further the role or perceptions of customers or suppliers but emphasise the especial 
influence of industry-wide beliefs. Furthermore, the authors perceive factors such 
as the policies of the state or macroeconomic developments as 'exogenous' factors 
which impose constraints on managers' actions and perceptions. Why these factors
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should be viewed as exogenous and competition or other actors should not, 
remains unexplained.
Two important related issues thus arise from the above. How should the 
'environment' be perceived in the business recipe concept, and how can successes 
and failures of recipes, and change in general, be explained? As for the notion of 
the environment, the literature on business recipes does not provide many clues as 
to how to interpret the organisational environment. A possible framework to 
overcome this theoretical limitation would be to combine the studies of Whitley 
(1992a) and Porac et al (1989) and to perceive the manager as receiving cues from 
the market which itself is cognitively constructed not only by the managers but also 
by the wider collective and their beliefs, or institutionalised values which, in turn, 
influence the manager who is part of this collective. Calori et al (1992) speak of 
different 'frames of reference' to which the managers refer in their cognition. This 
and the above suggest a multi-level model of actors and groups of actors 
connected by collective beliefs, where levels of beliefs and the groups within the 
levels are interdependent and individuals subject to various different belief systems. 
This approach seems to be similar to the one by Maurice et al (1980) and Sorge 
and Warner (1986). The latter authors view actors in a given context as 
interdependent and socially intertwined in a way that 'exogenous', or independent 
variables do not exist.
As for the notion of 'successes' or 'failures' of recipes, as well as 'change', as 
explained above, theorists in the business recipe tradition have so far generally 
failed to provide an explanation of why some recipes fail or become obsolete. 
Reference is made to changes in the environment (Grinyer and Spender, 1979b; 
Huff, 1982) which cause a recipe to no longer prove successful, however, these 
changes are not further examined. The only theorist who seems to deliver an 
explanation with regard to the roots of the success of certain recipes is Whitley 
(1992a ). As he explains with reference to national business recipes, the nature of 
efficiency and thus of the effective and successful ways of structuring business is 
dependent on the nature of the institutional environment in which the companies 
analysed are embedded. The success of structures and processes of organisations is 
thus, in Whitley's eyes, dependent on whether they are in accordance with wider 
societal beliefs and structures. As Whitley stresses, there is no single logic which 
will necessarily lead to success. Furthermore, the success of certain measures and 
activities might not always be guaranteed, as beliefs and assumptions as well as 
priorities change and consequently the structure of the market. 'Thus, macro- 
economic policies which achieved the desired effect in one situation may generate
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different outcomes if major economic actors develop different views about their 
significance and implications (...)' (Whitley, 1992a: 123). Accordingly, Whitley 
suggests that 'the social construction of business structures and practices means 
that not only are they the product of collective beliefs, conventions and moral 
codes which vary between societies, but also the nature of economic success and 
ways of achieving it are dependent on dominant conceptions of economic practices 
and rationalities' (Whitley, 1992a: 123).
As the institutions Whitley examines as independent variables are manifestations of 
collective beliefs at the society-level, the same is likely to apply to collective beliefs 
at other levels. This would imply that business recipes are only then successful if 
they are not only shared by industry or within a group as the 'right way of doing 
things', but also by those at whom the strategies based on the recipes are aimed: 
customers and, more generally, the wider society. Theorists in the business recipe 
tradition have generally put the focus on industrial recipes and their cognitive 
character without considering the importance and cognitive construction of 
customers' or society's beliefs who are likely to determine to a great extent whether 
a recipe is successful or not. It should be interesting to analyse how the 'wider 
societal recipes' and the managerial, or industry recipes interact and thereby lead to 
mutual exchanges of interpretations and beliefs (Calori et al, 1992). Up to now, the 
wider society has only been brought into the concept indirectly, through the 
idiosyncracy of the manager or as a wider frame without direct influence.
If the concept of business recipes is to be regarded as an alternative to other 
mainstream theories which it criticises severely, then it should be able to not only 
explain the way managers act and construct their own rationality but also how this 
action affects the context in which the managers are embedded, and how this 
context should be perceived. Business Recipe theorists (eg. Spender, 1989) seem 
to see the validity of the concept mainly in its realistic assumptions on managerial 
tasks. However, the validity or integrity of a theory is generally not only judged in 
relation to its usefulness to managers. Theories need to meet an academic standard 
or internal consistency and empirical validity.
However, the question whether the concept demands to be seen as an alternative to 
other theories cannot clearly be answered. Spender (1989) opposes the idea of 
constructing a comprehensive 'theory' of collective beliefs as this, in his eyes, 
would limit the scope for managerial creativity. As Spender puts it, 'a well formed 
theory is logically complete, with this very completeness rendering entrepreneurial 
input or 'subjective' interpretation unnecessary. A recipe, by contrast, is open,
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incomplete, ambiguous and in need of interpretation before it can be used as a 
guide to the firm's action even within its own rationality' (Spender, 1989; 7).
Spender sees the validity of the 'recipe' concept in exactly this flexibility and 
ambiguity. In his eyes, the concept can serve managers as guidance to understand 
their behaviour and lead their company successfully. However, it has to be 
remarked that the success of the company is also, to a great extent, dependent 
upon processes which are located outside the company, and outside the industry. 
There are various examples where strategies based on industry recipes have failed 
to lead to success (see eg. Huff, 1982; see also Shell and the discussion on the 
removal of'Brent Spar'). To managers it would be of critical importance not only 
to understand their own actions but also why these recipes fail and how to perceive 
the environment, issues not yet addressed by recipe theorists. It has to be 
questioned whether the concept of business recipes in its seemingly deliberate 
incompleteness and ambiguity depicts fully managerial reality in a way which helps 
managers master their task more successfully.
3.5 Conclusions
As shown in this chapter, the business recipe notion is a concept which explains 
well the complexity of the task managers face when formulating a strategy as well 
as the development through which an organisation goes over time. Furthermore, it 
draws attention to the importance of collective beliefs especially at the industry- 
level, which influence greatly the strategic activities of organisations.
However, the concept has so far failed to conceptualise the environment of 
organisations and to explain why recipes succeed or fail, or what causes change. 
Various theorists in the business recipe tradition emphasise that the business 
recipes, if made explicit, can help managers understand and master their task. 
However, this is only so to a limited extent if a manager is unable to understand 
how new recipes or ideas are evaluated by customers or the wider society. The 
collective beliefs of the latter, thus, are of great importance, too. Nevertheless, as 
outlined briefly in the previous section, the concept seems capable of explaining 
and incorporating reasons for the viability of certain recipes.
All in all, the concept, in its focus on what managers actually perceive and believe, 
seems to be able to depict a more realistic picture of organisations, their successes 
and failures, structures and processes than other mainstream economic or 
organisational theories.
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4 Research Task and Methodology
The aim o f this study is to reveal to what extent the business recipes o f  
organisations in different countries are subject to pressures exerted by the 
national institutional environment. The Institutional Theories o f  Organisations as 
well as the concept o f  Business Recipes, which form the theoretical basis fo r  this 
research, have been outlined in chapters tM>o and three respectively.
This chapter outlines firstly which research questions need to be addressed 
considering the theories outlined previously. Secondly, the methods are described 
which have been used to collect the data needed in order to determine the 
influence o f the national institutions. In this context, alternative methods o f data 
collection are outlined before those used in this study are described.
4.1 The Research Task
This research sets out to examine business recipes in different societies and how far 
possible differences are subject to variations in the national institutional 
environment. This study combines Institutional Theories of Organisations and the 
Concept of Business Recipes. In this research, a connection is established between 
the managerial recipes at the organisation level and the broader belief systems as 
manifested in national institutions. The two approaches can very well be combined 
as they both assume the existence of beliefs at different levels. In fact, the Business 
Recipe tradition in its focus on the strategic behaviour of organisations and 
organisational groups can well complement Institutional Theories of Organisations 
which have traditionally focused on explaining the structures and work processes 
of organisations. Indeed, it seems that both approaches are complementaiy as the 
limitations of the business recipe concept can be reduced by drawing explanations 
from the closely related Institutional Theories. Parallel explanations can be seen in 
the Organisation as Institution-Approach and the Concept of Business Recipes at 
the organisation level. It can be argued that business recipes may be defined as the 
rules institutionalised at the individual or group level regarding how to successfully 
undertake a business.
As Whitley (1992a) has shown, the Concept of Business Recipes and Institutional 
Theories can be combined. His study, however, focuses on the macro-structure of 
the market explaining how institutions affect business systems whereas the object 
of this thesis will be the organisational recipe.
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This research aims at delivering a possible explanation of how to perceive the 
organisational environment and how to explain the success and failure of business 
recipes; both areas which, as explained in Chapter Three, have largely remained 
unexplained in the Business Recipe Concept. Furthermore, this thesis attempts to 
give further insights into the behaviour of organisations facing institutional 
pressures, and the nature of institutions. These aspects will help provide further 
evidence for the validity of Institutional Theories.
The literature reviewed in the previous chapter has outlined the assumptions and 
ideas underlying the two notions. The following research questions were 
formulated on the basis of the theories, prior to the data collection:
1. The Concept of Business Recipes
Following the Concept of Business Recipes, it could be assumed that collective 
beliefs exist at different levels all of which would influence the recipes of Esso UK 
and Esso AG. In the case of the Exxon subsidiaries it could be assumed that apart 
from the recipes at the national level also the recipes of the international oil 
industry as well as, in particular, the recipe of Exxon would be of importance. Due 
to the limited scope of this study, however, it was decided to focus on 
organisational recipes and its interdependence with surrounding institutions. The 
recipe of Exxon, however, was not ignored completely. Exxon guidelines and 
overall policies were brought into the analysis as Multinational Institutions (see 
below). Considering the relatedness of Institutional Theories and the Business 
Recipe Concept, these Multinational Institutions might well be interpreted as parts 
of the overall business recipe of Exxon. This applies equally to the other categories 
of institutions defined (see below). All in all, the resulting first research question 
was:
What are the business recipes o f  Esso Petroleum and Esso AG respectively?
In this context, the main question was how the business recipe was most likely to 
manifest itself. It was assumed, on the basis of the literature, that the recipe not 
only manifests itself through beliefs mentioned by managers, but also through 
actions and measures implemented which would reveal managerial beliefs.
Furthermore, in order to be able to examine how far the business recipes are 
influenced by the national institutional environment the following research 
questions had to be addressed:
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What are the similarities and differences between the recipes o f Esso Petroleum 
and Esso AG?
What are the roots o f these similarities and differences?
2. Institutional Theories of Organisations
With regard to Institutional Theories, the basis of analysis was the 'Environment as 
Institution' approach as outlined in Chapter Two. However, in accordance with 
more recent institutional theorists, it was assumed that organisations are not 
passive, merely reactive to pressures from the institutional environment. As 
explained previously, organisational business recipes can also be regarded as 
institutionalised rules within the organisations as to how to successfully conduct 
the business. These rules may be in conflict with pressures from the institutional 
environment. It can thus be expected, in line with supporters of the 'Organisation 
as Institution' approach that organisations have their own distinctive rules and 
structures and may try to influence the institutional environment to accommodate 
their interests.
With the organisational business recipe being perceived as internally generated 
organisational rules this research can also be interpreted as analysing the 
interdependence between organisation-specific institutions and those perceived as 
'external' by members of the organisation. All in all, with regard to Institutional 
Theories, the following research questions arose:
What is the institutional environment o f  the two countries analysed?
Following the Institutional Theories it could be expected that the Institutional 
Environment consists of and is shaped by institutions such as the state, the 
educational and financial system, public opinion, the labour market and the like 
(see eg. Whitley, 1992b).
How do the institutional environments o f the two countries analysed differ? 
Differences could be expected to be rooted to a great extent in the historical 
evolution of the institutions in question, and especially of the configuration of the 
state-system (see eg. Lane, 1989).
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Do these institutional environments influence the business recipes o f the two 
organisations?
It could be expected that the business recipes are influenced by institutions, as 
institutions are manifestations of collective belief systems. These belief systems, as 
argued by business recipe theorists, influence managerial perceptions and 
subsequently action (see eg. Huff, 1982). Furthermore, it is argued by institutional 
theorists (see eg. Oliver, 1992) that institutions affect strategies, and thus, business 
recipes of companies. Institutions, though socially constructed, become an external 
reality to which managers adapt.
I f  yes, how do the institutions influence the business recipes?
Influence could be expected to be exerted in different ways (see eg DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995), by way of coercion, normative rules or via imitation.
Which institutions have an effect and why?
Due to the coercive power of the state (see eg Lane, 1989, 1992), it could be 
expected to be of primary importance. Other institutions which were considered as 
important were the national public opinion in each country. This especially, as oil 
companies due to their products could be expected to be subject to severe public 
scrutiny. For this reason, the influence of pressure groups was analysed as well. 
Furthermore, several theorists (eg Whitley, 1992; Maurice et al 1980) have 
underlined the importance of labour market institutions, especially trade unions and 
works councils in organisations, as well as educational instititutions, such as 
universities, schools and the like and, finally, professions.
Given that institutionalisation operates at a number o f levels what is the 
respective influence o f these other levels - particularly o f  the multinational, 
general international and sector-specific institutions?
As Esso UK and Esso AG are subsidiaries of Exxon, the latter and its guidelines, 
or 'multinational institutions', as named by the researcher, could be expected to 
have an influence as well (see also Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). Furthermore, 
sector-specific institutions, nationally and internationally, due to the international 
character of the oil industry, could be expected to be influential. Lastly, the 
emergence of international organisations had to be considered, such as the EU, or 
the OECD, which were named 'General International Institutions' (see Figure 1.0). 
The different institutions were thought to vary in influence, following theorists 
such as Oliver (1991) or DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and part of the research 
was meant to reveal how these different levels of institutions relate to the
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organisations in question. In particular, it should be revealed how far the influence 
of an institution is subject to its proximity to the organisations analysed.
How do the organisations act facing possible institutional pressures?
The research was partly aimed at revealing whether organisations necessarily have 
to adapt to institutional pressures, or whether there is scope for strategic choice, as 
Oliver (1991) argues.
Which other influences exist apart from the institutional environment?
The question as to whether other influences exist is only possible if we assume - 
unlike Whitley (1992a) or Maurice et al (1980) and Sorge and Warner (1986) - 
that not all factors are of institutional character. Although the case of these 
theorists is strong as explained in Chapter Two, the separation into various 
categories of influences seems helpful in order to evaluate the relative efficiency of 
organisations (see Chapter Two for details). Furthermore, Whitley's (1992a), 
Maurice et al's (1980) and Sorge and Warner's (1986) approaches suggest a very 
complex model which is difficult to research, especially considering the limited 
scope of this study. In addition, some factors such as the availability of natural 
resources, seem more technical than institutional in character, as the existence of 
the resources is independent of the existence of a society which is seen as owning 
it. For these reasons, in this thesis the distinction between the Technical and 
Institutional Environment will thus be applied. Furthermore, the notion of power 
and politics within the organisation will be integrated into the theoretical basis of 
this approach (see below).
Figure 1.0 depicts the environment of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum respectively;
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Figure 1.0 The Environment of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum
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4.2 The Choices in Research Design
Research tasks can be approached in various different ways. In this context, 
researchers firstly need to consider whether they want to undertake their analysis 
on the basis of a given theory {deductive method), or whether they wish to derive 
theoretical models from the data gathered {inductive method). This research 
applies a largely deductive approach as its purpose is to prove or disprove given 
concepts, ie. the assumptions of Institutional Theorists and those of Business 
Recipe theorists.
Secondly, researchers need to choose whether to apply a largely quantitative or 
qualitative research design. Qualitative research is applied mostly when the subject 
under analysis is hard or impossible to quantify, such as research which aims at 
revealing beliefs of individuals or motives for their actions. Quantitative research, 
on the contrary, is mainly used in areas where quantifications are possible, such as 
measuring how many people hold certain beliefs. This study applies a qualitative 
approach which was found to be appropriate for the research into belief systems 
and business recipes.
Within the area of qualitative research, researchers thirdly have to decide whether 
they are going to look at a narrow range of questions/areas and try to explore these 
with many people/sites, or whether they wish to look at a wide range of 
questions/areas and cover a limited number of sites.
Alongside the distinction between qualitative and quantitative approaches, 
researchers need to consider a variety of different research designs. They can, for 
example, pursue an experimental design, a survey methodology or undertake an in- 
depth case study. Experiments and surveys are usually allocated into quantitative 
approaches in that both usually entail measurement of some kind. All three 
methods will briefly be outlined in the following in order to show why a case-study 
approach was chosen.
As far as the experimental method is concerned, data in this method is collected in 
a laboratory, where volunteers are put under certain conditions and their behaviour 
or responses studied. The advantage of this method is that effects of certain 
influences can be studied by holding other factors constant. The experimental 
method, however, has a limitation in that it might be that 'what is being studied is 
laboratory behaviour rather than natural behaviour' (McNeill, 1990: 55). This effect 
is also called the Hawthorne effect as Professor Mayo first detected this difference
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in his study on the Hawthorne Plant of the General Electric Company (ibid.). 
Professor Mayo revealed that the behaviour of the subjects being studied might be 
different from their actual behaviour under 'normal' conditions. It has to be noted, 
though, that most research methods cannot fully eliminate the risk of the subjects 
analysed being different from their 'normal' self. An experimental design, however, 
being undertaken in a laboratory, might reinforce this effect. Apart from the 
Hawthorne Effect, in an experimental design, the experimenters themselves might 
influence the outcome by their presence and guidance of the volunteers through 
their experiment.
As for the survey design, surveys are mostly undertaken in order to obtain 
quantifiable data. However, surveys can also be used in quantitative research their 
advantage being that the results obtained are highly generalisable. However in 
order to ensure that the findings be generalisable a survey has to be conducted with 
many subjects. Furthermore, the mostly highly structured and standardised format 
of surveys leaves only little scope for the respondents to elaborate their answers 
further, so that issues which might be of interest might not become part of the 
investigation.
As for the in-depth case study, the researcher spends a period of time at a limited 
number of sites, and thus obtains a fairly deep understanding of the way they 
operate. The organisation's members remain in their context and are thus not likely 
to be subject to the 'Hawthorne Effect' (see above) as much as in the experimental 
design, the advantage being that the researcher obtains 'rich' embedded data. 
However, the presence of the interviewer/observer might still lead to results 
different from the 'normal'. Case studies can be conducted in different ways. The 
researcher can undertake the observation as a participant of the group or 
organisation. In this context, the researcher is not recognised as such and can thus 
study the members of the group in their natural behaviour. He can also undertake a 
non-participant observation where his role as researcher is clear to the individuals 
or groups analysed, however where the researcher spends a fairly considerable time 
with these groups or individuals. Lastly, the researcher can undertake interviews 
with a variety of members of the organisation or group. These interviews can be 
structured or unstructured. This latter method can also involve the use of 
questionnaires and documentary research in order to ensure the data's validity (data 
triangulation). If researchers undertake in-depth case studies, they have to be 
aware that due to the embeddedness of individuals studied in their context, the 
observations can be attributable to many different factors. The researchers risk, in 
this connection, that their data is only valid in one particular case, and not
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necessarily generalisable (Hartley, 1994: 209). Furthermore, if researchers 
undertake interviews, they have to be aware that the data might be influenced by 
both the interviewer-effect (responses are different to different interviewers) and 
the interview-effect (managers might behave differently in this situation).
For an experimental design it is essential to remove the participants from their 
normal context and other factors, which made an experimental design unfeasible. 
Furthermore, the design of an experiment seemed impossible on the basis of the 
research questions outlined above. A survey design which took a narrow range of 
questions/areas and tried to explore these with many people/sites did not seem 
appropriate for the research into business recipes. It would have been appropriate 
to do more in-depth, qualitative surveys (using semi-structured interviews) in 
several organisations across the two countries. However, this would have required 
a large number of researchers and thus was not possible in this study. For these 
reasons, a case-study design was chosen despite its limitation that the results might 
lack generalisability. The latter could have been improved by doing multiple case 
studies. Again, however, a large number number of researchers would have been 
necessary and thus, this method was not feasible in this study's context.
4.3 Research Site and Period of Study
As the effect of different national institutional environments was to be researched, 
it was necessary to select organisations in different countries which were 
comparable, in order to minimise the chance that dissimilarities might be due to 
differences in factors other than the institutions. In this context, features such as 
organisational size, degree of dependency, technology and the product were aimed 
to be matched in order to ensure that differences found be due to institutional 
pressures.
The companies to be analysed were Esso in Germany and Britain. Interviews were 
also held in Esso France and background research was undertaken as well on 
French institutions. Whilst time prevented this element of the research being further 
pursued, it did prove useful in bringing the comparison and contrast of Britain and 
Germany into sharper focus. All three countries seemed appropriate as many 
researchers have revealed differences between these countries (see eg. Sorge and 
Warner, 1986; Lane, 1989; 1992) and analysable results were therefore probable. 
As for Britain and Germany, interviews in these two countries could both be 
undertaken in the managers' mother tongue due to the researcher speaking both 
languages. Furthermore, the fact that the companies in question are subsidiaries of
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Exxon Corporation was expected to render it easier to isolate any cultural- 
institutional effects compared with a study of different companies in different 
countries. In the latter case, any differences observed in terms of business recipes 
could be due to sector-specific influences or the impact of their respective parent 
company, rather than to differences in the institutional environment. Moreover, it 
was found that the fact that Exxon is an American multinational was not 
problematic since its European subsidiaries have been established in local countries 
for a long period of time, and have had to operate within the context of the 
national culture and institutions of the host countries. Lastly, this research offered 
the opportunity of exploring the effect of the multinational corporation on the local 
business recipes. As Esso AG is active in the downstream, that is the refining and 
marketing of oil products, only with upstream activities being undertaken through 
subsidiaries, subject of the study in Britain will not be Esso UK, but its 
downstream division Esso Petroleum Company Ltd. Reference will be made to the 
holding company Esso UK where appropriate.
The business recipes of the above companies were analysed at one point in time, 
rather than over a longer period of time. This was mainly due to the limited time 
scope of this study. In an ideal situation a longitudinal approach would have been 
preferred.
4.4 Methodology Employed and Stages of Research
Interviews were undertaken with five senior managers and a board member in 
Germany, and five senior managers and a group manager in Britain. The business 
recipe was expected to be located at the level of senior management and above.
Various studies (eg. Grinyer and Spender, 1979a) have shown that business recipes 
are to a great extent determined by the responsible senior manager or CEO. At 
Esso as well, due to the profit centre concept of the Exxon subsidiaries, senior 
managers are responsible for their strategies and business conduct.
Data collection in the organisation was undertaken in Germany in October 1995 
and in Britain during January 1996.
The design of the interview schedules (see Appendices I-III) was based on the j
premise that managers' beliefs are subject to three main influences:
The Institutional Environment, defined as mles and requirements imposed by |
the social, legal and political context; j
i
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• the Technical Environment, defined as factors related to the production or 
exchange of a good;
• the Power and Politics within the Organisation, defined as the centres of power 
within the organisation at the national and international level, and the relations 
between the different actors derived from and/or leading to this 'power- 
structure'.
As explained above, the differentiation between the Institutional and Technical 
Environments were adhered to despite the criticism summarised in Chapter Two, 
as it proved helpful in order to distinguish contingent factors such as size, 
availability of resources or geographical characteristics from other, more society- 
based factors. As for the notion of Power and Politics within the Organisation, this 
was seen as complementing well the first two areas of influence, as it represented a 
notion of the 'inside' of the organisation and seemed particularly interesting in the 
case of a multinational corporation, as analysed in this study. Organisations can be 
defined as coalitions of interest groups (Morgan, 1986) and as such the business 
recipe might be affected by which group of interests is dominant and by the nature 
of any conflict between these interests.
The focus of analysis was the National Institutional Environment. The other areas 
were taken into account in order to better understand the factors which determined 
the influence of the national institutions. The purpose of the interview .schedule 
was to obtain a fairly complete picture of the process of strategy formulation as 
undertaken by managers in two organisations in two different societies. Only if 
influences of other factors were revealed could the influence of institutional factors 
be identified.
Apart from the potential influences outlined above, other factors are likely to exist 
influencing the perception of managers, such as the idiosyncracy of managers, 
beliefs at the industry level or the like (see eg. Huff, 1982). However, it was 
beyond the scope of this study to examine all possible influences on managers' 
beliefs.
The Standard Interview Schedule (see Appendix I) was divided into three parts. 
The structure of the schedule was semi-structured. In detail, the structure was as 
follows:
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1. General Question Section, containing questions about the personal 
background, education and career of the interviewee;
2. Open Question Section, with questions regarding strategy formulation.
This section was meant to enable the manager to explain factors taken 
into consideration when formulating their strategy and to evaluate their 
influence;
3. Closed Question Section, where managers were firstly prompted to 
consider certain institutions regarding the latters' influence as well as the 
way the adjustment to institutional pressures takes place. This section gave 
further insights into the nature of institutions, and their relation to 
managers' beliefs. Secondly, managers were asked to compare the 
influences of the Institutional Environment as opposed to the Technical 
Environment and the Power and Politics within the Organisation.
In the Closed Question Section, the researcher mostly worked with cards on which 
the factors analysed were written. This section consisted of four parts:
Firstly, managers were asked to compare the influences of institutions in one 
environment relative to those in another environment. The ratings went from 'the 
same' influence to 'more' and 'much more' influence, and 'less' and 'much less' 
influence respectively. For the analysis, the answers were given numbers with 'the 
same' = 0, 'more/less' = 1/-1; and 'much more/much less' = 2/-2.
The institutional environments were as follows:
General National Institutions; encompassing institutions such as the State (laws, 
energy policy, taxes etc), public opinion, trade unions, banks, capital market, 
professions, pressure groups;
General International Institutions ; encompassing the European Union, the 
OECD, the UN etc.;
Multinational Institutions', encompassing any Exxon guidelines (such as DIMS, 
CIMS), and contacts to/ cooperations with other Exxon subsidiaries; 
Sector-specific Institutions', encompassing institutions such as OPEC, the 
International Energy Agency, Rotterdam Market, American Petroleum Institute, or 
Sector-cooperations.
Secondly, the managers were asked to evaluate how they adjust their strategies to 
different institutional pressures. They were asked to name the most likely response. 
The categories of adjustment were taken from Oliver (1991).
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Thirdly, the managers were asked to evaluate the influences of the technical 
environment, the institutional environment and Power & Politics. The rating went 
from 'very strong', 'strong', 'moderate', and 'weak' to 'none'. The environments were 
characterised as follows:
Technical Environment: Economic Development, Availability of Resources, 
Competitors, Technological Progress, Suppliers, Customers (number etc..); 
Institutional Environment: OPEC, Public Opinion, The State, EU, OIMS and 
other Exxon guidelines, Sector-cooperations;
Power&Politics: Distribution of 'Power' within Esso UK, Distribution of 'Power' 
within Exxon Corporation.
Lastly, managers were asked to say which strategic approach their business unit 
tends to pursue. In the cases of the Esso Petroleum Strategic Planning Manager 
and the Public Affairs Manager as well as the board member in Germany, this 
question was modified because of their role within the organisation, and they were 
asked what strategy Esso Petroleum and Esso AG respectively tend to pursue.
Three possible options were given, and the managers were asked to choose
one/rate them if more than one was applicable. The choice of answers was as 
follows:
(  )  A strategy which achieves the most efficient utilization o f resources.
( )  A strategy which has legitimacy in the eyes o f society.
( ) A strategy which is acceptable to all stakeholders (ie. in this context:
interest groups within Esso , including shareholders and employees, at the 
national/international level)
The combination of an unprompted interview section (section 2) and a prompted 
section (section 3) was chosen in order to reveal possible areas of institutional 
influence of which the managers are not aware and which accordingly would not be 
mentioned in section 2. However, also this combined method does not ensure that 
all institutions which are influential would be revealed. Managers are likely to 
integrate institutionalised rules into their daily work and strategy formulation 
without necessarily realising it, not even if they are prompted. One way to detect 
any institutions which have an influence would be if the researcher worked in the 
company in question, as a manager, tackling business tasks and maintaining a high 
level of awareness as to which influences on his or her work are of institutional
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character. Such a thorough approach, however, was not feasible in this research 
due to the limited scope of the study.
A related limitation of the methodology used is the fact that the researcher had to 
rely on the managers identifying the relative influence of varying institutions in 
section 3, The danger of this approach is that managers might not be best placed to 
understand the degree of institutional influence to which they are subjected. This 
especially if we consider the 'taken-for grantedness' which characterise most 
institutions which impact on us. Some degree of bias in the data collected could 
thus be expected. However, to reduce the degree of bias, during the interviews the 
researcher encouraged the managers to elaborate on any points of interest or 
concern to them irrespective of whether they were included in the interview 
schedule or not. She thereby ensured that she obtained a picture of the business as 
comprehensive and unbiased as possible. The analysis as to whether the issues 
outlined by the managers had institutional origin was subsequently done by the 
researcher.
As the first interviews were undertaken, it became clear that managers of service 
functions required a different interview schedule due to the nature of their tasks. 
Subsequently, amended schedules were used for the interviews with the Public 
Affairs Manager and the Human Resource Manager in Britain (see Appendices II 
and III). These interviews were aimed at gaining an insight into what determines 
the policies of Esso in the above areas. The importance of interviews with 
managers from across functions within the organisations should be underlined at 
this point. Esso, as most other organisations, operate according to division of 
labour among the various departments. A full understanding of the overall business 
recipe of Esso UK and Esso AG respectively cannot be obtained by focusing only 
on line management, as basic policy decisions are mostly prepared and elaborated 
by service functions, though possibly initiated by line managers.
Throughout the interview, managers were asked to describe and evaluate their 
'strategy' or 'strategy formulation'. The notion of 'business recipe' was not used, as 
this could be expected to be misunderstood by the managers.
The interviews were recorded in note form as well as taped. None of the managers 
opposed the taping of the interview. Notes were taken in addition to the tape, in 
order to enable the interviewer to get back to certain areas of interest during the 
interview. The taped interviews were later on transcribed. In the case of Germany, 
they were subsequently sent to the managers interviewed for them to provide
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further comments on their answers. However, this was not done in the case of 
Britain as only one German manager returned a corrected version.
Prior to the semi-structured interviews as outlined above, 'information-interviews' 
were undertaken with the Public Affairs Manager in Germany. The former had the 
purpose to introduce the researcher into the subject and make her familiar with the 
oil industry and current issues as well as possible differences between the countries 
to be analysed (for the Information-Interview schedule, see Appendix IV). A 
shortened version of this schedule was used during an interview with the Strategic 
Planning Manager in Britain, to obtain information regarding factors such as the 
structure and size of Esso Petroleum. Extensive documentary research was also 
undertaken concerning the companies analysed, the oil industry in general as well 
as the countries in which the companies are situated (see Appendices V - VIII). 
Thus, data was triangulated by way of consulting and analysing different sources of 
information.
Business Recipes, that is, the beliefs of managers as to how to successfully conduct 
their business within a given context, cover all areas of a business. Due to the 
limited scope of this study as well as the limited number of managers interviewed in 
both companies, the complete business recipes of the two organisations covering 
all aspects of the business could not be subject of this study. Rather, it attempts to 
give an overview of the factors and beliefs mentioned by the managers interviewed 
as well as revealed through documentary research, especially focusing on 
distinctive features of both recipes.
In the following, firstly, the case studies of Esso Petroleum and Esso AG are 
presented in Chapters Five and Six respectively. In the final sections of these 
chapters, the overall business recipes of both companies are outlined. In Chapter 
Seven, the case results are analysed with special reference to the research questions 
outlined in this chapter. Lastly, a summary and conclusion of this research follows 
in Chapter Eight.
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5 Esso Petroleum Company Ltd. - A Case Study
In this chapter, the results obtained from the data collection on Esso in Britain 
are presented. Firstly, general information on Esso Petroleum is given. In the 
second section, different parts o f  the business recipe o f Esso Petroleum, the 
downstream side o f Esso UK, are described drawing information from the 
interviews undertaken as well as documentary research. In this context, those 
parts o f  the business are presented which, in the interviews, were revealed as 
being handled differently in the two companies analysed and/or as providing 
interesting insights into the managerial recipes o f both companies. In the final 
section o f this chapter the overall business recipe o f Esso Petroleum as gathered 
from the data presented will be outlined.
5.1 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd - General Information on the Company
Esso Petroleum is the downstream division of Esso UK Pic which is a fully owned 
subsidiary of Exxon Corporation. The company receives all financial resources and 
main raw materials from its parent. Furthermore, Exxon has guidelines and 
worldwide policies to which the subsidiaries are expected to adhere. In this 
context, especially the ideal of cost efficiency is emphasised throughout the 
company and represents the basis upon which the affiliates' performance is 
evaluated (for further details on the history and policies of Exxon Corporation, see 
Appendix VIII).
Esso UK Pic supplies around one-sixth of the petroleum products used in the 
British market, and produces about one tenth of total United Kingdom oil and gas 
output. Its upstream activities account for 75% of its profits with Esso being a 
major investor in the North Sea. To date, in cooperation with Shell, Esso 'has been 
responsible for a quarter of North Sea activity' (Esso UK Pic, 1995a). As for its 
downstream activities, the 'Esso refinery at Fawley is the largest in the United 
Kingdom and one of the most complex refineries in Europe’ (ibid.).
The current number of employees at Esso UK is 3,500. Since the 1970s where 
Esso UK had 12,000 employees the number has decreased considerably. Of the 
employees approximately 15 to 20 managers and five to ten other employees are 
sent from Exxon. Most of these work with Esso Exploration and Production Ltd, 
the upstream side of the business. The current turnover of personnel is less than 
2% and the average employee is about 42 years old. In addition to the Esso
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employees, Esso works with a considerable number of contractors. In the office 
complex in Leatherhead alone, 1/3 of staff are contractors.
5.1.1 Organisational Structure of Esso UK
Esso UK's offices are spread all over Britain. Both divisions of Esso UK Pic, 
Exploration and Production and Esso Petroleum Pic have a Managing Director 
who report to and are members of the board of Esso UK pic. The board consists of 
four members, with a financial director and the Chairman in addition to the 
Managing Directors of Esso UKs divisions.
5.1.2 Organisational Structure of Esso Petroleum Company Ltd.
Esso Petroleum has on average four to six hierarchy levels from the Managing 
Director down to the 1st Line Supervisor or foreman in the plants respectively. 
The business units are combined according to functions for the service functions 
and according to products for the product lines. The average span of control of 
managers is from three to five at the higher level of the hierarchy and about 20 at 
the lower level (eg. below the foreman).
For product lines and service functions a functional link to corresponding 
departments at Exxon Company International exists. One example of this is the 
refinery manager who is in close contact with the refining group of Exxon 
Company International (ECI) in New Jersey, 'they are sort of like the functional 
arm of the shareholder in New Jersey', as he explains.
The product lines at Esso Petroleum are organised as profit centres. The 
coordination of activities across the business units takes place at management level 
as well as through project teams consisting of employees as well as managers.
All in all, the organisation structure of Esso Petroleum is depicted in Figure 2.0, 
which shows the firm's relation to the holding company Esso UK Pic.
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Figure 2,0 Organisation Structure of Esso Petroleum Company Ltd.
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5.2 Components of and Contributors to the Business Recipe of Esso 
Petroleum
In the following, elements of the business recipe of Esso Petroleum are outlined. 
These are beliefs of managers as to how to successfully conduct their business. The 
business recipe of Esso Petroleum is manifested in the actions as well as attitudes 
of the company.
5.2.1 Esso Petroleum and its Employees
Management Recruitment and Development
At least 97% of the managers of Esso Petroleum hold a university degree. No 
vocational training or 'work and study degrees ' exist to develop future managers. 
The majority of managers are recruited directly from university after achieving 
their first degree and stay with Esso for their whole career. The majority of 
managers at Esso UK are of male sex. However, the number of women in these 
posts is increasing. At present, about 35% of the graduates recruited are women 
(Esso UK Pic, 1995a).
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Managers corne mostly from an engineering background. When they enter the 
company they are trained on different jobs in the form of job rotation. Among the 
jobs executed is mostly a stay at Exxon in the States or with another Exxon 
affiliate. Accordingly, having a specialist education when they join Esso UK, most 
of the managers become generalists in the oil business as their career goes on. A 
striking example of this policy is the Strategic Planning Manager who has had nine 
different jobs in his 12 years of being with Esso. As he explains, 'When I first 
joined the company the average assignment (of a manager) was 18 months. Now, it 
is about 2 1/2 years, and it is the shortest for 'highflyers". Of the managers 
interviewed, three had worked in their current positions between two and three 
years, two between five and six years, and one less than one year.
Further training for graduates is provided by way of 'leave of absence'. If the 
company sees the benefit in the further education of a graduate employee, they 
encourage the pursuit of MBA studies or the achievement of an accountancy 
qualification. In these cases, 'external creditation provides quality assurance of a 
person's competence - or it's a vehicle to help recruit and retain employees' (Human 
Resource Manager). Training is increasingly done at a European level (see below) 
in so-called 'European Skill Centres'.
Recruitment and Development of Emplovees at the Operational Level 
Employees at the operational level are mostly employed after graduation from 
school. Full-time training in the form of apprenticeships is undertaken in the 
refinery. All other training is provided 'on the job' or 'leave of absence'. For the last 
three or four years, Esso UK has introduced vocational training under the National 
Vocational Qualifications scheme of the governments education and training 
policies. According to the Human Resource Manager, this is to be extended.
Emplovee Participation
Esso UK pic is a non-unionised company. This used to be different in the 1970s 
before the conservative government under Thatcher came to power. As the Human 
Resource Manager points out: 'Back at the end of the 1970s all our employees at 
the operational level were collectively bargained'. However, the influence of 
unions is present, as the contractors with whom Esso works are largely unionised.
Today, pay bargaining at Esso is done at the individual level. Employees have 
individual employment contracts. The benefits are common throughout the 
company, including, for example, employee share ownership, but the salaries are
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calculated individually, This is done on the basis of the skills of the particular 
employee in comparison to a labour pool specific to his or her work. For instance, 
there exists a labour pool for process engineers and a different one for a skilled 
accountant. The Human Resource Manager explains: 'We are paying individual 
employees according to their skills within that market.'
Employee participation is carried out through staff committees at site level. These 
committees consist of employees from across the site who meet with management 
on a regular basis. These staff committees are merely concerned with workplace- 
related issues. Their involvement is based on consultation rather than negotiation. 
In this context, the Human Resource Manager explains: 'It's a dialogue about 
things that are concerning employees, so that's a long way removed from 
bargaining. It's more a sensing mechanism.' An example of the use of the staff 
committees to sense the needs of Esso employees was the establishment of a coach 
from the train station when Esso moved from inner London to Leatherhead, a fairly 
remote site south of London.
Overall, the Human Resource Manager sees the derecognition of unions as a 
positive development. In his eyes, the involvement of employees has increased this 
way because 'typically, in a unionised company, you find that the union 
representatives are a third party between you and your employees. ' The existence 
of well established communication (despite the lack of formal employee 
codetermination) is a factor that also the Strategic Planning Manager mentions. As 
he points out, in comparison with Esso AG, 'we are a more relaxed organisation 
(...). Relaxed in the way that it's pretty open, managers are very accessible.'
Furthermore, apart from the improvement of communication between management 
and employees, the Human Resource Manager acknowledges that the fact that 
Esso Petroleum is not unionised facilitates the change which all large enterprises 
across the world are going through at present. In this sense, he prefers the British 
system to German codetermination as - although the latter might bring short -term 
advantages - in long-term, the ability to change enables the company to transform 
quickly and thus to ensure its survival. This, in turn, is in the interest of those 
employees who stay with the company. Also the Refining Manager sees the non­
unionisation as an advantage. In fact, considering the depressed refinery margins 
and his strive for profitability, he says that 'I don't think we have fully developed or 
achieved the potential available from getting people out of the union.'
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Dismissals
Dismissals are relatively easy to undertake in Britain under current employment 
legislation. As the Human Resource Manager acknowleges ' it's very easy to make 
people redundant under UK legislation provided the jobs are disappearing.' 
However, Esso has primarily, up to now, offered employees 'who we can't see 
progressing through the organisation, financial packages (...) to ensure and 
maintain the motivation of those who stay'. According to the Refining Manager, 
the voluntary agreements were also undertaken because employees could 
otherwise claim their rights before industrial tribunals. Both managers do not know 
whether this policy of voluntary agreements will be adhered to in future. Especially 
in the refinery, there is not much further scope for financial packages. Here, 
already 10% of the workforce, that is 100 people were made redundant in 1995 
with 200 or 300 more to follow this year. Most employees who were willing to go 
have been made redundant so that 'you (now) move out of the area of voluntary 
redundancy into compulsory redundancy', as the Refining Manager states.
5.2.2 Esso Petroleum and the British Government
The actions of the British government influence the business of Esso Petroleum to 
a great extent. The influence is exerted directly via taxation and legislation as well 
as indirectly by shaping the environment in which Esso is embedded (for example 
in terms of education and training policies).
Relationship between Esso Petroleum and the Government
The managers interviewed at Esso Petroleum described the relationship with the 
government generally as cooperative. Regular meetings with government ministers 
'from cabinet level downwards' (Public Relations Manager), and meetings with 
senior civil servants ensure that the views of Esso are considered and that 'when 
(the government officials) are struggling with a particular issue they feel free to 
come to Esso managers and take our view' (Human Resource Manager). In this 
context, the strong position of Esso is based on the fact that Esso is 'something like 
the sixth largest company in Britain. So each government would expect, and we 
would expect, to have a view, whatever the issue of the day is' (Human Resource 
Manager). However, Esso is probably not the most powerful actor within the 
British oil industry, as the Human Resource Manager acknowledges. Shell and BP 
have their headquarters in Britain and thus have more resources allocated in this 
country. As the manager explains further, the fact that BP used to be state-owned 
no longer influences the relationship to the state, however it used to.
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The communication between Esso and the government is not merely done on a 
one-to-one basis. As the Public Relations Manager points out, the government 'has 
a strong desire to make sure that they get a strong input from industry generally.' 
Being a member of trade associations such as the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) or the United Kingdom Petroleum Industry Association (UKPIA), the 
company's interests are also represented through these institutions which, as in the 
case of the CBI, 'formulate national responses (to government legislation)' (Human 
Resource Manager).
All in all, the Human Resource Manager comments, 'you can never behave as if 
you expect all these things to be done your way. At least we have a view and make 
sure our voice is heard.'
Esso Petroleum and Government Legislation
With regard to the level of legislation, the Planning Manager points out that 'there 
are too many regulations that impose unnecessary burdens on the industry. 
Everywhere, in terms of the environment, competitive environment, we have had 
to go through monopolist examinations where we thought that was not necessary. 
We would like deregulation, but that's not on top of the list.' Apart from 
competition policies, Esso Petroleum is concerned especially about the recent 
developments in environmental legislation. In this context, Esso opposes strongly 
the increased level of taxation imposed during the past few years in line with 
environmental objectives of the British government. As Keith Taylor, the chief 
executive of Esso Petroleum points out (Esso UK pic, 1995b: 3) 'as a tool of 
environmental policy (increased taxation) is a very blunt instrument. The one thing 
that is clear is that industry's costs will continue to increase, and this potentially 
damages the United Kingdom's competitiveness in global markets.' Also the 
Strategic Planning Manager criticises the environmental legislation . As he 
explains, it is part of his work to analyse new or forthcoming legislation in terms of 
how Esso has to respond to them. He points out that the new legislation 'often 
results in investment, it's investment that we're usually not particularly happy about 
because it usually hasn't got a return, it's usually got a non-discretionary burden 
(...) Some environmental investment does have a return, but there are other 
investments that have effectively given no return (...). The damage that's been done 
to the environment isn't sufficient to justify that expense.' The company believes 
that cooperation between government and industry is essential in order to ensure 
the feasibility of environmental measures: 'Esso recognises that a partnership 
between industry and government based on a rational approach is essential to 
achieve affordable environmental progress. This involves setting scientifically -
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based and clear standards, and following these with cost-benefit analysis.' (Esso 
UK Pic, 1994d: 2).
As the Strategic Planning Manager explains later on, Esso feel that they are in a 
free market and that the government can trust the company to do their business. 
The role of the government should, in the manager's eyes, be merely to interfere 
where there's market failure. This belief is clearly expressed in the company 
magazine in 1993 with special reference to environmental legislation: 'Esso is a 
firm believer in self regulation and environmental management being an internal 
company responsibility. (...) Prescriptive legislation is something we oppose 
strongly.' (Esso View, December 1993: 3).
Exxon guidelines and UK legislation
Guidelines given by Exxon, eg. in terms of Human Resource Management, have 
only to a little extent to be adjusted to local legislation as UK and US law are quite 
similar. As the Public Relations Manager puts it 'there's (...) tremendous similarities 
between the way Exxon thinks, and the way the British government thinks.' One 
example of this is the 'Alcohol and Drug Policy' which was introduced by Exxon to 
all its affiliates at the end of the 1980s. It is to ensure that in safety-critical 
positions within the corporation people are employed who have not been 
previously convicted for alcohol or drug related offenses. In Britain, this policy 
could be implemented with only slight modifications. The latter were related to the 
fact that under UK legislation, convictions that happened more than five years ago 
are 'spent' .
If, however, there is a conflict between Exxon rules and local law, the local law 
takes precedence. Although, as the Human Resource Manager explains, 'there's an 
element of lobbying as well... if it's very important to the international organisation, 
(...) then you would expect local management to take it up with the regulators.'
5.2.3 Esso Petroleum and Its Competitors
As a reaction to the competition by the hypermarkets (see Appendix V), this year, 
Esso Petroleum has introduced its Trice Watch’ campaign. This ensures that Esso 
petrol stations adopt the lowest price in their area thus reducing the price gap to 
the large retail chains. Esso has adopted this price-oriented strategy because a 
consumer survey recently revealed 'that motorists now overwhelmingly prefer 
lower prices to promotions (...)' (Esso UK Pic, 1996b: 3). This cut in prices puts 
increasing pressure on the profit margins, and according to Esso Managers,
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operational efficiency needs to be improved further to help increase the margins. In 
addition to the Price Watch compaign, Esso has gradually extended its forecourt 
programme which started in 1978. Today, Esso petrol stations are not only selling 
motor oils and car accessories as in the beginning 1980s but a wide range of 
convenience goods in programmes such as 'Fresh Ideas' or 'Snack&Shop'.
As for the refining side, Esso Petroleum has responded to the change in demand 
structure by investing in facilities able to produce the lighter oil products that are in 
demand. The present overcapacity in the refining market has put Fawley refinery 
under increasing pressure. The Refining Manager believes that the long term 
survival of the Esso UK Fawley refinery depends upon the refinery's ability to work 
more cost-effectively and thereby increase profitability. As the Refining Manager 
puts it, ‘We are losing about $1 million a week at the moment. - So as the margins 
are not going to improve and the fundamentals of the business are not going to 
improve, there is a tremendous pressure on costs (...) whether that be people costs 
or material costs.’ In this context it is essential for the refinery to cut down not 
only its absolute costs but to improve its relative competitive performance, that is 
to decrease the competitive costs of its operations. These competitive costs are 
determined worldwide in the so-called Salomon-Survey. It allows the Fawley 
refinery to measure its performance against about 100 other refineries in the 
Middle East and Europe.
The ultimate aim of Fawley refineiy is thus to ‘improve (its) position against the 
benchmark’, as the manager explains. However, this improvement is not only about 
‘making money’. At the same time as driving down their costs, Fawley is trying to 
increase their competitiveness by aiming at the improvement of their safety 
performance, the reliability of the equipment, and their environmental performance. 
In this process it is important ‘to ensure that you have no product giveaway, that 
you get the maximum product out of the crude oil... but the real strategy is about 
improving safety, reliability and environmental performance at the same time as 
driving down the costs.’ Only such a complex strategy seems to ensure the long­
term survival of Fawley refinery.
In more detail, this strategy implies, for the manager, the improvement of the 
planning system, of the setting of objectives, of the stewardship system as well as 
the laying off of workers and the cutting down of the numbers of managers and 
supervisors, and finally the more efficient use of contractors.
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5.2.4 Esso Petroleum and the Public
The managers interviewed identified the following features of British public
opinion as most characteristic and as necessary to be considered in their business
conduct:
The British Public are concerned about safety and health. As the Public 
Relations Manager says, ’safety is something the company could easily be 
criticised for if it doesn't comply with it.... Safety gets a pretty strong attention'. 
The company places great emphasis on its compliance with safety standards 
and the improvement of its performance. As is expressed in the company 
magazine: 'Safety is our first priority and our most important business 
objective' (Esso UK Pic, 1996b: 5). The company see the Operations Integrity 
Management System (OIMS), one of Exxon's worldwide policies, as the tool 
for the achievement of an improved safety performance.
• The British Public is less concerned about environmental protection. 
Considering the Brent Spar public reaction in Germany, the Public Relations 
Manager comments that 'I don't think there's such a strong reaction to 
environmental issues (in Britain),' The Strategic Planning Manager sees a 
difference of concern among different parts of the public. As he explains, 'the 
environment is a big issue for us, but I'm not so sure it's so for the Esso UK 
customers. The press and the government have hyped it up into a big issue'; 
Nevertheless, Esso stress in their formal brochures that the company has had an 
environmental policy for 25 years (Esso UK Pic, 1995c: 4).
The British Public distrusts large profit-making organisations. As the Public 
Relations Manager explains, 'there's not much love for the oil industry in the 
UK, because (...) there is a deep distrust, dislike actually, lack of understanding 
on the part of the vast majority of this country for large organisations. And 
that's (...) increasingly a problem for multinational organisations.' He sees this 
as a recent development, especially since the Second World War where the 
country became heavily influenced by the socialist policies of the Labour party. 
As he says, 'I think especially in the post-war period where we went highly 
socialist, dominated by trade unions, there really is a distinct lack of 
understanding of business, of the profit motive and certainly a sort of dislike 
for things that have large numbers attached to them.'
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• There is a strong tradition and expectation that large companies give money 
to the charitable sector.
In this context, the Public Relations Manager explains that 'in the UK there's 
been a very strong tradition from the early days of the industrial revolution of 
industrials setting up educational organisations, community organisations, 
which has led in the UK to a very strong charitable sector.' As he states further, 
the support of charitable organisations is still expected by the British public. 
Also Esso, who have been in the UK for over 100 years, are subjected to this 
expectation. In fact, as the manager points out, 'a fairly substantial amount of 
my budget is devoted to charitable giving, sponsorship/support for works by 
charitable organisations. ' However, as he admits, this is not necessarily 
disadvantageous as 'the contact to the voluntary organisations enables us to get 
closer to some of these organisations that might cause you trouble if you don't 
manage them right.' Esso has a Community Action Programme which 
encourages employees to become involved with the local community. As is 
explained in a company brochure, 'the (Community Action) Programme 
focuses on education, the environment and assisting in locations where the 
Company is a major employer. The programme is proactive and recognises the 
important and innovative role played by the voluntary and charitable sector in 
national life' (Esso UK Pic, 1995a).
5.2.5 Esso Petroleum and the European Union
The overall opinion of the Esso managers interviewed regarding the European 
Union (EU) is sceptical in terms of the latter's goals and achievements. It is felt 
that most of its regulation, especially concerning environmental and social issues 
(for example employment legislation) place a great burden on the UK companies. 
The sceptical feeling about EU activities is clearly expressed by the Bitumen 
manager who states that 'I would say that the EU brings increasing costs, for no 
great benefit. Lots of formal harmonization which isn't real.' Especially in the area 
of environmental protection, Esso Petroleum believes that it is essential to set 
European standards the fulfilment of which should be left to the discretion of the 
individual companies (Esso UK Pic, 1993; 2). Esso Petroleum fears that unless the 
European Commission finds the 'right balance between safety, environmental, 
health, technical and economic considerations' (Esso View, February 1996; 4) the 
international competitiveness of the European market will decrease.
In order to ensure that EU decisions be based on 'sound science and cost- 
effectiveness' (Esso UK Pic, 1996b) In this context, Esso Petroleum and their
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holding company Esso UK oppose strongly the 'Best Available Technology' 
approach of the German government (eg. Esso UK Pic, 1993) Esso is represented 
in Brussels. As the Strategic Planning Manager explains 'we do a fair bit of 
lobbying (...) with the EU (...), in particular with the cabinets and the commission, 
mostly it's the environment directives that we try to influence quite a bit.' Esso 
follows its lobbying activities on behalf of or with associations such as Europia (the 
European Petroleum Industry Association) or the International Affairs Committee 
of the Confederation of British Industry, the latter of which is looking at the 
European dimension of employment legislation. With regard to European issues, 
cooperation exists among the European affiliates of Exxon to get 'a common 
approach throughout the affiliates responding to (the EU) public policy issues' 
(Public Affairs Manager).
5.2.6 Esso Petroleum and Exxon
In general, the managers interviewed view the influence by Exxon as top-level 
leaving scope as to how to manage their business units in detail. However, as the 
Bitumen Manager states, the influence of Exxon is increasing as the company is 
trying to maximise its return from the European market and thus introduces more 
and more standardised rules and procedures. The managers are generally aware 
that their performance is compared with other businesses of Exxon in Europe and 
the world and that Exxon will invest primarily in those businesses that promise 
superior return. Europe, in this context, provides only low return compared with 
growing markets such as Malaysia. Within Europe, however, the UK has an overall 
favourable position due to its low total labour costs and the non-interventionist 
stance of the British government so that, as the Human Resource Manager states, 
'it's going to be interesting to see whether this nearly deregulated economy from 
the Exxon perspective will lead to the placement of more and more management 
functions in the UK.'
The guidelines of Exxon affect all aspects of Esso Petroleum's business. As the 
Human Resource Manager explains, 'there are a lot of policies which guide the 
behaviour of the organisation at an individual level which are common across the 
world except where the local legislation prohibits it'. The implementation of these 
policies and guidelines is done even if, as in the case of the Alcohol&Drug Policy 
(see above), 'it felt very much like a US problem' (Human Resource Manager). In 
the area of Human Resources, there are a lot of guidelines and common policies set 
by Exxon . Examples of these are the Alcohol&Drug Policy (see above) or the 
Conflict of Interest Policy 'which is about not putting yourself as an individual
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employee in a position where your personal activities can conflict with the 
company's activities. At least with the company not being aware of it' (Human 
Resource Manager). Furthermore, the Exxon ethic is a prominent feature of Esso 
Petroleum Human Resource Policy. As the Human Resource Manager explains an 
example of this ethic is 'that (...) employees (deal) honestly with other employees 
and the outside world is an overarching goal.'
In the area of Public Affairs, guidelines are set for example concerning common 
approaches for emergencies and crises 'because large incidents affect both the 
corporation and the country where it happens' (Public Affairs Manager). In 
addition, responses to issues affecting several or all affiliates worldwide are 
formulated on an international basis. An example of an issue in this context is 
'global warming'.
In refining, the responsible manager highlighted the guidelines concerning the set 
up of strategic plans and how they ought to be presented:
'It is very clear how the shareholder wants the plan to be described.
(...) There are guidelines like crude price etc (...) but there are 
(also) lots of guidelines in terms of "Well, you must in your plan 
address this issue or that issue and when you do, we want it 
reported like this." So there are lots of forms to fill in and it's quite 
regimented in terms of how they want the data reported.'
All in all, the manager states that Exxon prescribes what they want him to include 
in his plan and how this should be reported 'rather than "you have to do it like this." 
So, he feels that 'there's a fair amount of flexibility in terms of how we do it, not 
what we do, but how we do if. Furthermore, the Refining Manager acknowledges 
the existence of expectations by Exxon which strongly influence his business. For 
instance, as he explains, '(...) their expectation is that you take the benchmark into 
account which they know you've got because they've got it as well (...). And, you 
know their expectation is that you will improve your performance (...). That's not a 
guideline as such but that's a sort of expectation.' After a strategic plan has been 
presented to Exxon, the latter might furthermore 'come back and say "well we 
don't think this is challenging enough." In this context, there is always the 
possibility for the manager of being replaced if the performance of his or her 
business unit does not come up to Exxon's expectations. As the Refining Manager 
emphasises: 'I have to lay off workers, as if I provide job security, the likelihood is 
that I won't deliver profitability, and if I don't deliver profitability they'll put
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somebody else in who will.'Also the corporation's strive for efficiency is very clear 
to the refinery manager who states that ' (...) when Exxon looks at where it wants 
to invest its money in refining capacity, it'd sooner invest it in an efficient refinery 
than in an inefficient refinery.' To sum up, he explains:' we still manage the 
business, the manner of how we do it is very much left to the refinery. But what we 
have to do is in many ways dictated by Exxon guidelines, visits, requests, 
exhortations, OIMS '
Also in the opinion of the Bitumen Manager, the guidance from Exxon is 'very top- 
level.' As he states, '(Exxon) say to Esso Petroleum "you can have £500 mill, of 
capital money to spend, and you can spend it on this and that and that." But they 
won't be coming to me and say "you should be selling your bitumen to this 
customer and not to that". However, as the Bitumen Manager acknowledges, the 
influence of Exxon is growing, 'as Exxon has a view that it can save a lot of 
duplicated effort by issuing rules. And there's an increasing tendency for Exxon to 
say 'this is how things should be done and this is how you're going to do it (...). 
They call it more "prescriptive".'
In the case of the Strategic Planning Manager, Exxon often initiates projects or 
enquiries for him or his group to work on. As the manager explains, 'Exxon 
Company International often ask us to do work, and are quite prescriptive about 
what they want us doing. 25% of what we do is prescribed that way. One example 
of this is the economics of shutting down a refinery. It's unlikely we'd volunteer 
that.' Projects like these are undertaken because Exxon 'want to preserve the 
business as best as (they) can, (so they) don't want to keep bad bits of the business.' 
Europe as a business location is at the moment a matter of concern to Exxon, as 
the corporation 'has got a big stake in Europe , and I think it would like to reduce 
that stake as it doesn't bring the return it could make elsewhere. (...)' He concludes 
that 'Europe definitely has a competitive disadvantage at the moment.'
One example of Exxon trying to maximise its return is the establishment of Esso 
Lubricants Europe which the corporation initiated and which serves to coordinate 
the policies of European Lubricants divisions of Esso affiliates. This has been done 
because 'it was seen as the best possible way of getting a satisfactory return out of 
the European market' (Lubricants Manager).
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5.2.7 Esso Petroleum and Other Affiliates
Among Exxon affiliates 'there's very little operating interface with the other 
affiliates as (they) are all serving local markets' (Human Resource Manager).
Nevertheless, in some areas cooperation exists on the one hand to formulate 
common approaches to issues which concern more than one affiliate (eg. in the 
case of Public Affairs) and on the other hand to achieve operational efficiency, as 
for example in the case of Esso Lubricants Europe (ELE), the European lubricants 
organisation. In the latter case, the European Lubricants Managers have reporting 
responsibility to ELE, and, as the Lubricants Manager points out, 'as the ELE- 
ffinction is developing, we are more and more developing a European strategy, 
that's in its early days ' In addition to ELE, other pieces of organisation have been 
set up that serve more than one affiliate. One example of this is a European 
Computer Organisation which, set up in Britain, operates across national 
boundaries. Lastly, affiliates buy from and sell to each other products, and give 
advice.
However, there is not only an element of cooperation among the affiliates but also 
competition. This not within their markets but within the multinational corporation.
As the Human Resource Manager says, 'we're not competing with Esso in 
Germany (...) except fo r  capital investment.' And, as the Public Affairs Manager 
states 'you have to demonstrate that if there's an investment you should get the 
budget.' Especially in refining, major investments have been undertaken. The 
Refining Manager is thus concerned not only with increasing profitability relative 
to other companies' refineries. As he says, '(in the Salomon Survey) we can see 
clearly where we stand versus other Esso refineries (...) all of which I am 
competing with.' Efficiency is in this context the main criterion for the allocation of 
investments throughout Exxon Corporation. The most efficient organisation gets 
the most investment. Provided the efficiency is achieved, however, managers of 
Esso UK see comparative advantages for their company as far as the allocation of 
Exxon investment is concerned. Their view is well summarised in the above 
mentioned statement of the Human Resource Manager who says 'it's going to be |
interesting to see whether this nearly deregulated economy from the Exxon 
perspective will lead to the placement of more and more management functions in 
the UK.'
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5.2.8 Perceived Differences between Esso in Britain and
Germany From the Perspective of Esso Petroleum's 
Managers.
Human Resource Manager: The single biggest difference is the interface with 
employees. I think we're the only one who's not unionised. '
Strategic Planning Manager: 'One of the most important things which is now less 
so but still quite marked is we have a lot of generalists in the company, we don't 
have many specialists. We don't leave people in jobs for very long (...). If I talk to 
my (...) German counterparts they'll invariably be in their jobs for 3-4 years. They'll 
understand the business better than I do. Probably (we have got) more an 
American notion, although we do it more than (the Americans), really.' 
Furthermore: 'I would say we're a more relaxed organisation, certainly more than 
Germany (...). Relaxed in the way that it's pretty open, managers are very 
accessible. We don't have lots of protocols - the downside of that; we might seem 
to be amateur. The Germans (...) project a much more professional image. 
Sometimes we do as well. We are professional but we don't always project it very 
well.'
Public Affairs Manager : 'One of the big differences is that the central government 
is much more important in the UK than I suspect it is in Germany. By that I mean 
(...) you have the added complication of the significant role of the Lander in the 
politics of the country and the impact it has on regulations affecting the business. I 
sense too, although I can't be entirely sure about this, that the relationship between 
German industry and the government is much more government will tell you what 
to do and what the rules of the game will be and industry will comply. Whereas, I 
think, in the UK, there's a lot more of an ongoing dialogue and challenging what 
the government is seeking to do. Maybe a slightly unfair comparison but it's my 
perception from seeing how my colleagues in Esso AG behave and also how their 
industry association behaves.' Furthermore, he points out that there are 
'tremendous similarities between the way Exxon thinks and the way the British 
government thinks, certainly that's different in Germany where you have a best 
technology of the world approach'.
Refining Manager: 'It's very clear from this benchmarking data that German
refineries are significantly more efficient and effective than our refinery is. It's clear 
that they run the business with fewer people, it's clear that they have better energy 
efficiency, their maintenance costs are a lot less than ours (...).'
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Lubricants Manager: 'The German market is very technical. The product in 
Germany is marketed and sold on technical properties, and people are prepared to 
pay an incremental margin. The UK is much less technical, more price sensitive. 
Lubricants in the UK are seen much more as a commodity. So you differentiate by 
what you've got around it whereas in Germany it's very much sold on the basis of 
its specification (...).'
Bitumen Manager: 'The markets are different in the way they're structured, to some 
extent. (...) The way the governments in each country specify road-building is very 
different.
5.3 Comparative Evaluation by Esso Petroleum Managers of Influences 
On Their Business
5.3.1 The Relative Influence of Different Institutional Environments
In this section, managers had to evaluate the influence of different institutional 
environments on their strategies (see Chapter Four). All in all, the managers 
interviewed considered the institutions within the General National Environment as 
relatively most influential with an aggregate of 11 points. This was closely 
followed by the Multinational Institutions with 9 points. The Sector-Specific 
Institutions got minus 8 points and the General International Institutions minus 12 
points.
Within the General Institutional Environment, particularly the state and public 
opinion were mentioned by the managers as influential. The managers were aware 
that these factors are interdependent and thus both have to be considered. As the 
Refining Manager puts it, 'obviously, the state is very important to us. We take a 
commitment to operate within the laws of the lands, and the extent that those laws 
change. Public Opinion exerts pressure on the state, the state exerts pressure on us 
(...). '
As for the Multinational Institutions, the majority of managers perceived their 
influence as strong or very strong compared with the General International 
Institutions or the Sector-specific Institutions. However, the managers had 
difficulties in comparing the influence of the General National Institutions with 
those of the Multinational Institution. The comparison was considered as 'tough' 
(Refining Manager) or 'tricky' (Bitumen Manager), as 'very close call' (Refining
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Manager). Managers mostly perceived the two environments as influential in 
different ways. The General National Institutions, in their eyes, shaped the context 
in which the company was embedded whereas Exxon and their guidelines and 
policies determines the way the company works. As the Refining Manager states, 
'the General National Institutions are very important and very much create the 
climate in the way we work. The Multinational Institutions specify the way we 
work.' In this context, the Multinational Institutions are deeply ingrained in the 
business as the company culture. As the Public Affairs Manager notes, 'the 
Multinational Institutions are so much part of how the company is that I take it for 
granted, because it is what the Exxon culture is.'
As far as the Sector-specific Institutions are concerned, the managers named as 
important factors OPEC as well as sector-bodies issuing standards to which the 
company adheres. However, the influence of these factors is not perceived as 
prominent as the factors of the General National or Multinational Environment 
which are considered to be more influential and immediate in the daily work. As 
the Refining Manager puts it, 'the Sector-specific Institutions are much about 
standards, we have to be aware of these things, and of course OPEC could 
overrule anything... but on a day-to-day basis, the (General National Institutions) 
are much more important.' Furthermore, the sector-bodies are very much 
determined by the company itself and thus can be influenced to a considerable 
extent. As the Public Affairs Manager adds, 'when it comes to the sector-bodies we 
usually work them very hard if we work something, we work it hard.'
As for the General International Environment, the only pressure seen as influential 
on a day-to-day basis was the European Union which, according to the Public 
Affairs Manager, is of growing importance. As he says, today, the influence 
exerted is '70% the UK government, 30% the EU... 10 years ago, it was 95% the 
UK government, 5% the EU.' Nevertheless, the pressures by the EU were 
considered as not as substantial as those from the state or public opinion. As the 
Refining Manager states, '(...) obviously, there are (EU) laws that are passed (...) 
that do influence us, but that's not an area that I worry too much about.'
5.3.2 Institutional Environment As a Whole relative to the Technical 
Environment and Power&Politics
Three managers answered this section. Two of them evaluated both the technical 
and institutional influence as very strong, one evaluated the technical as moderate 
with a tendency to strong and one the institutional influence as strong. As for
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Power and Politics, the managers had difficulties identifying with this notion. Two 
managers regarded the influence as moderate.
Managers perceived the technical influence as having a very strong influence 
because of the growing importance of the improvement of relative performance as 
compared with the competitors (Refining Manager) and technological change 
resulting from changes in the government's financial policy (Bitumen Manager)* . 
With regard to the former, the Refining Manager explains that 'increasingly, we are 
looking at our competitors. We're not looking at absolute performance, but 
competitive improvement of performance, and increasingly at international 
competition. The likelihood of making money is dependent on competitiveness.'
As for the Institutional Environment, factors considered as of very strong influence 
were especially Exxon, the State and Public Opinion.
With regard to the notion of Power and Politics the Bitumen Manager pointed out 
that Power and Politics might affect other parts of the business more. As the 
explains, 'I've got the benefit of being in a profitable part of the company, 
otherwise it might be different.' The Refining Manager had particular problems 
with the notion; Tve never seen us as a political company. Generally, I'd like to 
think that if people want to voice an opinion and are cogent about it, they're 
listened to. I don't think there's much politics....' As for the element of'Power' he 
distinguishes two areas within the company where power can be exerted, in the 
personal sphere and the business sphere. As far as the business is concerned, he 
acknowledges that power resides in the Management Committee and in Senior 
Management, however he opposes the idea that 'power' is a determining factor in 
the allocation of investments throughout Exxon. As the manager explains, the 
investments are undertaken on the basis of efficiency criteria. He does not feel that 
there is favouritism for certain affiliates. Accordingly, Power and Politics play a 
minor role in the business sphere. However, as he explains further, at a personal 
level it might influence the activities in the company: 'I think we're not always as 
considerate about our people as we ought to be, and I think they get damaged, like 
me...Thus, from a business point of view, I think Power & Politics has no 
influence, but from a personal point of view, I think its influence is very strong..'
For comments on whether the factors named by the managers are purely technical, see Chapter 
7.
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5.3.3 Strategic Tendencies of Esso Petroleum/The Single Business Unit
In this section, managers had to explain the strategic tendencies of their 
unit/company by choosing among three options: efficient utilisation of resources, 
gaining legitimacy in the eyes of society, and gain acceptance by the shareholder 
and/or employees (see also Chapter Four).
All six managers interviewed answered this question. The majority found it difficult 
to choose among the options given (see Chapter Four), as they perceived the 
separation of goals as not realistic. Only two managers (Public Affairs Manager 
and Lubricants Manager) answered quite determined and quickly and chose the 
first option, efficient utilization. The other four managers concluded that all three 
influences have to be considered if the company wants to be successful in the long­
term. The latter managers agree that the strive for efficiency only is impossible if 
the company want to ensure their long-term survival. All three factors have to be 
balanced. As the Strategic Planning Manager points out, ' we do actually seek 
consent, from the state, the public and the shareholder. Effective utilisation of 
resources is a very important strategy for us but we wouldn't do anything that was 
likely to reduce consent for our operators. If we shut down something and it would 
make our company seem less safe and environmentally friendly, we probably 
wouldn't do it. The first priority is thus consent, and the second is effective 
utilisation of resources. First rule: Don't do anything that gets yourself into the 
papers. Nobody likes the oil industry. There's very little good publicity. So the first 
thing to do is to ensure that anything you do has a very high integrity in any field.'
As the Bitumen Manager explains, depending on the issue, one factor might get 
more attention than the other. In his eyes, efficient utilisation of resources is 
important and is the overarching goal, however, it is pursued taking into account 
the needs of the stakeholders and society. Although, as the Refining Manager 
acknowledges, it is difficult to meet the needs of both, Exxon and the employees, 
as cost reductions are not possible at present without redundancies. As he says, 
'efficiency is number one priority, because if I don't do that, the refinery doesn't 
have much of a future and then everybody suffers and not just a few of them.' The 
Human Resource Manager explains that society's values have to be adhered to 
even if they are not 'enshrined in legislation'. All in all, 'it's a complex world. So 
you can't try to maximise shareholders' value to the exclusion of all the other 
issues. So you must maximise the value in the long-term, not just in the short-term.'
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5.3.4 Table of Adjustment to Institutional Pressures.
Three managers answered this section. They identified different ways of adjustment 
to institutional pressures depending on the institution. The institutions to which 
they would adjust fully* are the State (3) and Exxon (3), the European Union (1) 
and Rotterdam (1). As for the State and Exxon, in both cases managers pointed 
out that before a law and/or a guideline is imposed there is scope for influencing 
and negotiating with these bodies so that the final measure respects the interests of 
Esso UK. After a law or guideline has been finally agreed upon, there is, however, 
no room for negotiation. Other institutions such as public opinion, labour market 
institutions, pressure groups and the like were responded to in different ways, from 
'seeking a compromise' to 'trying to manipulate the institution'.
5.4 Summary - The Overall Business Recipe of Esso Petroleum
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the following does not represent the complete 
business recipe of Esso Petroleum but focuses on those aspects of the recipe which 
were revealed to be distinctive relative to Esso AG and/or gave insights into the 
ways Esso Petroleum managers perceived their business.
The managers of Esso Petroleum have one overarching goal: to reduce costs and 
at the same time improve the company's performance in the areas of quality and 
reliability, safety and environmental protection, in order to increase their 
competitiveness. This is to be achieved partly by way of further redundancies and 
the improvement of management systems. Esso Petroleum managers strongly 
oppose measures which are not cost-effective, and unless the company is forced 
by law, its parent company or public pressure to do otherwise investments with 
inferior or no return are not undertaken.
Whereas Exxon guidance is accepted and not perceived as restricting, Esso 
Petroleum managers oppose any constraints to their business by either the UK 
government or other organisations such as the EU, which might lead to 
unnecessary expenses, from the point of view of cost-effectiveness. With regard to 
the EU, Esso Petroleum Managers believe that the efforts of the Union to 
harmonise regulations throughout Europe lead to unncessary expenses and little 
benefit. One of the concerns of Esso Petroleum is thus to be present in Brussels 
and exert influence on the European Commission in order to reduce the
The number of managers choosing the respective institution is given in brackets.
82
disadvantageous effects the directives might have. The decisions of the EU should 
be based on sound science and technology and investments made should reflect the 
environmental gain they bring (eg Esso View, December 1993). The pledge for 
European-wide standards the achievement of which should be left to the discretion 
of the companies affected, shows the company's belief in 'self-regulation', in leaving 
the execution of environmental protection to the companies themselves.
As for the British State, Esso Petroleum managers perceive the relationship with 
the government as cooperative, however, emphasis is put on challenging and 
questioning government policies. Especially the Public Affairs Manager points out 
that Esso Petroleum participate in the policy-making process. Governments should 
ensure that legislation is based on the ideal of cost-effectiveness. Particularly in the 
areas of competition and the environment, Esso Petroleum managers oppose 
'unnecessary' government regulations. Measures by the government to reduce state 
interventions during the 1980s have been very welcome by Esso Petroleum 
managers. Scope given to companies under the new legislation is fully used. One 
example of this is the fact that during the 1980s, Esso Petroleum became a non­
unionised company (see also below). If the state interferes where the market fails, 
Esso Petroleum is prepared to adjust to the state policies. This becomes obvious in 
the area of Human Resources. Since the introduction of the National Vocational 
Qualifications Scheme Esso has offered vocational training at the operational level 
where staff have in general traditionally been trained 'on the job' only.
The interface with employees, described by the Human Resource Manager as the 
'single biggest difference' between Esso Petroleum and Esso AG, is characterised 
by its focus on the individual rather than the collective. Employees have individual 
employment contracts which are negotiated yearly. Although site committees exist, 
their influence is limited to work-place related issues. Formal codetermination does 
not exist and is not seen as desirable, as it is believed to decrease the company's 
flexibility and thus to be disadvantageous in the long-term. Regarding the attitude 
towards trade unions, the managers believe that the non-unionised character of 
their company is an improvement to the previous situation (see eg. Human 
Resource Manager, Refining Manager). Unions are regarded as a third party who 
disturb the communication between management and staff. Managers believe that 
the communication between management and employees has improved being 
carried out via site committees and through direct communication with the 
managers. In this context, the reduction of union power and state intervention in 
general in the Human Resource area is seen as critical to the long-term survival of 
the company. Especially at present where competition becomes increasingly fierce
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and margins tight, the change which needs to be affected by the company, partly 
by way of redundancies, is believed to be easier to undertake under current 
legislation and thus to be beneficial for those employees who stay. The interface 
with employees reflects the company's belief that it is essential to ensure that 
employee participation may be subordinated to the end of achieving a satisfactory 
return.
As for management recruitment and development, Esso Petroleum believes that 
graduates preferably with an engineering degree satisfy the company's needs best. 
During their career with Esso Petroleum the young managers, most of whom are 
male, gain experience in different jobs which shows the company's focus on 
flexibility. Furthermore, they are encouraged to pursue ftirther education, which 
the company believes increases their motivation as well as providing a 'quality 
assurance' to Esso. The recmitment of operational staff has so far been undertaken 
directly from school with training being provided 'on the job', apart from some 
areas in refining. As mentioned aboved, this has changed recently, and increasingly 
vocational training is offered for employees at this level.
Exxon guidelines and UK legislation are in general quite similar, and Esso 
Petroleum is only in a few cases forced to adjust Exxon policies to local needs or 
legislation. If, however, there should be a conflict, local legislation takes 
precedence unless the issue in question is of critical importance to the whole 
corporation. Esso Petroleum managers perceive the guidance by their parent 
company as 'top-level'. The guidelines and policies pervade all areas of the business 
and are engrained in the day-to-day operations of the managers. Exxon policies and 
guidelines are the 'culture' of the corporation and thus are perceived as 'the way 
things are'. Most policies supported by Esso Petroleum have been originated by 
Exxon. Examples of this are the Alcohol & Drug Policy, the Code of Conduct, or 
Exxon Ethics, or OIMS, the recently implemented Operations Integrity 
Management Systems. In a few cases, Exxon requires projects to be carried out or 
policies to be implemented which Esso Petroleum would not initiate itself because 
the projects or policies do not seem necessary under current circumstances (eg. 
Alcohol&Drug Policy), or because they point to a direction the company is 
resistant to follow (eg. analysing the economics of shutting down a refinery). 
Generally, the attitude of Esso Petroleum managers to Exxon show an overall 
strong belief in Exxon worldwide goals and the attempt to accommodate them to 
the greatest possible extent. Even in cases where local legislation and Exxon 
policies conflict, Esso Petroleum does not exclude the possibility of negotiating 
with the local government if the matter was important to Exxon corporation.
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Esso Petroleum face fierce competition not only locally but also increasingly from 
abroad. In retail, the company has reacted nationally with a proactive and 
aggressive marketing strategy which reflects the belief of the managers that 
business is best made via the price (see especially the current Price-Watch 
campaign). Emphasis is put on the improvement of operational efficiency to help 
the margins, given the current low prices. As for the Refining side of the business, 
the Refining Manager believes that the best way to improve his profits is the 
increase in efficiency and the relative improvement against the Salomon refining 
benchmark in all areas of the business. He believes that there is a lot of potential 
for improvement due to the low labour costs and non-unionisation.
As to the national Public Opinion, managers are aware of the core beliefs and 
values of the British public and the company adjusts to them 'even if they are not 
enshrined in legislation' (Human Resource Manager). The managers believe that 
the adjustment to public pressures is beneficial, as it is important to try not to 'get 
into the papers.' Managers are aware that the public influence government policies 
to a considerable extent. An example of the adjustment of Esso Petroleum to 
public pressure is the support of charity organisations by the company which the 
British Public expect of large organisations. The commitment of Esso to helping 
the community is emphasised in all public brochures on the company. The company 
have 'Community Action Programmes' which encourage employees to become 
participate in local groups and activities. In their representation to the public, Esso 
Petroleum stresse as well their commitment to environmental protection and 
performance. The introduction of OIMS (Operations Integrity Management 
Systems) is presented as the tool for the improvement of the company's safety and 
environmental performance. The company especially stresse the importance of 
safety in its operations, which is one of the company's goals.
With regard to other Exxon affiliates, Esso Petroleum Managers acknowledge the 
existence of cooperation among the affiliates which, however, does not seem to be 
regarded as a prominent feature of their activities. Nevertheless, managers 
acknowledge that the affiliates compete for Exxon resources (see especially the 
Refining Manager). All in all, Esso Petroleum managers believe that compared with 
their continental European counterparts, they have a potential competitive 
advantage when it comes to the allocation of investments throughout the Exxon 
organisation. The nearly deregulated economy especially with little labour 
legislation and low total labour costs seems to represent a good basis for Exxon
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investments once efficiency has been improved, as lower costs imply higher profit 
margins.
As for the different institutional influences identified, Esso Petroleum managers 
believe that General National Institutions, and here especially the State and the 
Public Opinion, and Multinational Institutions, that is, policies and guidelines by 
Exxon and cooperations with other affiliates, have a very strong influence on their 
strategy formulation. Sector-specific institutions are adhered to when it comes to 
sector-wide standards, however Esso and Exxon's interests are represented quite 
well in sector-specific instititutions and the latter are not perceived as restrictive. 
OPEC is not seen as of critical importance in the day-to-day business, however, it 
is perceived as having the potential to 'overrule everything'. As for the General 
International Institutions, although the importance of the EU is believed to have 
increased, managers do not feel that the overall influence of General International 
Institutions is very strong.
The Institutional Environment and the Technical Environment are both perceived 
to have strong or very strong influence, as for Power & Politics, the results are 
difficult to analyse as managers had problems with the notion, and further research 
would be required to obtain more reliable results regarding the influence of Power 
& Politics.
Evaluating possible tendencies in their strategic conduct, Esso Petroleum managers 
believe that economic efficiency alone is not the key to success. Only if the needs 
of society and the shareholder as well as the employees are considered, the long­
term satisfactory return to the company's activities is ensured. Esso Petroleum 
managers seek the consent of the public, the State and Exxon in everything they 
do. This is the company's primary goal. Public Opinion is respected as managers 
believe that bad publicity damages the business. However, as the Refining 
Manager acknowledges, when it comes to balancing the needs between Exxon and 
the employees, job security often has to be sacrificed for the aim of cost- 
effectiveness set by Exxon.
As for the adjustment to various institutional pressures, managers of Esso 
Petroleum identify three institutions to the pressures of which they would adjust 
fully** ; the State (3) and Exxon (3), as well as the European Union (1) and 
Rotterdam (1). With regard to the State, Exxon and the European Union, they
The number of managers choosing the respective institution is given in brackets.
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believe that before a law or policy is passed, influence and lobbying is possible to 
adjust the law or policy to the company's needs.
The company as a whole sees future success as depending upon its ability to adapt 
to the current circumstances and to improve its safety performance as well as its 
efficiency and competitiveness. As expressed in the company magazine, 'we would 
be unwise to assume there will be an improvement in our business environment,* so 
it is incumbent on us to adapt, to improve our efficiency and our competitiveness, 
to maintain our emphasis on operational integrity and safety, and to remain alert to 
our customers and their needs. Our future depends upon our success in these areas 
'(Esso UK Pic, 1996b; 4).
* According to the company (Esso UK Pic, 1996b: 3-4), the current circumstances are 
characterised by a refining overcapacity, intense competition in the market-place, stagnating oil 
demand, an overall mature oil market and weak crude oil prices.
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6 Esso A.G. - A Case Study
In this chapter, the results obtained from the data collection on Esso in Germany 
are presented. Firstly, general information on Esso AG is given. In the second 
part o f this chapter, different parts o f the business recipe o f  Esso AG are 
described drawing information from the interviews undertaken as well as 
documentary research. In this context, those parts o f  the business are presented 
which, in the interviews, were revealed as being handled differently in the two 
companies and/or as providing interesting insights into the managerial recipes o f 
both companies. In the final section the overall business recipe o f  Esso AG as 
gathered from the data presented will be outlined.
6.1 Esso AG. - General Information on the Company
Esso AG is a fully owned subsidiary of Exxon Corporation. The company receives 
all financial resources and main raw materials from its parent. Furthermore, Exxon 
has guidelines and worldwide policies to which the subsidiaries are expected to 
adhere. In this context, especially the ideal of cost efficiency is emphasised 
throughout the company and represents the basis upon which the affiliates' 
performance is evaluated (for further details on the history and policies of Exxon 
Corporation, see Appendix VIII). Currently, the major company goal is World 
Class 2,000, a goal according to which all affiliates have to reach world class 
standard by the turn of the century.
Esso AG has an overall market share of approximately 12%. Its main competitors 
are Aral, BP, DEA, Shell and VEBA. Esso AG owns two refineries, in Bavaria and 
Baden-Württemberg. As for the retail business, Esso owns 1,545 petrol stations 
which places it into the fourth position behind ARAL, Shell and DEA 
(Fachverband Tankstellengewerbe, 1996: 23).
The current number of employees at Esso AG is 2,052. The company have reduced 
the number of staff considerably, in 1980 it was as high as 4,500. Of the 
employees, two managers and three other employees are sent from Exxon. Since 
October 1995, the board member responsible for Finance and Personnel is from 
Exxon. In addition to its employees, Esso AG works with contractors. Employee 
turnover is low with approximately two to three percent. The average age of 
employees is quite high at 44 years.
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6.1.1 Organisational Structure of Esso AG
Esso AG has various offices in Germany. The company's head office is in 
Hamburg. The company has on average five hierarchy levels from the board 
member to the team leader or foreman in the plants respectively. The business units 
are combined according to functions in the case of the service functions, and 
according to products for the line functions. The average span of control of 
managers and supervisors is from four to six subordinates. For both line and 
service functions, a functional link exists to corresponding departments at Exxon 
Company International. The product lines at Esso AG are organised as profit
centres. Each board member is responsible for a variety of functions within the
organisation. The business line and profit centre managers report directly to the 
board member, who are headed by the chairman of the board. The coordination of 
activities across the business units takes place at management level, partly through 
long-term project groups. Furthermore, short-term project groups are set up if 
necessary and can involve managers as well as subordinates. All in all, the 
organisational structure of Esso AG is shown in Figure 3.0.
Figure 3.0: The Organisation Structure of Esso AG
Lubricants
DistributionPlanning
Project East
Law
Retail
Esso Austria -
COEDMineral Oil/Gas
Ind.& Wholesale
Tax
Finance
Esso Switzerland
Public Affairs
Accounting
Director
Purchasing
Human
Resources
Occupational
Health
Director
Refining & 
Supply
Director
Information
Systems
Chairman
89
6.2 Components of and Contributors to Esso AG's Business Recipe
In the following, elements of the business recipe of Esso AG are outlined. These 
are beliefs of managers as to how to successfully conduct their business. The 
business recipe of Esso AG is manifested in the actions as well as attitudes of the 
company.
6.2.1 Esso AG. and its Employees
Management Recruitment and Development
The majority of managers at Esso AG. hold a university degree. However, 
increasingly, management potential is developed after graduation from school by 
way of work and study degrees in cooperation with the Hamburg Chamber of 
Commerce. Most managers stay with Esso AG. for their whole career. The 
majority of managers at Esso AG are of male sex. The number of women recruited 
and reaching management positions is increasing, however. At present 
approximately 50% of graduate intake are women.
The prominent types of degrees that managers hold are in Management 
(Betriebswirtschaftslehre), Economics (Volkswirtschaftslehre) and Engineering. 
Upon entering the company, graduates are trained on various jobs in the form of 
job rotation. This includes at least one stay abroad. The tenure of posts vary 
depending on age and career potential. Of the managers interviewed, four had 
worked in their current positions for at least 9 years, and the two remaining for 7 
and 6 months respectively.
In general, Esso AG does not encourage further studies of young managers at an 
external organisation. Further training is provided 'on the job', as explained above, 
and within the company through seminars and the like.
Recruitment and Development of Employees at the Operational Level 
Employees at the operational level are partly recruited after graduation from school 
and trained in cooperation with local Chambers of Commerce in apprenticeships, 
or they are recruited after the achievement of the skills necessary for their job. 
Vocational training is pursued extensively in both the administration as well as 
production /refining. Close cooperation with the local Chamber of Commerce
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ensures that the skills taught at the 'Berufsschule' (Professional School) 
corresponds with the requirements of the company.
Employee Participation
At Esso AG, employees participate at all levels via works councils on site as well 
as via representation on the supervisory board. The works councils, the members 
of whom are mostly -though not necessarily - union members, have wide-ranging 
powers with regard to personal and social matters as well as the right for 
information in economic matters relating to the company.
Esso AG is a unionised company. With its responsible union, IG Chemie, they 
negotiate pay for all employes included in the wage agreement. Generally, all other 
employees including those who do not belong to the union, are paid the same 
wage. Esso AG have an internal wage agreement (Haustaripertrag) which means 
that they bargain with IG Chemie for Esso's employees only and not together with 
other companies. However, wage comparisons among companies in industry 
ensure that wages are adjusted to current trends. Management wages are not 
covered by union agreements and are thus agreed on an individual basis.
The works councils especially have a strong influence on the managers' business. 
As the Bitumen Manager explains, any plans regarding new positions and 
transferals of employees are first given to the Human Resource Department who 
forward them to the works council. If the latter does not agree to the plans 
outlined, the manager has to justify his plans in front of the councillors. Especially 
in the current times of rationalistaion, the works council has a strong position in 
trying to ensure that jobs are secured.
The managers interviewed at Esso AG view the activities of the works council 
positively. As the Human Resource Manager puts it : '(...) We need the consent of 
the works council in the entire social area, in safety, or, for example, the Alcohol & 
Drug Policy. But we don't perceive this as a restriction. It has the advantage that, 
once we've convinced the works council, the latter supports our policies which 
means the policies are not only accepted by the top but also by the bottom of the 
organisation. This leads to a much more constmctive and harmonic working 
environment (...). In other words, when (the works council and us) support each 
other, it is very positive. Accordingly, when the works council is constructive - 
which they are mostly in Germany - it leads to the prominent social peace that we 
have in Germany.' Also the other managers acknowledge the importance of works 
councils. In this context, the Lubricants Manager explains that 'of course, I cannot
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violate the Works Constitution Act {Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), which is a 
limitation - however, I must say on the other hand that I have an outspoken 
relationship with the works councillors, and that I respect them. Because the works 
councillors have a strong position and I would do badly if I acted against the 
interest of my subordinates.'
Dismissals
Dismissals are not easy to undertake under German employment legislation. Prior 
to a dismissal, the works council has to be consulted. If the employer fails to do so, 
the dismissal is legally void. In the case of mass redundancies, a social plan has to 
be negotiated with the works council which influences the selection of employees 
laid off and ensures that the consequences of the dismissal are minimised for the 
employees affected. If staff is to be reduced, it is attempted to achieve this by way 
of natural turnover or financial compensation. This, however, has in the past not 
always been possible. A social plan was set up, for example, during the 1980s 
where, due to an enormous overcapacity, the number of staff was reduced to a 
great extent. To Esso AG, it is a primary concern that redundancies - as well as all 
other social policies - are undertaken in a socially acceptable {sozialvertraglich) 
way for the employees in question. One of the purposes of the Human Resource 
Department is thus to help the fianctions in developing these socially acceptable 
policies.
6.2.2 Esso AG and the German Government
The actions of Esso AG are greatly influenced by the German government. The 
company's business recipe appears to be influenced especially by the environmental 
and employment regulation, by the tax regime and by the free market which hardly 
restricts imports and thus leads to greater competition.
With Germany being a federal state, however, not only the central government 
influences the way businesses operate. In fact, in many areas. Lander and 
communal governments have more direct influence than the federal government 
itself. One example of this is mentioned by the Bitumen Manager. The demand for 
his products is partly dependent on how many roads are built within Germany. In 
this context, the Federal Government has a share of merely 8% in the construction 
of roads, the Lander have 27%, and the communes have 65%. In the following, 
the term 'government' will represent the whole apparatus of Federal 
Government/Lander Government/ Communal Government, unless otherwise 
indicated.
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Relationship Between Esso AG and the Government
The managers interviewed at Esso AG view the relationship with the government 
generally as cooperative. Cooperation and the exchange of information exists at all 
levels, for the company as a whole as well as for single departments.
Esso AG as a whole is in contact with the government by itself, but even more so 
by way of its national organisation, the Association of the Mineral Oil Industry 
{Mineralolwirtschaftsverband), established in 1946. This used to be different 
before the 1980s when all oil companies had representative offices in Bonn, the 
then German capital. These offices were closed in the effort to rationalise during 
the 1980s and their purpose was assigned to the Association. The aims of the 
contact with the government is the exchange of information. As the Bitumen 
Manager, formerly Public Relations Manager, explains, it was 'to collect 
information from the international arena, which Exxon governs partly as well, and 
to provide the German government with it, and in turn, to get to know the energy 
policy of the government in order to adjust our corporate policy to it.' As mineral 
oil products are toxic, the ministry of the environment has become especially 
important. Apart from this, regular contact exists with the Ministries of Economics 
and Finance, as well as Transport.
As for single departments at Esso AG, also these are mostly represented in national 
associations, such as the Association of the Bitumen Industry (ARBIT). In the 
latter case, the Bitumen association meets with government representatives six 
times a year in conferences.
Esso AG and Government Legislation
Managers interviewed at Esso AG do not question the existence of legislation and 
regulation as such. However, the activities of the German government are not only 
seen in a favourable way. In fact, the mineral oil industry as a whole and also the 
managers interviewed criticise the government for its excessive regulations 
especially in the area of environmental regulation. During the last decade, the 
German government has generally tended to implement stricter environmental 
legislation than its European neighbour countries. According to Esso AG and 
indeed the whole German mineral oil industry (Esso Report, 1995a: 12-13), the 
German industry can no longer afford the resulting comparatively high costs of this 
policy. In this context, the call for more economical solutions to environmental 
problems has become more and more urgent. As expressed in the Esso Report 
(Esso AG, 1995c) the Esso AG company magazine, 'it should be the goal of
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environmental policy to reconcile the ecologically necessary with the economically 
acceptable.' Apart from the environmental policy, also the competition policy is a 
matter of concern for the German mineral oil industy. As Jobst Siemer, the present 
Chairman of Esso AG explains (1995a: 19), the German mineral oil industry 
'expect a legal and administrative framework which makes possible fair competition 
among the different sources of energy and the various national and international 
suppliers of energy as well as the free choice for the consumers among alternative 
energies and suppliers. '
As mentioned above, despite this criticism, however, the managers inteiwiewed do 
not in general oppose regulation and legislation. On the contrary, the attempt by 
the Human Resource Manager to establish an acceptable legal framework for the 
Alcohol & Drug Policy (see below) shows the acceptance and support of Esso AG 
managers of legislation.
Most activities of Esso AG at present focus on compensating for the burden placed 
onto the company by rendering its operations ever more efficient. As the board 
member acknowledges, the high labour costs, the excessive environmental 
legislation as well as the relatively high taxation lead to a competitive disadvantage 
for Esso AG as compared with Exxon affiliates in other countries. As he says, 'we 
must live with these costs, and we must now try as Esso in Germany to make the 
best out of a bad situation. That means that the pressure to rationalise is greater for 
us than for others. We must try to work even more efficiently so that the higher 
costs (...) don't affect us in such a way. To put it more precisely, we must improve 
our productivity and, if possible, be better than the others. We have already 
succeeded in doing this to some extent (...). That way, we have created a 
counterweight. Nevertheless, it remains something which always needs 
observation.'
Exxon Guidelines and German Legislation
Exxon guidelines are modified quite frequently at Esso AG. This is on the one hand 
because, especially in the Human Resource Area, policies are subject to approval 
of the works council; on the other hand, in various areas, German laws are stricter 
than Exxon rules in which case the local laws are followed. As the board member 
explains, 'It goes without saying that we will modify (the Exxon guidelines) if it is 
necessary from a legal point of view. Local laws and regulations - and we internally 
have a clear understanding of this - have to be complied with . Nobody could come 
and say, do it differently. That's not possible.' He explains further that 'there are
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guidelines, recommendations, but overall we guide our policies along the national 
market.'
Also the Refinery Manager takes the German legislation, once set, as rule to which 
he has to adhere. As he explains, 'if the German Government implements a law 
regarding the quality of petrol, I don't need OIMS or Exxon guidelines - if I want 
to sell petrol in Germany I have to do that according to the specifications laid 
down by law.'
In the Human Resource area, policies are mostly subject to the approval by the 
works council. Thus, Exxon policies have to be negotiated between management 
and councillors and, if necessary, modified. As the Human Resource Manager 
states, 'if we didn't have works councils or our laws, the circumstances compared 
with the United States or the UK would be a lot more similar.' An example of this 
procedure is the implementation of the Alcohol & Drug Policy. As the Human 
Resource Manager explains at the time of the proposal by Exxon, in Germany 
'there existed a legal environment with no experience with such random testing (as 
included in the policy). Neither the works council nor us could thus find a legal 
framework, and there was also nobody who could define us one. So we agreed on 
getting together with the president of the local Labour Court in Hamburg 
{Landesarbeitsgerichf), and to formally establish a Committee of Agreement 
(Einigungsstelle) * . Together (...) we then defined a legal framework. With this, 
we deviate in many points from what Exxon originally wanted, but we can say, we 
have done what was legally justifiable, what may be demanded, but we cannot do 
any more.'
If, thus, there is a conflict between Exxon rules and local law, the local law is 
adhered to. As the Board Member concludes, 'when we compare the values and 
guidelines of the shareholder and society, we have got the rule that we'll always 
follow the stricter one.'
6.2.3 Esso AG and Its Competitors
The area presently most troubled at Esso AG is Refining. Retail, in contrast to 
Esso Petroleum, is the most profitable part of the German operations as
* According to §76 Works Constitution Act, the Committee of Agreement consists of an equal 
number of employer and employee representatives. In the case of disputes between the works 
council and the employer's representatives the committee has to be set up as a means of achieving 
a settlement.
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Hypermarkets are not a prominent feature of the German oil market (see Appendix 
VI).
In Retail, the strategy currently focuses on establishing new petrol stations in East 
Germany as well as extending further the forecourt programmes at stations all over 
the country. This strategy is based upon market research which revealed that 
customers increasingly visit petrol stations for other purposes than purchasing 
gasoline (Esso AG, 1996a: 11).
The Esso AG Refining Manager is presently most concerned about local legislation 
and the effect it has on the international competitiveness of the German refining 
industry, Although fierce competition exists within the German refining market due 
to the existing overcapacity, the competition from abroad is seen as a major 
problem which induces the Esso refineries to try and render their processes ever 
more efficient. Due to the strict local legislation, the Esso AG refineries have for a 
long time already rationalised and improved their efficiency. At present, the 
German refineries are among the most efficient in Europe due to their investment 
in advanced technology. The cost-disadvantage of German refineries caused by the 
strict legislation has led to the strange situation that the most modern, 
environmentally friendly German refineries are at risk of being closed down 
whereas others, which have not invested as heavily, are less expensive to run 
(Kalkoffen, 1995). Nevertheless, the refining manager feels that a necessary 
prerequisite for the suiwival of Esso AG refineries is their superior performance. As 
the costs imposed by legislation can hardly be circumvented, the Esso refineries 
'(have) to concentrate on influencing and improving the things we can influence' 
(ibid.). In the manager's eyes, the better performance should be achieved by making 
the maintenance of the refining processes an equally important goal as the 
operations themselves. This can be achieved by better teamwork and the urge to 
perform exceptionally well. As Kalkoffen explains (ibid), 'we have to produce 
economically to reduce the damage for us and our environment. This is not new 
and has always been the philosophy of Esso. However, we must never stop to 
demand the most from ourselves. '
6.2.4 Esso AG and the Public
The managers interviewed identified the following features of German public 
opinion as most characteristic and as necessary to be considered in their business 
conduct. However, as the Bitumen Manager explained, it is difficult to measure
96
public opinion and strategies are thus mostly based on assumptions about the
concerns of the public.
• The German Public are concerned about the current unemployment rate. As 
the Bitumen Manager explains, the current unemployment is a prominent issue 
in the German Public. Accordingly, companies have to be aware that further 
redundancies can cause public criticism. Accordingly, the company generally 
attempts to decrease the number of staff by way of natural turnover. *
• The German Public is concerned about 'Germany as a Business Location' 
(Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland). As the Bitumen Manager explains, 
Germans fear that in future, Germany will lose its superior economic position 
relative to its competitors. The company itself attempts to influence the 
government to improve the conditions for the German industry, a discussion 
which is carried out publicly.
• The German Public distrusts multinationals. The Public Relations Manager 
points out that there is a general suspicion concerning the activities of big 
multinationals. Coupled with the concern about environmental protection, this 
leads to the unfavourable position in which the major oil companies are, in the 
eyes of the public. The company place great emphasis on the integrity and 
environmental friendliness of their operations (see eg. Esso AG Annual Reports 
1994; 1995).
• The German Public is concerned about the environment. As the Bitumen 
Manager explains, this concern is not always based upon facts. As he puts it, 
'the Germans love their cars, but they dislike the oil companies for polluting the 
environment, for example through tanker accidents. And this, although the car 
is the polluter number one.' Environmental protection is among the corporate 
goals of Esso AG. The company 'participate in the constructive development of 
environmental standards where legislation does not yet exist' , as described in a 
company leaflet on the corporate goals and basic values (Esso AG, 
'Ziel/Grundsatze. Wir verpflichten uns'). The emphasis on environmental 
protection becomes apparent in many ways, such as in the fact that the 
company's Annual Reports are printed on 100% recycled paper.
* To this must be added, however, that the pressure for Esso AG to lay off workers is presently 
not as strong as for Esso Petroleum, as tire company rationalised heavily during the 1980s partly 
resulting from the strict legislation and high costs imposed.
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6.2.5 Esso AG and the European Union
Esso AG managers are in general in favour of the European Union's goals but 
acknowledge as well the organisation's limitations in setting binding rules for its 
member states. As the Refining Manager puts it 'we would wish that the European 
Union was more important (than the German Government), as then we would get a 
harmonisation regarding our higher taxes and regulations where we in Germany are 
strictest.' Esso AG as a whole is thus very much in favour of common European 
policy approaches. Especially the current attempt by the European Commission in 
cooperation with the European car and mineral oil industry, the Auto-Oil 
Programme, is highly welcome. Esso AG hope that this cooperation will lead to a 
cost-efficient and rational solution. However, the Refining Manager points out that 
even if directives are accepted at a European level, 'the Germans already take the 
next step, so that the difference remains. ' This, however, is not only the case with 
the German government. Esso AG itself has recently implemented a Europe-wide 
measure, the introduction of low-sulphur diesel fuel, one year before the deadline 
stipulated by the European Union (Esso AG, 1996a: 18). The Refining Manager, 
asked why Esso AG chose to do this, said that this seems to be 'culturally 
determined', but he could not find a definite answer.
6.2.6 Esso AG and Exxon
The influence of Exxon on the business o f Esso AG is strong, however restricted 
by German legislation (see also above). Exxon provides the capital for Esso AGs 
operations as well as general data (on the crude oil price, for instance), crude oil 
and, finally, qualitative quidelines. Exxon influences all areas of Esso AGs business.
In the case of Bitumen, the responsible manager explains that Exxon exerts major 
influence on his business by way of resource allocation especially regarding the 
allocation of crude oil. As the manager states, at the time of the US boycott against 
the Iran, crude oil from this country was no longer available to Exxon. Instead of 
obtaining oil from other countries, Exxon decided not to subsitute for the high- 
quality Iranian oil and chose to make less business. As the manager says, 'these are 
the sort of guidelines which are formulated internationally by Exxon, and which are 
binding for us, by which we cannot pass ' In addition, worldwide policies such as 
World Class 2,000 (see Appendix VIII) influence the managers' business.
98
The Public Affairs Manager acknowledges that in some cases, decisions made by 
Exxon do not correspond with national rules or preferences. As he says, 'Exxon 
sometimes makes decisions which are rational, which are efficient, but which are 
accepted neither by our colleagues nor by the public. In these cases, international 
rationality (which derives from the maximisation of returns on a worldwide basis), 
and national rationality clash. The latter is often emotional, and not rational.'
This conflict is also seen by the refining manager who, referring to the Brent Spar 
'conflict', states that '(the fact that Exxon is a rational, analytical organisation) is 
one of the major problems we have in public. The problem which arose with Brent 
Spar (showed) (...) that the public problem does not exist in our mindset, in our 
structure. Because we have mastered it on an analytical basis, this is the best 
solution, and that's that. And then, all of the sudden, we see that we have a 
problem with the public.' Furthermore, he explains that he receives his crude oils 
from Exxon, and that he thus is subject to Exxon's allocation of crudes. This might 
be decided in favour of other refineries across the world. However, he 
acknowledges that without being part of Exxon, he would not even have access to 
the high-quality crudes that Exxon allocates. Furthermore, in the refinery, 
worlwide standards and guidelines exist, such as OIMS, which 'I have no 
possibility to influence (...).'
With regard to the Lubricants business, the manager describes the influence of 
Exxon as an 'immensely narrow corset'. In his case, Exxon has induced the 
creation of ELE, Esso Lubricants Europe. This organisation coordinates the 
policies of European Lubricants departments of Exxon affiliates at the European 
level . The goal of the establishment of this institution is to reduce costs and to 
'earn more money', as the manager explains.
As for the board member, he explains that 'there are certain things where it is said, 
for the sake of international harmonisation, it is important to move within a certain 
framework. This, however, changes as time goes on. (...) When there is a project 
to be undertaken, the shareholder comes and says 'see whether you cannot do that 
together, and if you don't do that voluntarily, then we'll have to implement 
guidelines." -Such guidelines exist, but not in the sense 'Do it this way and not 
differently'. This wouldn't correspond with the responsibility I have versus the 
German legislator, who requires from a board member that he acts independently 
and self-responsible. The shareholder cannot prescribe everything, this is not the 
way it works. '
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In the area of Human Resources, the influence of Exxon varies according to the 
subject in question. As the Human Resource Manager explains, in terms of 
'recruitment policies, it is difficult for Exxon to give guidelines, as the respective 
national labour market as well as the behaviour of other companies influence the 
respective Esso organisation very strongly, and is very different. We have thus, for 
example, guidelines regarding remuneration policies, that the shareholder accepts 
or doesn't accept.' The area of Human Resources, however, reflects well to what 
extent guidelines and policies by Exxon can be implemented. There are areas where 
Exxon opposes policies, and others where the multinational favours and policies 
and induces their implementation. One fitting example of the latter is the Alcohol & 
Drug Policy, which is outlined above. An example of the former is the question of 
part-time work which Exxon generally opposes. However, as the Human Resource 
Manager of Esso AG explains 'Due to the high unemployment in France and also 
here in Germany, the French as well as us have a real problem with this. In these 
cases, we have the possibility to enter into a dialogue with the shareholder (...)'. A 
further example of this is the bonus payment, a current trend in Germany which 
Exxon is against. The Human Resource Manager states in this context; 'Normally, 
if we operated by ourselves, we would say we follow this trend, as this means that 
you reduce extra costs in long-term. Exxon, however, opposes against this, as they 
have made experiences in the United States - in an entirely different environment - 
and have concluded that bonus systems can only with difficulties be implemented 
fairly (...) So we deviate at present from the general trend in Germany.' However, 
as he adds, not always does Esso AG follow Exxon's ideas. As he puts it: 'On the 
other hand, we have introduced the assessment of superiors 25 years ago, and 
Exxon is against it. They don't want subordinates to assess their superiors, as they 
say - from their American point of view - that then, superiors become the 
opportunists of their subordinates (...). Anyway, we have it , and we have just 
tightened it up, we have made it virtually obligatory, so that each superior has to 
do it - and then we have had big discussions with the shareholder who didn't want 
it. However, then our chairman spoke intensely in favour of it, and all of the 
sudden, they've accepted it. This despite of the fact that now, we are the only 
organisation within their mineral oil activities, that has the assessment of superiors. '
All in all, the Human Resource Manager views the restrictions from his local 
environment positively. As previously quoted with regard to the works council, he 
sees it as an advantage to base his decisions on a consensus with workers' 
representatives. Furthermore, he states 'The English have less legal restrictions, 
they can virtually implement everything at once (...). They have much more 
freedom. However, this means as well, that when Exxon wants to implement a
100
policy worlwide, the English have fewer arguments not to implement it, so they 
have to implement it almost identically. In our case, those policies are mostly 
subject to the approval of the works council, ie. we have to negotiate with the 
works council
6.2.7 Esso AG and Other Affiliates
According to the managers interviewed, the exchange of information has always 
taken place among the affiliates. Regular meetings of business line managers have 
ensured a broader view of the business of Exxon in Europe and the World. 
Recently, more efforts by Exxon have been made to rationalise their European 
operations by initiating projects and the establishment of institutions involving 
various European affiliates. An example of this is Esso Lubricants Europe (ELE). 
The Lubricants Manager explains in this context that 'we are about not to think in 
terms of the 'affiliate Esso AG' anymore but to talk about ELE, the European 
organisation, and of local units. So we're already a step further..' He explains 
further that the exchange of ideas with other affiliates is beneficial as he can 
subsequently adopt some of their successful policies for his business in Germany.
Despite the overall communication and some (increasing) degree of cooperation, 
there is also an element of competition among affiliates which is very clearly felt by 
the managers of Esso AG. As the board member acknowledges, Esso AG has to 
try to compensate for the additional costs imposed on them by the state by 
rationalising and making their operations more efficient. Already in the past, 
common operations of affiliates have not been placed in Germany, instead Exxon 
chose other locations in Europe. As the board member states, '(...) we have created 
a common European purchasing department (for some products) (...). Of course, 
there was the question as to where to place the organisation. And the decision was 
'Brussels', the decision was not 'Hamburg'. And one of the reasons for this was 
certainly that the latter would have been more expensive (because of the higher 
labour costs in Hamburg (...)'. He gives a second example, explaining that '(...) we 
have dismantled our large-scale computer, and all data is processed in England. 
This is a common project of England, Norway and us. Another central computer is 
in Paris for France, Italy and the Benelux (...). And (...) certainly Great Britain is 
less expensive than Germany. We wouldn't have been able to get the computer to 
Hamburg, as this would have been too expensive.'
Also the other managers state that Esso AG has to focus on efficient operations 
and high-value and innovative technology in order to be able to compete. As the
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Lubricants Manager says, the higher costs existing in Germany are a 'big problem'. 
The fact that total labour costs, for example, are approximately double as high in 
Germany as in Britain will 'mean that we will probably focus on some products 
which require a high technical know-how, and that we won't necessarily make 
mass-products.' And the adds that 'compared with the other European markets in 
the area of lubricants, the German market is approximately 2-3 years ahead. (...) 
This is because our cars are more developed, and therefore it is necessary for us to 
have more know-how to meet the requirements of the market (...). '
6.2.8 Perceived Differences between Esso in Britain and Germany From the 
Perspective of Esso AG's Managers
Human Resource Manager: Regarding Human Resource policies, 'there are things 
that only we can do, where we deviate from the international policy either because 
our legislation sets a certain frame, or, because in cooperation with the works 
council we make agreements which also our parent company sometimes has to 
accept, though reluctantly (....). The British have much more freedom (...).' And 
further he explains: 'The big disadvantage we have are our high labour costs. The 
advantage, which we have had over many years, is few strikes - we have always 
had a very strong social peace - thus little loss of working time.'
Member of Board: 'The environment is very different. We have an open market 
with little regulation which internationally is very interwoven (...) A very 
international market (...). In Britain, it is (...) different. Britain was always less 
integrated in the international market (...). Another difference (among these 
countries) is the importance of oil exploration and production (...). As for the Esso 
affiliates, differences are not very big. (...) (Both) Esso affiliates have refineries, 
(both) have a complete sales organisation, (both) thus sell the oil products which 
are demanded in the market. (Both) are active in the upstream, mainly via partly 
owned companies. And (...) (both) have the same corporate philosophy: a 
reasonable rate of return to our capital and sufficient profits. The basic philosophy 
is the same. The respective execution is subject to national habits, customs and 
mentalities.'
Refining Manager: 'Our refineries are cleaner, because we have stricter
environmental regulations. One example: the Mobil refinery in Worth is about to be 
shut down, and it will be moved to France. And our regulations that we have in 
Karlsruhe, for example for the emission of sulphur dioxide, is about 3000t, and the 
French have times ten more, so you can have 28000t for a comparable refinery
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A substantial difference are thus the regulations, regarding those relating to 
the environment as well as those relating to the technology. Inspections by the 
authorities, all our rules are much more prominent and stricter than in (...) in 
Britain. .. We also have less employees, much less than in Britain. .. because the 
Germans are too expensive, that is the main reason.'
Lubricants Manager: '(Regarding the business of Esso AG as a whole), the British 
market is certainly less competitive. This is because it is an island, and because 
they've been very clever with their capacities in that they haven't allowed so many 
products to be imported. And what happens in Germany? Everybody dumps his 
products in the most liberal market, in Germany. And that happens also within the 
Esso corporation, eg. with the Benelux. There's a huge gas field in Groningen of 
which Exxon has a big share, and the Dutch government expects that we also 
invest money in the Dutch economy. So we have two big refineries there (...). The 
Dutch market is quite small, and the refinery is so big, the stuff has to go 
somewhere. So it goes from the Netherlands down the Rhine (into Germany).This, 
however, is different in Lubricants, as there are less locations of production, and as 
we try to organise the European business according to the best logistics.'
Bitumen Manager: 'No major differences. Both (Bitumen divisions) sell to both 
industry and road construction. Of course, though, we have different ways of 
constructing roads. In (...) (both) markets, Shell is the number one in Bitumen, and 
Esso the number two.'
6.3 Comparative Evaluation by Esso AG Managers of Influences on Their 
Business
6.3.1 The Relative Influence of Different Institutional Environments
Five of the six managers interviewed answered this section. As the board member 
differentiated his answers depending on a long-term and short-term view, two 
ranking lists of influences evolved. For the short term, the managers interviewed 
considered the institutions within the multinational environment as most influential 
with 14 points. This was followed by the sector-specific institutions with 3 points, 
the General National Institutions with 2 points and the International Institutions 
with -22 points. For the long-term, still the multinational was seen as most 
important with 12 points, the General National Institutions came next with overall 
4 points followed by the Sector-Specific Institutions with 3 points, and finally the 
International Institutions with, again, -22 points.
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As for the Sector-specific Institutions, managers pointed especially to the 
importance of the Rotterdam market which 'is decisive for the price as a whole in 
the mineral oil business' (Lubricants Manager). Furthermore, institutions such as 
the API were pointed out as setting standards to which naturally, one has to 
adhere, as well as the Association of the Mineral Oil Industry as Esso AG stipulate 
their position by way of this organisation.
As for the Multinational Institutions, their influence was mostly regarded as very 
strong. The comparison with the General National Environment was difficult for 
the managers. As mentioned above, the Board Member distinguished between 
long- and short-term influences: 'In this case, we have to differentiate between 
short-term and medium to long-term influence. The influence of Exxon is 
immediate, for example the budget guidelines directly influence our planning. The 
state sets the framework for us all, whilst the guidelines from Exxon only concern 
us at Esso AG. In short-term Exxon is more important, in medium to long-term, 
the state is more important. Because one thing is dependent on the other. Because, 
if the economic situation (in Germany) is bad, then also the budget guidelines will 
get more difficult.' Other managers pointed out that the influence of Exon is much 
stronger because 'Exxon have the alternatives, they can invest their capital 
worldwide. Esso AG has no influence on this' (Public Affairs Manager).
However, the importance of the General National Institutions is still considered as 
strong. Institutions mentioned mainly in this respect are the strict regulations and 
energy policy, labour market institutions and the works council.
As for the General International Institutions, managers commented that the 
influence of the EU was not very strong, however they wished it was. A 
harmonisation across Europe would be beneficial as then, the cost-disadvantages 
that German companies have to bear would be the same in the rest of Europe as 
well.
6.3.2 Institutional Environment As a Whole relative to the Technical 
Environment and Power & Politics
Three managers answered this section. The Technical Environment was perceived 
as very strong by all three. The Institutional Environment was seen as having a 
very strong influence by one manager, who viewed the influence of technical and 
institutional factors as equal, and two viewed it as strong. As for the notion of
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Power and Politics, two managers viewed the influence of Power & Politics as 
moderate (Board Member and Refining Manager). One manager (Bitumen) 
evaluated it as 'strong'. The Refining Manager showed difficulties with the concept 
of Power&Politics (see below). Comparing the influence of Power & Politics and 
the Institutional Environment, the Bitumen Manager perceived the Institutional 
Environment as less influential than Power & Politics.
The Refining Manager had general problems with the notion of Power and Politics. 
As he explains, Exxon is first and foremost a 'rational corporation, which means 
that the allocation of our resources is based on rational criteria.(...) This has 
nothing to do with the distribution of power, but is purely rational (...). And if 
Exxon thinks, that Esso UK should get more money, because this will altogether 
be more beneficial for the corporation, then I might think , they have more money 
and a lot more power, but that's wrong. Up above there is the fact that we are, 
after all, only human beings with sympathies and antipathies within the 
organisation, that's the human factor. But that's nothing which I would call 'the 
distribution of power.'
6.3.3 Strategic Tendencies of Esso AG/The Single Business Unit
All six managers interviewed answered this question. The majority found it difficult 
to choose among the options given (see Chapter Four), as they perceived the 
separation of goals as not realistic. Only one manager (Refining) answered very 
determined and quickly and chose the first option, efficient utilization. The other 
five managers concluded that all three influences have to be considered if the 
company wants to be successful in the long-term.
In the eyes of the managers, the factors have to be weighed up against each other. 
Legitimacy is important as, as the Bitumen Manager explains, Esso AG want to be 
a 'good citizen'. As the Board Member points out, society and Exxon set the scope 
within which Esso try to make the best out of their resources. As he says, the 
separation into different factors as done in the question is difficult as it 'constructs 
conflicts which don't exist according to us'. He adds, 'of course we are a company 
with economic aims, that is we want to make profit, we want to achieve a 
sufficient rate of return. We won't do this to the detriment of society, though but 
only within the scope of the rules that are set by society and the state. So we would 
not violate any laws or modify them, or interprète them our own way only in order 
to achieve better profits. That cannot happen. In the scope of society within which 
we move, we want to make the best out of our resources. And it goes without
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saying that this must also be in correspondence with the strategy and values of the 
shareholder.'
6.3.4 Table of Adjustment to Institutional Pressures.
Three managers answered this section. The managers were asked to put different 
institutional pressures in a ranking order with regard to the adjustrment of their 
strategy to these pressures. The categories of adjustment are taken from the paper 
by Christine Oliver (1991). The managers identified different ways of adjustment to 
different institutions. The institutions to which they would adjust fully* were the 
State (3), the financial system (1), the labour market (1), the EU (2), OPEC (2), 
Rotterdam (3) and Exxon (3).
In the case of the state, all three managers mentioned the possibility of influencing 
government bodies before the law is implemented, in the case of Exxon only one 
manager mentioned this possibility. In the case of the EU, one manager mentioned 
the possibility of influence before the law is passed.
6.4 Summary - The Overall Business Recipe of Esso AG
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the following does not represent the complete 
business recipe of Esso AG but focuses on those aspects of the recipe which were 
revealed to be distinctive relative to Esso Petroleum and/or gave insights into the 
ways Esso AG managers perceived their business.
The overarching goal for Esso AG managers is to further increase the efficiency of 
their operations in order to compensate for the costs imposed by local legislation 
and taxation. This is essential in order to remain competitive within the Exxon 
corporation as well as relative to national and international competitors. A further 
focus lies on influencing the German government to improve the conditions for 
German businesses in the long-term in order to ensure the prosperity of Germany 
as a business location.
Esso AG managers describe the relationship with their government as cooperative. 
Nevertheless, the company criticises the German government for the high level of 
legislation in the cases where this is not cost-efficient (eg. Esso Report 6/95). 
Areas of especial concern to the company are the German environmental and
The number of managers choosing the respective option is given in brackets.
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competition policies. However, Esso AG managers do not in general oppose or 
desire to demolish the existence of legislation or regulation. Especially the German 
employment legislation is highly supported as, in the eyes of the managers, it leads 
to motivated and content employees and an overall pleasant and constructive 
working climate. The managers acknowledge increasing international competition 
and the competitive disadvantage of Germany as a business location. Attempts are 
being made by Esso AG in cooperation with the German Association of the 
Mineral Oil Industry to influence the German legislators to consider the cost- 
efficiency of their measures. Nevertheless, the basic values and regulations in 
Germany are not questioned and currently, the managers of Esso AG focus on 
trying to compensate for the high costs imposed on their business by their 
legislative environment, by remaining ahead of their international competitors 
especially in the area of techological innovation.
Regarding the attitude towards the European Union, managers of Esso AG are 
strongly in favour of the union. To them, Europe-wide harmonisation would imply 
that Germany would no longer have a cost-disadvantage as compared with her 
European neighbours. As expressed by the Refining Manager, though, the German 
government tends to always be a step ahead of the union, and thus the comparative 
disadvantage remains. The company, in cooperation with the German Association 
of the Mineral Oil Industry, tries to influence the government to abandon this 
proactive policy, one major concern being the potential introduction of an 'Eco- 
Tax' (see Appendix VI). Nevertheless, the fact that Esso AG itself has introduced 
low-sulphur diesel fuel one year before the deadline stipulated by the EU seems to 
show that the company believes in the rules once set and implements them as soon 
as possible, even if it seems more cost-efficient to take more time.
As far as the interface with employees is concerned, the focus is on the 'collective' 
rather than the individual, especially in wage agreements which are negotiated with 
the responsible trade union IG Chemie. Managers of Esso AG view the relationship 
with the union as cooperative and constructive. Employee participation is laid 
down by law and is highly formalised. It is carried out through works councils as 
well as in the supervisory board via employee representatives. Managers 
appreciate the importance of employee codetermination for a harmonic working 
climate. They acknowledge the power of the works councillors and integrate the 
latter's interests in their strategy formulation, this especially in the area of 
personnel. The Human Resource Manager sees an additional advantage in the 
works council as the latter's influence enables him to modify Exxon policies 
according to national circumstances.
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German employment legislation makes dismissals very difficult to undertake as it 
requires the employer to carry out the dismissals socially acceptable for the 
employees involved, as well as close cooperation with the works council. The 
Human Resource Manager supports this legislation and sees one of the main roles 
of his department in advising other functions within the company on how to 
'design' socially acceptable policies. As for management recruitment and 
development, Esso AG recruit their management potential primarily from 
university, however, develop managers also internally by way of work and study 
degrees or apprenticeships. The young managers are trained 'on the job' and are in 
general not encouraged to pursue further studies. Staff at the operational level are 
either recruited from school and trained as apprentices in cooperation with the 
local Chamber of Commerce, or are recruited after having obtained the necessary 
qualification.
Managers of Esso AG perceive the influence of Exxon as strong and are aware of 
the often conflicting interests of Exxon and the German government. In these 
cases, the company follows the stricter rule imposed. The worldwide Exxon 
rationality seems to clash frequently with the values and beliefs of the German 
public (see Brent Spar; Public Affairs Manager). The managers accept the 
existence of Exxon guidelines, however the remark of the Lubricants Manager who 
describes the guidelines as a 'narrow corsett' shows that they are to some extent 
perceived as restrictive. The Human Resource manager regards it as positive that 
some Exxon policies have to be adjusted to the German context and that, as a 
consequence, Esso AG often pursues policies which other Exxon affiliates do not 
have.
As for Esso AGs competitors, the area of especial concern is refining. Esso AG 
managers are especially concerned about competition from abroad. The Refining 
Manager is aware that his refineries are among the most efficient in Europe but 
that they are more costly to run than those refineries across the border which are 
less efficient and less environmentally friendly. He believes that the further 
improvement of his operations with strong emphasis on the maintenance of 
themachinery is the only way for his refineries to remain competitive in the long 
run.
As for the national Public Opinion, the managers of Esso AG are aware of the core 
values and beliefs of the German public, and the company considers them in their 
conduct. Especially the environmental concerns of the German public are
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considered and the company place a strong emphasis on the environmental 
friendliness of their operations. Nevertheless, as the Refining Manager 
acknowledges, the public concern is not always included in the decision-making 
within the Exxon Corporation, which might lead to problems once a decision 
becomes public.
With regard to other Exxon affiliates, Esso AG managers view positively the 
cooperation with their other European counterparts and see as beneficial the 
exchange of ideas and information among them. They are highly aware of the 
competition among the affiliates and believe that within Exxon corporation, 
Germany has a disadvantage as a business location due to the high costs imposed, 
and that the company has to compensate for this also within the scope of the 
multinational corporation. Already, Exxon investments have been placed in other 
European countries. The managers believe that the only way for Esso AG to 
remain competitive within the multinational context is to remain ahead of the other 
affiliates, especially in areas which require a high degree of technical know-how.
As for the evaluation of different institutional pressures, Esso AG managers 
perceive the Multinational Institutions as by far the most influential. Although the 
board member distinguishes between long-term and short-term influences with 
Exxon having an immediate influence, and General National Institutions setting the 
framework, the overall evaluation of influences leaves a wide gap between Exxon 
and the Sector-specific Institutions and/or the General National Institutions. With 
regard to the Sector-specific Institutions Esso AG managers emphasise especially 
the influence of the Rotterdam market which determines the oil prices and on 
which Esso AG thus depends. With regard to General National Institutions the 
managers believe that the State, Trade Unions and Works Councils have the 
strongest influence. The influence of the General International Institutions is 
generally perceived as not very strong.
Regarding the comparison of different environments, the technical environment is 
overall perceived as having a very strong influence, and the institutional 
environment is seen as having an overall strong influence. As for Power & Politics, 
its influence is overall seen as moderate. However, one manager had problems with 
the notion of Power & Politics explaining that Exxon corporation acted on the 
basis of rationality and thus, the notion of'Power' was not an issue. *
* Overall, as will be explained in more detail in Chapter Seven, the influence of the notion of 
Power & Politics is difficult to analyse from the data gathered.
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In evaluating the strategic tendencies of their units, the Esso AG managers 
generally pointed out that the consideration of the values of society, the national 
legislation as well as the needs of shareholder and employees is seen as essential. 
The strive for economic efficiency only is seen as impossible if one wants to ensure 
the company's long-term survival. Managers of Esso AG try to balance these 
needs, and to achieve the highest possible efficiency within the scope of Exxon 
guidelines and policies and societal values and regulations.
Regarding the adjustment to various institutional pressures, the Esso AG managers 
identified various institutions to the rules of which they fully adjust** : the State (3), 
Exxon (3), the Financial System (1), the labour market (1), the EU (2), OPEC (2), 
and Rotterdam (3). With regard to Exxon, the State and the EU, managers believe 
that influence and lobbying is possible before a law, directive or policy is passed.
All in all, facing a stagnating national oil demand, and a high level of legislation and 
competition, Esso AG believes that the only way to remain successful and 
competitive is to maintain a high level of technical expertise, innovations and 
efficiency in order to stay ahead of other countries. As Jobst Siemer, present 
Chairman of Esso AG puts it (Siemer, 1995a: 18), 'the (German mineral oil 
industry) faces the challenge to prove its capability to innovate, continuously 
improve their efficiency, and to adopt the structure and capacity appropriately, in 
order to compete successfiilly for international capital, against the dynamic and 
growing regions in other parts of the world.'
The number of managers choosing the respective institution is given in brackets.
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7 Comparative Analysis
The purpose o f this thesis is to examine how fa r  the business recipes o f Esso 
Petroleum and Esso AG are influenced by their National Institutional 
Environment. In this context, research questions were formulated in Chapter 
Four. In this chapter, the case results are presented and analysed on the basis o f  
these questions. The case results are firstly summarised in tabular form. Then, the 
key similarities and differences found between the two cases are outlined. In the 
following section, the research questions formulated in Chapter Four will be 
answered on the basis o f  the findings before the implications o f the findings for  
Institutional Theories and the Concept o f Business Recipes are analysed. In the 
conclusion then, the findings are overall summarised by answering the key 
question underlying this research, that is , whether the business recipes o f both 
companies are influenced by institutions.
7.1 The Overall Business Recipes of Esso Petroleum and Esso AG
The overall business recipes of Esso Petroleum and Esso AG have been outlined in 
Chapters Five and Six respectively. The following table summarises the key 
features of the respective recipes:
Table 4.0: Key Features of the Business Recipes of Esso Petroleum and Esso AG
Area Esso Petroleum Esso AG n
Attitude towards the 
State
Emphasis on challenging 
government policies
Belief that business can best be 
undertaken with as little 
regulation as possible
No opposition against existence 
of legislation
State should ensure prosperity of 
Germany as a business location 
in the long-term
Attitude towards the EU EU brings increasing costs for 
no great benefit
EU directives should be cost- 
efficient
Emphasis on self-regulation of 
companies
Strongly in favour of EU
Concern about pro-active EU 
policies of government
BUT: Introduction oflow- 
sulphur diesel fuel one year 
prior to deadline
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Area Esso Petroleum Esso AG 1
Relationship with 
Employees
Interface: focus on the individual 
rather than the collective
No codetermination
Non-unionised, unions regarded 
as 'third party'
Belief that codetermination 
decreases the flexibility of a 
company to adjust to changes
Belief tliat employee 
participation has increased since 
de-unionisation
Focus on the collective rather 
tlian the individual
Codetermination
Unionised; constructive 
relationship with unions
Belief that works councils 
enhance working climate, lead 
to social peace
Focus on socially acceptable 
policies
Advantage not to have to fully 
adjust to Exxon policies
Exxon Seldom conflict of Exxon 
policies with local legislation
Local legislation takes 
precedence if conflict - but: 
challenging of government 
policies possible
Exxon guidance 'top-level'
Often conflict of Exxon policies 
with local legislation
Stricter rule is always followed
Exxon very influential; 'narrow 
corsett'
Competitors
Retail
Refining
Focus on price
Improvement of relative 
competitiveness
Focus on convenience stores + 
new stations in East
Concern about international 
competition; stay ahead of 
competitors
Public Opinion Adjustment to core beliefs; 
Avoid adjustment if possible
Adjustment to core beliefs; 
Avoid adjustment if possible
Other Exxon affiliates Potential competitive advantage 
versus European affiliates due to 
deregulated economy and low 
total labour costs
Competitive disadvantage due to 
strict regulations and resulting 
high costs
Different Institutional 
Pressures General National Inst: +11 p 
Multinational Inst: + 9p 
Sector-specific Inst: - 8p 
General Internat. Inst: - 12p
short tm /long tm 
Multinathist +14p +12p 
Sector Sp. Inst + 3p + 3p 
Gen. Nat Inst + 2p + 4p 
Gen Intern. Inst -22p -22p
Institutional 
Environment vs 
Technical Environment 
vs Power & Politics
Institutional and Technical 
Environment very strong; 
problems with Power & Politics
Technical Enviromnent very 
strong, histitutional 
Environment strong. Power & 
Politics moderate - problems 
with notion
Adjustment to Various 
Institutional Pressures
Full adjustment to:
State, Exxon, EU, Rotterdam
Full adjustment to:
State, Exxon, EU, Rotterdam, 
Financial Market, OPEC, 
Labour Market
Tendencies in Strategic 
Conduct
Economic efficiency alone not 
key to success; consent number 
one priority
Achieve highest possible 
efficiency within scope of Exxon 
and Society
Determinants of Future 
Success
Improvement of efficiency and 
competitiveness; maintain 
emphasis on operational 
integrity, customer satisfaction
Maintain high level of technical 
expertise, innovations and 
efficiency; stay ahead of 
competitors
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7.2 The Similarities and Differences
Esso Petroleum project an overall goal-oriented image. The needs of employees 
are potentially subordinated to business needs, as participation is hardly formalised 
and at the discretion of individual managers. The company is strongly in favour of 
self-regulation and individualism, and incorporates quite willingly and to the 
greatest possible extent the policies and guidelines of its parent Exxon. It seems 
that Esso Petroleum managers identify themselves more readily with the goals of 
their parent company than with those of the British state. Esso Petroleum 
managers have an overall positive perception of their situation as the cost- 
advantages of the UK system imply a potential competitive advantage.
Esso AG managers project an overall more means-oriented image. The socially 
acceptable character of their policies is a major concern especially for the Human 
Resource area, and the codetermination of employees is seen favourably and as 
constructive. The existence of legislation is not questioned. The emphasis of 
managers seems to be on the collective, within and outside the organisation. The 
fact that managers perceive Exxon as somewhat restrictive and that they are 
generally quite pleased with not having to comply entirely with Exxon policies 
leaves the impression that Esso AG managers quite readily identify themselves with 
the local environment. Esso AG managers believe that they have a competitive 
disadvantage and their main concern is to compensate for the high costs imposed 
by local legislation.
As above table shows, the business recipes of both companies are different in many 
aspects. The attitudes towards the state and regulation differ significantly, as does 
the interface with employees. We can also note a different perception of Exxon 
influence with Esso UK managers perceiving the influence as top level direction 
whereas German managers seem to perceive it as more restrictive. Lastly, the 
evaluation of the managers of the competitive position of their companies vary 
greatly.
7.3 Key Aspects of the Institutional Envionments of Esso Petroleum and 
Esso AG
The following gives an overview of important key issues of the institutional 
environments of both countries (for details, see Appendices V and VI).
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The national institutional environment of Britain is characterised by a fairly 
centralised state-system. The power of local government, which was never a 
prominent feature in the system, has been reduced further since the 1980s (see for 
example Lane, 1989). Due to the electoral system, party coalitions are not common 
in Britain and policy direction can thus change dramatically from one legislative 
period to another. Government policy in Britain has, partly due to the electoral 
system, led to short-termism and piecemeal actions by the British government. The 
fact that legislation does, in addition, not involve many parties, reduces the 
legitimacy of the measures introduced by the government (Lane, 1989). Employers 
and trade unions have traditionally had an adversarial relationship. Trade unions 
were largely able to impose unilateral regulations on employers and enjoyed legal 
immunity from common law liabilities (Ferner and Hyman, 1992). Due to this, 
unions had the capacity to impede businesses to a great extent. During the 1980s, 
under Margaret Thatcher, union power was largely diminished, and many British 
firms chose to de-unionise (Metcalf, 1991). The fact that Britain underwent a 
lengthy period of industrialisation (Wiener, 1981; Lane, 1989; 1992) has allowed 
certain social-institutional patterns to persist. Among these is a strong belief in 
individualism and laissez-faire capitalism (Lane, 1989). Since the period of 
industrialisation the country has experienced no major disruption of institutional 
patterns. Another feature of the British institutional environment has been the low- 
skill profile of the British working population (eg. Bharmal, 1994a; 1994b; Lane,
1989). Theorists have established a link between low worker productivity and low 
skill profiles (Lane, 1989;1992). The lower productivity of British workers thus 
seems to be partly due to the education and training policies of the British 
government. Currently, Britain seems to base its competitiveness on its low-skill, 
low cost profile. Attempts are being made to improve the education and training 
policies but these have not as yet been very decisive (see eg. Bharmal, 1994a;
1994b).
In Germany, the state system is based on consensus and cooperation. The federal 
system with relatively autonomous Lander governments as well as the strong 
influence of unions, the federal bank and the fact that the electoral system 
encourages the establishment of party coalitions, ensures that legislation enjoys a 
high degree of legitimacy among the population (eg. Lane, 1989). The system has 
been subject to many disruptions and national crises, and institutional fabrics have 
thus frequently been destroyed and reformulated. This is especially apparent after 
World War II when the Allied Forces set up a new state system based on strong 
democratic principles to which the population has adhered since then. Trade 
Unions and employers have traditionally had a non-adversarial relationship and
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employers view the relationship with unions generally as cooperative (Lane, 1989). 
Employee codetermination is laid down by law at site level as well as in 
supervisory boards. Germany has since the war developed into a high-wage, high- 
skill economy. The high productivity of the German workforce has been explained 
as rooted in the comprehensive education and training policies of the German 
government (Lane, 1989). Recently, in the face of increasing international 
competition, the high costs imposed on German businesses have proved to be a 
potential competitive disadvantage (see also Appendix VI). There is general 
agreement by the German population and businesses that Germany has to focus on 
high technology and innovations in order to stay ahead of its competitors.
7.4 The Research Questions
In Chapter Four, research questions were formulated with regard to Institutional 
Theories and the Concept of Business Recipes. These research questions will be 
addressed in this section.
7.4.1 Institutional Versus Technical Influences Versus Power and Politics
One key issue for the evaluation of Institutional Theory is the extent to which 
institutional as opposed to technical factors explain similarities and differences 
between organisations.
Contingency theorists emphasising the task or technical environments would 
expect both companies to act similarly unless certain contingencies such as the size 
of the company, the degree of dependency within the national environment or 
regarding a parent company, the number and power of competitors, the customers, 
the availability of resources, technological progress and the like were different.
Both, Esso Petroleum and Esso AG, however, are very closely matched in this 
respect: both are subsidiaries of Exxon, have the same degree of dependency on 
their parent in terms of the supply of financial resources and raw materials, the 
sizes of the company are matched roughly, and competitors are largely 
multinationals.
With regard to technical factors, the availability of resources, might seem an 
important difference given that Britain is endowed with large resources of crude oil 
in the North Sea. However, this does not prove to be the case for Esso Petroleum. 
Exxon evaluates the downstream and the upstream side of their business
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separately. Esso Petroleum obtains all raw materials from Exxon, and the origin of 
the crude oil plays a minor role in the resource allocation. A related point, 
however, is that Esso Petroleum's focus on challenging government policies might 
be rooted in the power of the sector within the economy (see Appendices V and VI 
for the respective power of the sectors in Germany and Britain). Esso UK, the 
holding company of Esso Petroleum, is approximately the sixth largest company in 
the UK, and its Exploration and Production division provides an important return 
to the government. Equally, the willingness of Esso AG to comply with 
government regulation might be derived from its not being as powerful within the 
economy. It has to be noted in this context, however, that due to mineral oil being 
the major source of energy in both countries, the oil industiy has a fairly strong 
position in Germany as well as Britain (see also Appendices V and VI). There is 
some evidence, see Lane's (1989) analysis of the manufacturing sector, that the 
attitudes towards the government are engrained in the institutional frameworks of 
both countries. This does not exclude the possibility of Esso UK being able to 
influence the government more strongly than its equivalent in Germany.
Another major difference in the technical environment of both companies seems to 
be the hypermarket competition which Esso Petroleum faces. Fierce competition 
by the hypermarkets and a market survey showing the liking of customers for low 
prices have induced Esso Petroleum to follow a more price-oriented strategy than 
Esso AG. This different strategy seems to be a result of technical pressures, partly 
because Esso Petroleum is rewarded for providing their service at a competitive 
price, and hence suggests that to some extent Esso Petroleum's strategy is subject 
to influence from a technical environment. As we have seen from the data, though, 
the managers of Esso Petroleum do not think a strategy is feasible which goes 
against the values of society and the shareholder. Thus, we can assume that 
although the pressure by the hypermarkets is of technical character, the strategic 
response to this pressure is formulated within an institutional framework. The 
exposure of oil retail to technical pressures furthermore supports the argument by 
Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) that not all parts of an organisation might be 
affected equally by institutional pressures.
As for technological progress, it becomes clear from the data that the technology 
used in Germany is overall more advanced than in Britain. However, much of the 
technological progress seems to be a compensation for the strict regulations. 
Furthermore, we can note from the behaviour of not only Esso AG within its 
environment, but also from the German government, that the emphasis on 
technological progress seems part of the German way of 'going about things'. The
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British Public Affairs Manager speaks of the German 'best technology of the world 
approach', and within the EU, Germany is an advocate of the Best Available 
Technology' approach to environmental regulations, which implies that countries 
should try to reduce the damage done to the environment with the most advanced 
technology possible. As the strive for technological progress thus seems to be an 
institutionalised practice in Germany, it has to be questioned whether this factor 
should be regarded as of technical nature.
Lastly, the emphasis placed by managers on the pursuit of efficiency goals, seems 
to suggest that both companies are facing a rather 'technical environment', as Scott 
(1987; 126; see section 2.3.1) defines the technical environment as 'those 
(environments) in which organisations produce a product or service that is 
exchanged in a market, so that they are rewarded for effective and efficient 
performance.' However, the data gathered gives the impression that managers 
strive for efficiency not mainly because the market dictates it, but because Exxon 
require their subsidiaries to operate as efficiently as possible. The managers know 
that their performance and thus future budget and resource allocation is subject to 
their efficiency performance. Cost-efficiency is presented as an ideal throughout 
the company (see Appendix VIII). It is the relative efficiency of the affiliates which 
is of primary importance within the corporation. It seems that various elements of 
the business recipe, for example the lobbying activities of both companies, are 
rooted in the strive for the improvement of this relative efficiency. This is 
supported by the fact that the Esso Petroleum Refining Manager speaks of 
improving his performance against the 'benchmark'. Thus, as argued in Chapter 
Two, it is the relative efficiency which plays a major role in Exxon and this is to a 
great extent institutionally determined. It seems as if the goal of efficiency is an 
institutionalised 'ideology' of Exxon as to how to sucessfully manage their business, 
rather than a market requirement. Of course, it may be that Exxon pursue this goal 
because the worldwide oil market is of technical character and thus rewards 
efficient performance. Literature on the European oil industry and their concerted 
efforts within the EU seems to suggest that all oil companies strive for efficiency 
(see, for example, Herkstroter, C A. J., 1995). However, further research would 
be needed comparing Exxon with other multinational oil companies in order to see 
to what extent the latter pursue the ideal of efficiency, and how far this is shaped 
by institutional and technical factors. In this study, the pursuit of efficiency seems 
more appropriately interpreted as an institutional requirement imposed by Exxon 
Corporation onto its affiliates.
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The task of both companies seems overall the same, so why then do managers of 
Esso Petroleum prefer to do business without regulation? Why is the interface 
with employees organised so differently? Why is Esso AG overall more efficient? 
With regard to the latter, it seems that the oil business can be conducted with the 
less efficient measures of Esso UK. It thus cannot be the task which requires more 
efficient measures in Germany. Lastly, both companies do not pursue the goal of 
economic efficiency alone. Instead managers point out that it is essential to 
integrate the needs and values of the shareholder and society.
All in all, it seems that the differences found between the companies are to a great 
extent rooted in differences in their institutional environments. With the above 
criticism of technical determinism in mind, we will , in the following, analyse how 
the institutional environments of both companies may influence the latters' 
managerial recipes.
It is difficult to evaluate from the data gathered whether the notion of Power & 
Politics plays an important role in the recipes of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum. The 
notion was generally perceived as of moderate influence by the managers or as not 
influential at all. The fact, however, that managers did not feel that Power & 
Politics is important does not necessarily mean that it is not influential. In fact, 
some comments on the part of the managers seemed to show that this notion might 
be influential within the corporation. As an example, the German Bitumen Manager 
perceived the influence of Power & Politics as strong. This might be because his 
department is quite small and contributes only a little part to the overall business of 
Esso AG. We can thus not rule out completely that Power & Politics have an 
influence within Esso AG and Esso Petroleum or within Exxon corporation. Esso 
AG and Esso Petroleum are overall quite profitable companies within the 
corporation and research reported by Robbins (1991) suggests that this is not a 
situation which most promotes politics. More research would be needed to 
determined the influence of Power & Politics on the business recipes of the 
companies analysed.
7.4.2 Which Key Institutional Influences Exist and Why?
In Chapter Four we defined four levels of institutional influences: the General 
National Environment, the Multinational Environment, the Sector-specific 
Environment and the General International Environment. In the following, the 
influence of key institutions within these environments as well as the overall 
influence of the respective environment will be analysed.
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The most apparent institutional influences on the business recipes of both 
companies are those exerted by Exxon and the respective government. We can see 
from the data that the Exxon rationality or institutionalised rules of behaviour, are 
engrained in the day-to-day activities and the strategy formulation 'of both 
companies. Examples of this are the Operations Integrity Management System 
(OIMS), the Exxon ethics or the ideal of cost-efficiency against which the 
performance of the affiliates is measured (for details on Exxon policies, see 
Appendix VIII). The influence by Exxon seems to be based on the company 
providing the affiliates with raw materials and financial resources. We can see from 
the data that both companies are aware that their future supply with resources is 
dependent on providing a superior return to Exxon. Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
explain the adjustment to the institutional environment as a 'fight for survival' on 
the part of the organisations. We can argue that this applies to the relationship 
between the affiliates and Exxon. By conforming to Exxon rules and goals, in this 
case achieving the highest possible efficiency, they ensure future resource flows 
which are necessary for the companies' survival. As Meyer and Rowan (1977: 349; 
see also section 2,2.1) describe organisations adjusting to institutional pressures as 
'remaining successful by social definition', we could describe Esso AG and Esso 
Petroleum as trying to 'remain successful by Exxon definition'.
As for the requirements of the State, the data reveals that both companies 
incorporate national regulations in their recipes. Examples of this are the adoption 
of environmental measures in Germany, or the payment of mineral oil taxes by both 
companies. The influence of the state can be explained by its being the 'central 
coercive power' (Zucker, 1987; see also section 2.2.1) within the collective of a 
state system. Organisations within the collective have to adjust to the rules 
imposed coercively by the state, in order to be accepted and understood and 
thereby ensure their survival. Esso AG and Esso Petroleum both depend upon 
their national context in terms of the demand for their products. The adjustment to 
societal rules ensures future returns which - together with the supply by Exxon - 
are essential for their survival.
The fact that the companies have to balance the requirements of both, the state and 
Exxon, underpins the argument by Rosenzweig & Singh (1991; see Chapter Two) 
that subsidiaries of multinationals are subject to both, the pressures of the national 
institutional environment, and the rules and requirements which exist within the 
multinational corporation. This view is further supported by the fact that managers 
of both companies found it very hard to compare the influence of the Multinational
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Institutions and the General National Institutions. They generally pointed out that 
both types of institutional environments influenced their businesses in different 
ways. Exxon seemed to be perceived as influencing the way the companies work, 
whereas the state is perceived as setting the framework, creating the climate.
Comparing the two cases we can see that the managers of Esso AG are more often 
subject to conflicting presures by the State and Exxon than the managers of Esso 
Petroleum. As the rules and guidelines by Exxon are the same worldwide, this 
difference between the countries is likely to be rooted in differences in the state- 
systems to which the companies are subjected. Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) point 
out that differences in the nature of the national institutional environment of a 
company from that of its parent may lead to differences in the way parent and 
subsidiary pursue their activities. Equally, similar institutional environments will 
lead to similar practices of subsidiary and parent company. As we can see from 
above cases, Germany with its coded law and focus on consensus politics, as well 
as influential unions and a comprehensive system of social security represents an 
environment quite different from the Anglo-Saxon systems. Britain and the United 
States, on the other hand, are quite similar as also acknowledged by the Esso 
Petroleum Public Affairs Manager. According to Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) we 
can expect a company subjected to a different kind of institutional environment to 
be more likely to become isomorphic with its local environment. Indeed, we can 
find that the German managers seem to identify themselves quite readily with their 
local environment. The acceptance of local regulation by German managers has 
furthermore been identified as a distinct feature of the German system (Lane, 1989; 
1992) rooted in the underlying system of consensus. On the contrary, in Britain, 
the legitimacy of the local government is low, which partly explains the inclination 
to tend towards Exxon. This also seems to support Zucker's (1987) view that 
institutional interpenetration, in this case by the national institutional environment, 
is dependent on the legitimacy of external control. Furthermore, the fact that the 
business recipes are built on these underlying societal institutions shows that 
institutional pressures are not only exerted by way of regulations, but also at the 
cognitive level (Scott, 1995).
Both companies are not entirely isomorphic with their national environment. Many 
of their policies are required by Exxon and might, at the time of the 
implementation, be uncommon for the local context, as the case of the Alcohol & 
Drug Policy illustrates. On the other hand both companies are not entirely 
isomorphic with their multinational context either which becomes apparent through 
their having to adjust certain policies to the national context. On the basis of
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Institutional Theories this can be explained by various factors. Firstly, it seems to 
show that conflicting pressures in the institutional environment decreases the ability 
of an organisation to conform fully with all the institutions exerting the pressure 
(Oliver, 1991). Secondly, the only partial isomorphism might be due to the fact 
that both organisations are vertically integrated from the refining to the marketing 
of oil products, as well as research, and that they both obtain their resources from 
Exxon. This renders them largely independent of their local environments, mainly 
on the supply side. The adjustment to institutions such as financial markets, thus is 
not of critical importance to ensure the companies' survival (see also Zucker, 
1987). These institutions accordingly receive only a low rating by the managers in 
the evaluation of institutional influences (see Chapters Five and Six). Lastly, the 
fact that the companies do not comply fully with the rules and/or requirements by 
either Exxon or the state seems to suggest, in line with Scott's (1995) argument, 
that responses to institutional pressures are also institutionally determined. We can 
see how the differences in the institutional environments enable managers to adopt 
recipes different from their parent. This is supported by the Esso AG Human 
Resource Manager according to whom Esso Petroleum have less excuses not to 
implement an Exxon worldwide policy (see also Chapter Six). The findings suggest 
that Scott's view can be extended to different levels of institutional influences. In 
the case of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum, we can see that the way the companies 
react to the state is largely shaped by Exxon and vice versa. Thus, we can argue 
that if an organisation is subject to various institutional environments at different 
levels, the responses to either of these levels may partly be determined by pressures 
from other institutional environments.
The Exxon guidance is perceived differently by managers of Esso AG and Esso 
Petroleum. Esso Petroleum generally perceive the influence as 'top-level', whereas 
Esso AG managers seem to perceive the influence as more restrictive. All in all, the 
data seems to reinforce the above perception that Esso Petroleum are more 
inclined to identify themselves with Exxon, whereas Esso AG managers seem to 
more readily identify themselves with their local environment. This becomes 
especially clear from the interview with the Human Resource Manager of Esso 
AG, who, a few times, refers to policies Exxon has created 'in a completely 
different environment', or 'from their American point of view', which shows a 
cultural distance between the manager and the policies he has to accommodate. 
This seems to underpin the argument by Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) that 
another factor which influences the isomorphism of a company with its 
environment, is the cultural distance between parent and subsidiary.
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In both cases. Public Opinion has a strong influence on the business recipes of the 
companies. Examples of this are the support of charity organisations on the part of 
Esso Petroleum, or the adoption of an environmental image by Esso AG. Public 
opinions represent cultural expectations. Organisations within a given context 
have to adjust to the public opinion if they want to be accepted and understood. As 
the managers are aware, public opinion is a very influential institution, especially in 
the societies of Britain and Germany as they have a considerable influence on 
policy-making. This circle of institutional reinforcement (see Lane, 1989) is very 
clearly seen by the managers. Non-compliance with public opinion may result in a 
loss of business (see, for example, the Brent Spar incident). The public expect an 
organisation embedded in a society to act as part of the collective, and adhere to 
the social order. In the case of public opinion the companies face conflicting 
pressures of Exxon and the public. The Exxon rationality prescribes the ideal of 
cost-efficient measures, with which the requirements of the public do not 
necessarily comply. The fact that managers try to avoid adjustments to public 
opinion, or to manipulate it where possible, as shown in the Tables of Adjustment 
(see Chapters Five and Six) seems to underpin Oliver’s (1991) assumption that 
conflicting pressures force the company to decide which norms to follow* . In this 
context, the argument by Abrahamson (1991; see section 2.3.1) comes into play. 
The adjustment to public pressures is often not cost-effective at first sight as the 
company might jeopardise economically efficient procedures in favour of publicly 
required procedures. Equally, as seen in the case of Esso Petroleum, it might spend 
money on the support of charity organisations which apparently does not provide 
the company with a return. However, the adjustment to public pressure does, as 
becomes clear from the data, benefit the company in the long run, it is 'symbolically 
efficient' (Abrahamson, 1991: 609). Both companies try to obtain legitimacy in the 
eyes of society in which they are embedded. In the eyes of the British public, an 
acceptable, maybe 'ethical' company is expected to support charities. In Germany, 
an 'ethical company' is maybe expected to protect the environment. The companies 
act accordingly to ensure that they are understood and accepted.
It can be argued that to some extent the managers themselves, being part of a 
wider collective, believe in giving money to charity or in protecting the 
environment, and not only do so as a reaction to public pressures. However the 
partial awareness of managers of the public opinion and of the benefit an 
adjustment brings to the company seems to point in the direction of a more self­
* However, as the Esso AG Bitumen Manager points out, the measurement of public opinion is difficult to 
the company and the company thus often adjust to what they assume the public feel.
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interested company. On the other hand, it is debatable, whether, in the case of Esso 
AG, the early introduction low sulphur diesel (see also Chapter Six) is part of a 
conscious decision to accommodate public interest or if it reflects managers' 
beliefs. More research would be needed to answer this question. Interestingly, the 
organisations generally perceive the public as 'emotional' and themselves as 
'rational' (see Chapters Five and Six). In the eyes of institutionalists (for example 
Whitley, 1992a) we can argue that both Esso rationality and the rationality of the 
public are based on underlying, institutionalised beliefs about the 'appropriate way 
of doing things'.
7.4.3 The different levels of institutional influence
The business recipes show that the managers are influenced not merely by one level 
of institutions, but that direct influence is exerted by various levels of institutions. 
We have seen above that Exxon, the centre of the Multinational Environment, and 
the state as well as the national public opinion within the General National 
Environment have a great influence on the recipes. Furthermore, we have seen that 
an underlying societal rationality, as apparent, for example in the attitude towards 
regulations, seems to be reflected in both recipes.
Interestingly, in Germany, where the pressure exerted on managers can be traced 
back to a great extent to the state system and the distinct features of the General 
National Environment, managers rate the influence of the General National 
Institutions as relatively low compared with the Multinational Institutions and the 
Sector-specific Institutions. This seems to support the formerly mentioned view 
that managers of Esso AG identify themselves more with their local environment 
and do thus not perceive it as restrictive. In Britain, managers seem to rate the 
General National Environment as relatively high because their underlying 
rationality is the belief in self-regulation (Lane, 1989). These findings suggest that 
the perception of institutional influences is itself institutionally determined (see 
Scott, 1995, for a related view).
We can see from the data that the General International Institutions do not affect 
the business recipe greatly. The managers are concerned about EU politics, which 
they identify as the most influential institution within the General International 
Environment. They are aware that EU directives influence their government and 
undertake lobbying at Brussels, but for the day-to-day work and the strategy 
formulation, the EU is not decisive.
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It is difficult to determine the influence of sector-specific institutions. If we 
followed Spender (1979; see also Chapter Three) we would expect that the 
industry recipe, the underlying institutionalised beliefs as to how to conduct 
business within a given industry, would be most influential and that socio­
economic influences would 'act on the organisation through the industry recipe' 
(ibid; 66). How far this is correct with regard to Esso Petroleum and Esso AG, is 
difficult to determine. Both companies cooperate in trade associations within the 
industry. In Germany, the industry as a whole undertakes lobbying activities to 
improve 'Germany as a business location'. Furthermore, we see that standards 
within the national and international oil industry exist to which the companies 
adjust. In order to analyse the influence of sector-specific institutions, further 
study would be needed including other companies from the same sector in the two 
countries.
The above seems to suggest that not all institutions have the same influence. On 
the one hand, the data shows that institutions within a certain level exert different 
sorts of influences on the company, and on the other hand, we can see that the 
levels as a whole vary in influence as well. These findings support Oliver's 
assumption (1991) that not all institutional pressures are similar. As we will see in 
the following section, the nature of the institutional influence determines how an 
organisation reacts to it (Oliver, 1991). Considering the above findings it seems 
that the dependence of the company on the institutions in question and/or the 
potential consequences of non-compliance play a major role in the way the 
organisations adjust. This shows that Oliver's (1991) assumption that institutional 
adaption is partly due to the organisations' self-interest is supported. Both 
companies seem to adjust mainly to Exxon, the State, Public Opinion, because 
non-compliance could result in a deprivation of supply of resources or the demand 
for the final products. It thus seems that in the fight for survival, the consideration 
of what factors are perceived to be essential to the organisations' long-term 
survival, is a major influence on the business recipes.
7.4.4 How Do Organisations Act Facing Institutional Pressures?
The business recipes reflect adjustments to different levels of institutional 
environments as well as to different kinds of institutions. As far as the former is 
concerned, the Multinational Environment as well as the General National 
Environment have the most apparent influence on the recipes. Regarding the 
influence by the national institutions we have discerned coercive isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1977; Scott, 1995) resulting from rules and requirements
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by institutions such as the state and public opinion, as well as mimetic isomorphism 
(ibid.) at a cognitive level which is apparent as both recipes reflect cultural values 
(for example, the attitude towards state regulation, the focus on consensus versus 
individualism). In the case of institutions at a cognitive level, it does not seem 
appropriate to describe the organisation as 'facing' institutional pressures, as the 
institutions are engrained in the social patterns of the countries in which the 
companies are embedded. The managers adjust to these values unconsciously, the 
latter are 'taken for granted'. Managers of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum do not 
seem aware that they are incorporating these institutional values in their conduct. 
To them, their recipe is based on 'rationality' and is the appropriate way of doing 
their business. In this sense, even though the companies are subject to pressures 
from Exxon, the underlying societal rationality is deeply engrained in the business 
recipe.
As for coercive institutional pressures, both companies see no way but to comply 
with state legislation and Exxon rules once they are set. As we have shown above, 
non-compliance could imply risking legitimacy and long-term survival. With 
respect to Exxon, the state and also the European Union, managers of both 
companies point out that before a law is passed, negotiation with the respective 
institution is possible. This supports the assumption by Covaleski and Dirsmith
(1988) that companies influence the institutional framework of which they are part. 
In fact, both companies have a subdivision 'Government Relations' whose purpose 
is the exchange of information and lobbying with the government.
Furthermore, various examples suggest that both companies influence institutions 
not only on their own behalf but also in cooperation with other organisations. Both 
companies are members of trade associations who formulate national responses to 
regulations. This supports Scott's (1995) assumptions that organisations are 
engaged in lobbying activities in groups of organisations as well as by themselves.
The willingness to adjust, is clearly influenced by the institutional framework. The 
underlying belief in self-regulation leads to the company challenging government 
policies more in Britain, than in Germany. We can thus argue in line with Scott 
(1995) that also the response of an organisation to institutional pressures is 
institutionally determined. This is also reflected well in the Table of Adjustment 
(see sections 5.4.4 and 6.4.4 respectively). Esso AG managers name seven 
institutions to which they would fully adjust, whereas Esso Petroleum managers 
name three.
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As for public opinion, the companies do not see full adjustment as the most likely 
response (see sections 5.4.4 and 6.4.4). Managers of both companies see as more 
likely that they would 'try and manipulate', 'avoid adjustment', or 'negotiate'. The 
data seems to overall suggest, however, that the strive for consensus is a major 
component of the business recipe of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum. Both 
companies want to avoid attracting negative publicity, both want to be 'good 
citizens' which they understand as undertaking measures 'which have a high 
integrity in the field' (see section 5.3.3). This seems to imply adjustment to public 
pressures if it seems likely that it might lead to a bad image in the public eye. If the 
danger of risking bad publicity seems negligible, the adjustment accordingly does 
not seem to take place.
We thus see that organisations do act differently to different institutional pressures. 
Institutions at a cognitive level seem to be integrated without the managers actually 
being aware of it. In those situations where institutional pressure is exerted 
coercively the companies generally comply fully with the rule imposed - with the 
possibility, however, of exerting influence on the institutions before the imposure 
of the rule. Only if the pressures are conflicting or adjustment does not seem 
necessary - as it seems possible in the case of public opinion - the companies 
actively decide which norms to follow. In most cases, then, they try to balance the 
requirements of the institutions which exert the pressure.
7.5 Implications for the Theory
Considering the outline of Institutional Theories of Organisations (see Chapter 
Two), there seem to be a number of important issues in Institutional Theory:
1 Whether institutions provide a set of environmental conditions for 
organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Whitley, 1992a) or whether 
organisations are institutions (Zucker, 1987)
2 Adaption Versus Active Agency (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 
1991; Scott, 1995; Zucker 1987)
3 Whether the process of institutionalisation relates to three kinds of 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995)
4 The effect of inconsistencies of institutional pressures (Oliver, 1992)
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5 The decoupling of formal structures from informal structures under 
institutional pressures (eg. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987)
6 The respective influence of various levels of institutions (Calori et al,
1992)
7 The relative influence of technical versus institutional factors (eg Scott,
1987; Whitley, 1992a; 1992b)
8 The importance of history in understanding institutional influences (Lane, 
1989;1992)
9 The development of business recipes as a two-step process (Spender, 1989, 
Porac et al, 1989)
10 The most appropriate level of collective beliefs for analysing the strategy 
of an organisation (Spender, 1989; Huff, 1982)
11 How to perceive the environment in the business recipe concept
12 The key determinants of the success and failure of business recipes 
(Whitley, 1992a)
Issues 2, 4, 6 and 7 have been covered in the previous section of this chapter. In 
this section, the implications of this study for the remaining issues 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 
10,11 and 12 are addressed below.
7.5.1 Whether institutions provide a set of environmental conditions for
organisations or whether organisations are institutions
The 'Environment as Institution' approach views organisational environments as 
consisting of institutions which become reflected in the structures and processes of 
the organisations. In this approach, organisations are viewed as mainly adaptive to 
their institutional environment (eg. Lane, 1989). The 'Organisation as Institution' 
approach, on the contrary, pictures the organisation as an institution itself, creating 
its own distinct structures and beliefs (eg. Zucker, 1987).
This study has applied a largely 'environment as institution' approach and has 
shown that the business recipes of both companies reflect characteristic features of
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the institutional environments in which they are embedded. Nevertheless, it would 
be wrong to conclude as some institutionalists (eg Meyer and Rowan, 1977) do 
that organisations are mainly adaptive to their environment. Both Esso Petroleum 
and Esso AG are interrelated with their institutional environments and adaption 
seems, as the data has revealed, to be only one possible response. Given that 
managers of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum regularly face conflicting pressures 
imposed by the different levels of institutional environments to which they are 
subjected, it seems a realistic assumption that the recipe of the companies is based 
on some kind of rationale of how to resolve these conflicts. In line with Zucker 
(1987:454, see also section 2.2.2) we can argue that a mere 'environment as 
institution' approach would neglect the importance of these various social realities 
which force individuals and groups to balance the different demands they make.
7.5.2 Whether the process of institutionalisation relates to three kinds of 
isomorphism
As outlined in Chapter Two, institutional theorists have explained similarities 
among various organisations by way of three different kinds of isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1977; Scott, 1995): coercive, mimetic and normative. 
Coercive, or regulative, pressures may be exerted via rules or laws. Mimetic 
isomorphism takes place at a cognitive level , for example by way of imitations 
among organisations, or by the adoption of culturally supported values. Normative 
isomorphism mainly results from the institutionalisation of 'appropriate' practices, 
for example advocated by consultancies or universities. As shown in section 7.4.7, 
evidence can be found in the case studies for coercive and for mimetic 
isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell (1977) explain that mimetic isomorphism may 
also take place by way of imitation among organisations. It is difficult to discern 
from the data whether the companies are subject to this kind of mimetic 
isomorphism. The focus of this research has been on individual companies and their 
relation to their national institutional environment rather than to other 
organisations within the same context. Nevertheless, we can find some degree of 
imitation among the affiliates: they meet frequently in order to exchange ideas, and 
a remark by the Lubricants Manager shows that (see section 6.3.7) practices that 
have proven successful may be adopted other affiliates. The fact that successful 
practices are more likely to be adopted and become practice in other companies 
supports the view of Huff (1982) as well as DiMaggio and Powell (1977). 
According to Huff, successful practices are likely to become adopted widely by the 
companies in the same sector. Whether this is the case at Exxon, cannot be 
established from the data. Recent information from one of the German managers
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has shown that within the goal of World Class 2000, the affiliates are exchanging 
ideas and experiences in order to develop 'best practices' for the whole company.
As for normative isomorphism, we do find evidence for the adoption of practices 
advocated by institutions such as trade associations, universities, professions and 
the like. Trade associations do not only exist at sector level, but also in cooperation 
with other industries. One example of this is the wage comparisons which Esso AG 
undertake with other organisations in industry. Both companies seem to adjust to 
norms of behaviour by recruiting their managers mainly from university, or by 
providing apprenticeships in cooperation with local Chambers of Commerce as in 
the case of Esso AG. In all these cases the companies do not perceive the 
influences as very strong or as restrictive. This is likely to be due to the fact that 
they actively contribute to the norms being created by these institutions, as in the 
case of Chamber of Commerce.
7.5.3 The decoupling of formal structures from informal structures under 
institutional pressures
According to institutional theorists (eg. Meyer and Rowan, 1977), organisations 
which face conflicting technical and institutional pressures tend to decouple 
elements of their structure from their technical activities in order to be able to meet 
institutional as well as technical requirements.
It is not possible on the basis of the data gathered to evaluate whether Esso AG 
and Esso Petroleum are subject to conflicting technical and institutional 
requirements and whether their formal presentation, or recipe, is different from the 
way the companies actually work.
7.5.4 The importance of history in understanding institutional influences
From the above findings we can see that history plays a major role in understanding 
underlying rationalities of businesses. The business recipes are in both cases built 
upon a society-wide rationality which, as we have shown above, seems to have 
developed in the course of history. In both cases we find that institutional values 
are incorporated in the business recipes which are engrained in the respective 
society and are rooted in the historical development of the respective country.
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7.5.5 The development of business recipes as a two-step process
Spender (1989) and Porac et al (1989) see strategy formulation as a two-step 
process whereby managers first create their own rationality on the basis of which 
they then analyse the strategic options of their company.
In both cases we can find an underlying rationality which is partly shaped by 
Exxon, and thus similar in both cases (for example the ideal of cost-efificiency), 
and partly influenced by the national institutional context. As explained in section 
7,4,6, the influence of the sector-recipe, which is especially stressed by Spender 
(1979) is not clearly identifiable on the basis of this research. In the case of the 
underlying societal rationality it is interesting to note that managers do not seem to 
be aware of the social origin of their beliefs. When they were asked to name factors 
which they take into consideration when formulating their strategy (see Appendix 
I), they named primarily factors relating to the task environment. The only 
institutions they mentioned were Exxon and the state. This seems to show that the 
underlying rationality, that is institutionalised values in the respective society, is 
engrained in the way managers think. The strategy formulation seems to be 
undertaken on the basis of a rationality which is largely influenced by collective 
beliefs at society level and at the multinational level, which supports Spender's
(1989) and Porac et al's (1989) view.
7.5.6 The most appropriate level of collective beliefs for analysing the 
strategy of an organisation
Business Recipe theorists (eg. Huff, 1982; Spender, 1989; Grinyer and Spender, 
1979a; 1979b) posit that the beliefs at industry-level are most critical in influencing 
recipes of companies. Whilst this research does not provide sufificient evidence to 
contradict this assumption, it shows that other factors such as the influence by the 
parent company, or the societal context, are of critical importance, too. In both 
cases studies, it is the societal rationality which partly influences how managers 
perceive Exxon, the competitiveness of their industry or the strategy which ensures 
future success. In both cases, it is the Exxon rationality which partly determines 
the way the companies work, the processes they apply, the goals they work for. 
This demonstrates that the rationality of managers is influenced by multiple levels 
of collective beliefs. This underpins Calori et al's (1992) finding that managers are 
subject to various frames of reference. The managers believe that society creates 
the climate, the framework within which they work, and that Exxon influences the 
way the companies work. The study suggests, however, that this is not completely
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accurate. The societal rationality pervades both companies and thus influences the 
way they work, too. Exxon institutions and societal institutions are both 
represented in the business recipes of the companies.
7.5.7 How to conceptualise the environment in the Business Recipe Concept
Business recipe theorists have as yet failed to provide a convincing 
conceptualisation of the environment of an organisation (see Chapter Three). 
Despite their overall focus on collective beliefs and underlying rationalities, the 
theorists seem to follow a rather rigid distinction between organisation and 
environment with factors such as government policies defined as 'exogenous' 
constraints. As becomes clear from this study, the concept of environment needs 
to include institutional factors, as well as technical (as seen in the case of oil retail, 
see above).
This study suggests that the environment partly consists of institutions, collective 
belief systems which reinforce and influence each other. These belief systems 
operate at different levels and exert varying influence on the companies' business 
recipes. Whilst the study shows that organisations are subjected to different levels 
of beliefs, it is not clear how the actors with which the companies interact, are 
influenced by the collective beliefs of both companies. This would be essential 
knowledge for the analysis of whether a rigid distinction between the organisations 
and their environments, as seemingly posited by business recipe theorists (see 
Chapter Three), is sustainable. Further research would be needed in order to see 
whether the framework suggested in section 3.4 is appropriate.
7.5.8 The key determinants of the success and failure of business recipes
Business recipe theorists have so far failed to provide an convincing explanation of 
what determines the success or failure of business recipes. In this context, the first 
issue is how - in creating a business recipe - an organisation seeks to ensure that a 
recipe will succeed, and secondly, what factors determine the success or failure 
once this recipe has been implemented.
As for the creation of a business recipe, the findings show that managers do not 
view the strive for efficiency as sufficient to ensure the survival of their companies. 
Rather, they argue that they try to achieve the highest possible efficiency within the 
scope of the requirements of the shareholder and society (see sections 5.4.3 and 
6.4.3). This seems to suggest that it is essential for the success of a recipe that the
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requirements of the institutional environments are fulfilled. These findings underpin 
Whitley's perception of success as being determined by the institutional context 
(1992a). However, the institutional environment might, as in the case of Esso AG 
and Esso Petroleum, consist of many and varied institutional influences. In this 
case, the success of the business recipe can be explained as depending upon the 
ability of the companies to balance the needs of the varying institutional 
environments, or in the words of one Esso Petroleum manager, the consent of the 
parties involved becomes the superior goal in the creation of the organisational 
business recipe.
It is impossible to establish from the case studies what determines the final success 
or failure of a business recipe. Business recipe theorists posit that business recipes 
become 'obsolete' when 'changes in the environment' occur (Grinyer and Spender, 
1979b; Huff, 1982). However, neither are the nature of the changes explained nor 
do the theorists provide a convincing conceptualisation of the 'environment' (see 
also above). They acknowledge the cognitive construction of markets by actors 
within the market. Other factors, such as government policies, however, are 
viewed as 'exogenous' (Porac et al, 1989). This seems to suggest that the changes 
are most likely to be caused by 'exogenous' factors, because the market is pictured 
as an enclosed entity. This seems a rather inconsistent argument, as part of the 
environment is pictured as cognitively constructed and part seems to be depicted as 
of rather technical character. Since a government is a social construct, and should 
thus not be viewed as 'exogenous' to other actors within a society, it seems likely 
that it is the interaction and interdependence of different institutions within a 
society which leads to mutual influences and changes. If we thus assume the 
environment as largely consisting of institutions, the determinants of the success or 
failure of a business recipe are likely to be of institutional character. In fact, there 
have been examples where business recipes have failed due to institutional 
pressures: As the recent Brent Spar incident illustrates, the negative German public 
opinion induced Shell to withdraw their plan to dispose of the platform in the 
North Sea, although the company saw this as being the more economical and 
ecologically friendly option. In this case, we can see clearly how institutional 
influences determined the failure of Shell's recipe.
7.6 Conclusions
As shown in this chapter, the business recipes of both Esso AG and Esso 
Petroleum are to a considerable extent influenced by their national institutional 
environment. The differences between the business recipes are rooted to a great
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extent in the underlying societal rationality shaped by the state-systems of the two 
countries in which the companies operate. This rationality influences the way the 
managers view the actions of their government, manage the relations with their 
employees or evaluate the competitiveness of their companies. Especially as far as 
the latter is concerned, it seems that the ability of the organisations to achieve a 
satisfactory return to the shareholder Exxon is significantly influenced by the 
configuration of their national institutional environment to which they must adjust 
in order to gain legitimacy and survive. The balancing of the needs of the 
shareholder and society seems to be a primary concern of Esso AG and Esso 
Petroleum managers. Economic efficiency alone does not ensure the future success 
of the companies.
Considering the findings outlined in this chapter, we can conclude that the ways the 
companies operate, as manifested in their recipes, are different to the extent that 
their national institutional environment allows them to be different. The mutual 
dependence on Exxon as well as the similarities in their technical environment (see 
section 7.4.1) would suggest that both companies are quite similar in their 
operations. However, as we have seen the Esso Petroleum recipe seems overall 
more goal-oriented, based on self-regulation and individualism, characterised by a 
high degree of identification of the managers with Exxon goals and policies, and a 
positive evaluation of the competitive position of their company. The Esso AG 
recipe, on the other hand, seems overall more means-oriented, based on the 
collective and consensus, characterised by a high degree of identification with the 
national environment, and a fairly pessimistic evaluation of the competitive position 
of the company. On the basis of the findings we can argue, to conclude, that all 
these features are rooted in the configuration of the respective national institutional 
environment. Within their own contexts, both companies' recipes are likely to 
represent the 'taken for granted way of doing things'. The comparison reveals, 
however, that the key features of the recipes are socially determined, and that 
success is relative and determined by the institutional context in which the 
companies are embedded.
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8 Conclusions
The purpose o f this final chapter is to firstly summarise the contents o f the 
previous chapters. Subsequently, a summary o f the key results and implications 
o f the research is provided. Thirdly, the adequacy and validity o f institutional 
theories o f organisations and the concept o f business recipes in the light o f this 
empirical research are assessed. Fourthly, the methodology applied is critically 
appraised before lastly, the scope fo r further study is outlined.
8.1 Summary of the Previous Chapters
This research set out to examine how far business recipes of organisations are 
influenced by the national institutional context in which they are embedded. In this 
context, institutional theories of organisations were described in Chapter Two 
showing that these theories provide an especially sound basis for cross-cultural 
comparisons. Furthermore, it was argued that organisations should not be viewed 
as mainly adaptive to their institutional context, as posited by many institutional 
theorists (for example, Meyer and Rowan, 1977), but that it seemed more realistic 
to assume that organisations and institutions are interdependent and engaged in 
mutual interaction. Chapter Three provided an outline of the concept of business 
recipes. It was shown that this concept in its focus on collective beliefs and 
underlying rationalities explains well the complexity of the managerial task. As the 
review rendered clear, though, the concept of business recipes does not provide 
sufficient explanations as to how to conceptualise the environment of an 
organisation, or the determinants of the success or failure of business recipes. In 
Chapter Four, the research task was defined and the methodology described.
Chapters Five and Six presented the case studies of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum 
focusing on the key components of and contributors to the business recipes of both 
companies. At the end of each chapter, an overall summary of the key features of 
the respective business recipes was provided. On the basis of these findings, an 
analysis was undertaken in Chapter Seven on the basis of the research questions 
outlined in Chapter Four. It is not the purpose of this concluding chapter to repeat 
what has already been said in Chapter Seven. Rather, an overview of the key 
results and implications of the research is provided, and the limitations of the 
underlying theories and the methods used are outlined. Lastly, the potential scope 
for further research is summarised.
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8.2 Key Results and Implications of this Research
The case studies of Esso Petroleum and Esso AG, despite their common 
dependence on Exxon and a fair degree of similarity in the technical factors of their 
environments, demonstrate distinct features in their business recipes which are to a 
considerable extent rooted in the configuration of the respective national 
institutional environment. The institutional influences affect the organisations at 
different levels. This includes the cognitive level as the business recipes were 
shown in this study to reflect the underlying societal rationalities of the two 
countries. These findings thus support the assumptions of institutional theorists 
about the influence of institutions on organisations as well as providing evidence 
that institutions affect thinking and action at the strategic level of organisations, 
thereby extending the argument of institutional theorists.
Furthermore, the study illustrated how organisations act facing conflicting 
institutional pressures. The conflict between the parent company, Exxon, and the 
state as central coercive power (Zucker, 1987) of the national institutional 
environment was elaborated, and the need for the managers to reconcile these 
conflicting demands. The responses of the companies to these conflicting pressures 
were shown to be institutionally determined with the national institutional 
environment providing the scope for their actions. It was argued that the relative 
competitiveness of Esso Petroleum and Esso AG, and thus their ability to achieve a 
satisfactory return to Exxon is to a considerable extent subject to the configuration 
of key national institutions in their countries. Moreover, the case studies showed 
clearly that organisations do not merely strive for economic efficiency but that they 
pursue this goal within the scope of their institutional environment.
Considering the above key conclusions of this research, we can argue that the 
development of common business recipes across Europe seems only likely if the 
configuration of key national institutions becomes similar across boundaries. As 
Lane (1989; 293) posits, however, entire changes in national institutional patterns 
are only then possible if the whole institutional fabric is destroyed which requires 
an event equal to a 'national crisis'. Whilst this is not a probable option, the 
increasing similarity could take place more slowly with modifications of national 
institutions being fostered, for example, by the influence of multinationals, global 
networks and the like. For the moment, however, differences in business recipes 
are likely to remain prominent across Europe, which this study has illustrated.
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The combination of institutional theories of organisations and the concept of 
business recipes in this thesis is important. Given that they both emphasise 
collective belief systems, these two sets of theories have similar approaches. 
However, the foci of their analyses are different: business recipe theorists focus on 
analysing organisational strategies, whilst institutional theorists have so far focused 
on the structures and processes of organisations. It was argued (in Chapters One 
and Four) that the concept of business recipes and institutional theories of 
organisations may thus well complement each other. This research has established 
a link between recipes and the broader belief systems as manifested in national 
institutions. Whilst Whitley (1992a) has brought together the two approaches 
before, his research dealt with the macro-structures, or business systems of various 
countries. This research was relatively unique in its focus on business recipes at the 
organisational level, or in other words, the analysis of the influence of the wider 
institutional framework on the 'micro-level' strategy formulation.
8.3 Adequacy and Validity of Institutional Theories of Organisations and 
the Concept of Business Recipes
8.3.1 Institutional Theories of Organisations
In Chapter Seven, institutional theories were utilised in explaining the similarities 
and differences in the business recipes of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum. The 
adequacy and validity of institutional theory stood up reasonably well in the light of 
this empirical work. There is no single approach within institutional theory, and 
Chapter Seven demonstrates which of the various concepts and theories offered 
the most explanatoiy power, and, conversely, those concepts and theories which 
were not well supported by the empirical evidence. Overall, there are three aspects 
of mainstream institutional theory which need to be questioned and adapted in the 
light of the research reported in this thesis. Each of these areas are outlined below.
Firstly, institutional theories have, to date, placed little emphasis upon the conflicts 
within the institutional environment which force managers to balance the various 
demands of this environment. Whilst this appears to be a 'normal' feature at Esso 
AG and Esso Petroleum, and is likely to be so in other companies, only few 
theorists in the institutional tradition (for example, Oliver, 1991; Rosenzweig and 
Singh, 1991) have elaborated this aspect of organisational life. This may partly be 
due to the fact that institutional theorists have only in a few cases analysed 
strategic actions of organisations, where the need to balance various institutional 
pressures is likely to be most pronounced. As mentioned in previous chapters.
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organisational structures and processes have been the predominant concern of 
institutional theorists. This is despite the fact that the strategies of companies are 
likely to be influenced by institutions to a considerable extent. More research is 
needed to elucidate the influence of institutions on the strategies and recipes of 
organisations and, in particular, the need to balance various institutional pressures.
Secondly, whilst this study has succeeded in showing that differences between the 
business recipes do exist, it has also demonstrated that the recipes of both 
companies are similar in many aspects due to the companies' common dependence 
on Exxon. To some degree the recipes of both companies are 'global' in character 
as they partly consist of rules and processes which are implemented worldwide by 
Exxon. Whilst the globalisation thesis has been hotly debated in both the 
organisational theory and strategy literature (for example, Ohmae, 1990; Whitley, 
1994), institutional theorists have tended to focus their attention upon national 
institutions and national differences. Only a few theorists have drawn attention to 
the influence of multinational companies on local recipes (for example, Rosenzweig 
and Singh, 1991). The rationale for this approach is exemplified by Whitley who 
argues that the postwar internationalisation of firms and markets is limited in 
degree and significance as long as national institutions among countries vary. This 
echoes the argument made in section 8.2, above. However, this is not a reason for 
institutional theory to neglect the world-wide implications of multinational policies 
and practices.
Thirdly, institutional theoiy has frequently implicitly assumed the existence of a 
unitary organisation, the members of which are subject to similar institutional 
pressures. This study has shown that the various department managers of the two 
companies are subject to varying degrees of institutional influences (see section 
8.3.2). It is equally possible that different institutional pressures will be found 
among organisational levels; that is, subordinates might have different 
institutionalised beliefs or 'recipes' to managers. Organisations consist of a variety 
of social groups and it is misleading to perceive organisations as a unity with 
common motives and beliefs. Whilst this study in its focus on business recipes at 
senior management level was unable to show how far institutionalised rules and 
beliefs vary among the various levels of the organisations analysed, it is important 
to recognise the possibility of such variations.
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8.3.2 The Concept of Business Recipes
In this study, the concept of business recipes was found to be an appropriate means 
of exploring the interface between institutional pressures and strategy formulation. 
In this context, the concept has much to offer. However, the adequacy and validity 
of the concept of business recipes can be questioned on two fronts in the light of 
this thesis.
Firstly, whilst this study has been able to identify certain key features of the 
business recipes of Esso Petroleum and Esso AG (see Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven), the features identified cover only but a small part of the business of the 
two companies. In general, it is arguable whether there is an overall business 
recipe in organisations. Each department within an organisation is likely to have a 
distinctive individual recipe, tailored to the particularities of the business with 
which the department is dealing. The case studies of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum 
have already demonstrated that the area of Human Resources is subject to strong 
institutional pressures due, for example, to the specific configurations of the 
national labour markets in both countries. Areas such as Retail have been shown to 
be subject to strong technical pressures as well as to institutional pressures, and 
accordingly, their business recipe is different to that of Human Resources. This 
illustrates a likely variety of business recipes within organisations which has so far 
been neglected by theorists in the business recipe tradition. It also suggests that 
Scott's (1987) division of organisations into four categories (see Chapter Two) 
depending on their being subjected to varying degrees of institutional and technical 
pressures, is misleading. A thorough analysis of organisational business recipes 
seems to require research into the individual recipes of the different departments of 
the organisations, and, subsequently, an analysis as to whether common features 
can be identified amongst these individual recipes.
Secondly, it has been a difficult task to research business recipes in this study (for a 
more detailed evaluation of the methods used, see section 8.4 below). Business 
recipe theorists have used many different methods to identify underlying 
managerial rationalities (see, for example, Grinyer and Spender, 1979a; Calori et 
al, 1992). This difficulty is clearly one of the inherent weaknesses of the concept of 
business recipes and renders the validity of empirical investigation problematic.
In conclusion, this thesis suggests that institutional theory and the concept of 
business recipes are capable of improving the understanding of the content and 
formation of strategy in the two Esso companies. This is not to argue that these
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theories and concepts are capable of encapsulating all that is important in the 
strategy formation process; they have strengths and weaknesses. As Morgan 
(1986) argues, no one metaphor or theoretical approach is capable of illuminating 
the three dimensional nature of organisational process and outcomes, but different 
approaches can offer fresh and important insights.
8.4 A Critical Appraisal of the Methodology Applied
This study set out to identify the overall business recipes of both Esso companies 
and explore the origins of these recipes. In particular the influence of institutional 
pressure on the business recipe formation was sought. However, the study also 
wished to consider the possible influence of other factors such as the technical 
environment and power and politics. It soon became evident that this would not be 
an easy task.
One of the key methodological problems relates to the concept of business recipes. 
The research reported in Chapters Five and Six aims to identify a business recipe 
for each of the two companies. As discussed above, it is arguable whether a single 
corporate business recipe exists; rather the strategic direction of an organisation 
could be envisaged as arising out of a collection of business processes and recipes. 
Whilst it is argued that the broad brush business recipes outlined in Chapters Five 
and Six have validity, it is also acknowledged that a richer picture of recipe 
formation and content might have resulted from the application of a different 
research methodology. A possible method for researching the corporate business 
recipe would have been to undertake interviews with managers and potentially 
subordinates of different departments to subsequently identify potential similarities 
among departmental recipes. This comprehensive method was not possible within 
the limited time scope of this study.
However, just extending the number of people interviewed does not necessarily 
answer all the methodological problems. Institutional theory and business recipes 
seek to explore underlying rationalities and taken-for-granted values. These are not 
easy to research as the researcher needs to understand the underlying rationale of 
the behaviour and attitudes of the subjects analysed. The use of interviews in this 
research is certainly not the best method to identify recipes or the influence of 
institutions, as the subjects interviewed are unlikely to be aware of their underlying 
rationality and/or the potential institutional influences. In fact, the managers 
interviewed had obvious difficulties with the questions asked in Section III of the 
Standard Interview Schedule used in this study (see Appendix I). Due to the
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apparent weaknesses of the use of interviews the thorough documentary research 
undertaken in this study to complement the results from the interviews was 
essential to ensure to the greatest possible extent the validity of the data obtained. 
In an ideal situation, certainly, a method such as cognitive mapping, for example 
with the Senior Executive of the two companies, would have been preferred.
The methodology employed in researching business recipes can be said to focus on 
either the process of recipe formation (for example, the cognitive creation tradition 
of Spender, 1989), or the outcome of recipe formation (for example, the content of 
business recipes as identified by Whitley, 1992a, which are assumed to be rooted in 
institutional pressures). Whilst this thesis endeavoured to encapsulate both the 
content and process of strategy formation, it is acknowledged that the 
methodology employed means that more is revealed about the content of business 
recipes than the process of their creation.
Finally, as acknowledged in Chapter Seven, the methodology applied was not well 
suited to exploring the influence of power and politics on strategy formation. The 
interviews did not elicit much insight as to whether the business recipes of the two 
companies were subject to power and politics. Because of this, one may conclude 
that the two Esso companies could be harmonious entities with little in the way of 
power and politics. This, however, would be surprising given the empirical 
evidence to the contrary in other organisations (see, for example, Morgan, 1986). 
Therefore, it is more likely that the lacking evidence found for power and politics 
in Esso AG and Esso Petroleum was due to the fact that only little time in the 
interviews was devoted to revealing the influence of power and politics (see the 
interview schedules in Appendices I-IV). In addition to this, it could be argued that 
power and politics might be perceived as part of the private life of the organisation 
and hence not for discussion in the public forum of a research interview. Lastly, the 
level of awareness of power and politics amongst staff, particularly those from a 
technical background, might not be well developed and hence not easily 
articulated.
Overall, it is acknowledged that the methodology applied in this study has 
limitations in relation to the research questions which were being investigated. The 
choice of methodology was largely constrained by the time frame of the M.Phil 
thesis (one year). Having acknowledged the limitations, it is important to point out 
that the methodology employed did result in the collection of useful and valid 
empirical evidence which has shed light upon the core research issues addressed.
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8.5 Scope for Further Work
This study has focused on analysing the business recipes of two companies within 
the mineral oil industry in two different countries. In order to establish whether the 
findings of Chapter Seven, the key conclusions of which are summarised above, are 
representative, further research is needed. Firstly, research should be undertaken 
into the managerial recipes of other oil companies within Britain and Germany and, 
possibly other European countries. This would reveal whether the findings 
represented general features of European oil companies. Secondly, research into 
the recipes of companies in different sectors should be undertaken, which would 
show whether the conclusions derived in this study are only representative for the 
oil industry. Thirdly, it would be interesting to expand this research into other 
continents in order to see whether and to what extent a distinct European 
institutional framework exists which is reflected in the recipes of European 
organisations. Lastly, the strive for efficiency of Esso AG and Esso Petroleum has 
in this study been explained as being an institutionalised ideology of Exxon (see 
Chapter Seven). Further research into the business recipes of other multinational 
oil companies would be required in order to see whether efficiency is a requirement 
of the oil market, as contingency theorists argue, whether it is particular to the 
Exxon Corporation, or whether it is an institutionalised belief throughout the oil 
sector.
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Appendix I: Standard Interview Schedule
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‘The Effect o f  the N ational Institutional Environment on Strategy Formulation: 
Comparative Case Studies o f  ESSO in Britain, France and Germany ’
Sibylle Hanemann, Betriebswirtin (WA) in submission for the M.Phil in Management,
Economics and Politics
Supervisor; Dr. Sandra Nutley
January 1996
Interview-Schedule for the Interviews with Managers of Esso 
Britain
Date:
Position:
Gender:
Introduction
- B r ie f explanation o f  m y C V
- Purpose o f  the analysis
- Purpose o f  the interview (..to understand your business)
The analysis of your answers will be more effective if I tape our conversation. 
Would you mind if I recorded this interview? All data will be treated as strictly 
confidential. You will receive a written out copy of the tape within the next 2 to 4 
weeks. Furthermore, the summaries of these interviews as well as the final version 
of my dissertation will be presented to PA, Thereby it will be ensured that no 
secret information be published. (IF AGREED WITH,, SET RECORDER UP)
153
I. General Question Section
PREPARATION: TAPE
First, I would like to ask you some general questions regarding your business 
unit as well as your personal background.
1. Tell me briefly about your area of work.
(- Span o f control?)
154
2. How does it fit into Esso as a whole?
3. How long have you been in this position?
.................years.
4. How long have you been with Esso?
..................years.
5. Which kind of education did you pursue before/during your career 
with Esso?
155
IL Open Question Section
0.1. To come back to your strategy, within which time period do you 
normally have to present an updated strategy?
0.2 Do you normally present it to a member of board of ESSO A.G., or 
also to representatives of EXXON?
1. GET CARDS OUT (TO NOTE FACTORS) 
TAPE!
Please take me through the process of strategy formulation which you 
underwent when you formulated your current strategy and name 
the factors that you took into consideration.
WRITE ANSWERS ON CARDS - EACH FACTOR ONE CARD 
2. Who was involved in the process of strategy formulation?
156
3.1. To what extent are you given guidelines within which to develop the 
strategy of your unit?
3.2. What are they?
157
4. On these cards, I have listed the factors you mentioned in 1.. Which of
these do you consider as most influential on your strategy? Please put 
the cards in a ranking order.
Ranking order:
158
5. Why do you think, these factors are more influential?
159
6. If you compare your business unit with those in Britain and Germany, 
which differences come into your mind?
160
7. Do these differences lead to comparative (dis)advantages on your 
part?
161
III. Closed Question Section
1. Institutions Relative to Institutions in Other Environments 
(Which institutions are more important/Rating?)
® General National Institutions vs General International Institutions
The general national institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the general international institutions.
® General National Institutions vs Sector-Specific Institutions
The general national institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the sector-specific institutions.
•  General National Institutions vs Multinational Institutions
The general national institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions.
•  General International Institutions vs Sector-Specific Institutions
The general international institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the sector-specific institutions.
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•  General International Institutions vs Multinational Institutions
The general international institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions. 
•  Sector-Specific Institutions vs Multinational Institutions
The sector-specific institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions.
2. In the organizational literature, a number of statements can be found 
regarding the way organizations adjust to institutional pressures. 
Could you please tell me in which of the following situations this 
pattern of adjustment actually corresponds with the way you 
adjust your own strategy?
HAND HIM/HER THE SHEETS OVER
EXPLAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WAYS OF ADJUSTMENT
EXPLAIN HOW TO FILL SHEETS IN (RANKING ORDER IF 
POSSIBLE)
163
3. As mentioned above, theorists in organizational analysis determine
different kinds of influence on the strategy formulation of a company/ 
of a strategic unit. Among others, there are
The Institutional Environment
The Technical Environment
The Power and Politics Within the Organization
In this last section, we would like to find out how influential you 
perceive these categories of factors relative to one another when it 
comes to your strategy formulation.
GET CARDS OUT.
TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT
Influence
5 4 3 2 1
Very strong Strong Moderate 
• INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Weak None
Influence
5 4 3 2 I
Very strong Strong Moderate 
• POWER AND POLITICS
Weak None
Influence
5 4 3 2 1
Very strong Strong Moderate Weak None
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4. — > ONLY IF ANSWERS TO QUESTION 3 NOT SATISFACTORY;
Which factors are more influential?
•  Technical Environment vs Institutional Environment
The technical environment h a s ...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the institutional environment.
® Technical Environment vs Power & Politics
The technical environment has...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than power & politics within the 
organization.
•  Institutional Environment vs Power & Politics
The institutional environment h a s ...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than power & politics within the 
organization.
168
5. What strategy does your business unit tend to pursue ....
( )  A strategy which achieves the most efficient utilization o f resources.
( )  A strategy which has legitimacy in the eyes o f society.
( )  A strategy which is acceptable to all stakeholders (i.e. in this context:
interest groups within ESSO (including shareholders and employees) at the 
national/international level).
169
Appendix II: Interview-Schedule for Human Resource Manager
University o f St Andrews
Department of Management
‘The Effect o f  the N ational Institutional Environment on Strategy Formulation: 
Comparative Case Studies o f  ESSO in Britain, France and Germany  '
Sibylle Hanemann, Betriebswirtin (WA) in submission for the M.Phil in Management,
Economics and Politics
Supervisor; Dr. Sandra Nutley
January 1996
Interview-Schedule for the Interviews with Managers of Esso 
Britain
Date:
Position: Personnel Manager
Gender:
Introduction
- B r ie f explanation o f  m y C V
- Purpose o f  the analysis
- Purpose o f  the interview (..to understand your business)
The analysis of your answers will be more effective if I tape our conversation. 
Would you mind if I recorded this interview? All data will be treated as strictly 
confidential. You will receive a written out copy of the tape within the next 2 to 4 
weeks. Furthermore, the summaries of these interviews as well as the final version 
of my dissertation will be presented to PA. Thereby it will be ensured that no 
secret information be published. (IF AGREED WITH,, SET RECORDER UP)
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I, General Question Section
PREPARATION: TAPE
First, I would like to ask you some general questions regarding your business 
unit as well as your personal background.
1. Tell me briefly about your area of work.
(- Span o f  control?)
171
2. How does it fit into Esso as a whole?
3. How long have you been in this position?
.................years.
4. How long have you been with Esso?
..................years,
5. Which kind of education did you pursue before/during your career
with Esso?
172
IL Open Question Section
1, Do you provide a yearly personnel strategy?
If Yes, which factors do you take into consideration when formulating 
your strategy?
2. Do you normally present your strategy/ your plans to a member of 
board, or also to representatives of Exxon?
173
3. Who was involved in the process of strategy formulation?
4. Do you consult any external organisation/are there any cooperations 
with other companies within the sector/among sectors?
174
5. How is the influence of the state on your personnel strategy / plans?
6. To what extent are you given guidelines by the board/by Exxon within 
which to develop the strategy of your unit?
175
7. Does it happen that an Exxon guideline is not implementable in 
France?
If yes, why? What happens in these cases?
176
On these cards, I have listed the factors you mentioned in Î.. Which of 
these do you consider as most influential on your strategy? Please put 
the cards in a ranking order.
Ranking order:
177
9. If you compare your business unit with those in France and Germany, 
which differences come into your mind?
178
10. Do these differences lead to competitive (dis)advantages on your part?
179
11. Does your company undertake vocational training of employees?
( ) Yes ( ) No.
11.1. If Yes, which professions are trained?
Do you cooperate with external organisations?
180
Where are former trainees placed?
11.2. If No, why not?
181
12. Does Codetermination exist in Esso Britain?
( ) Yes ( ) No.
12,1. If Yes, how are the employees organised?
182
12.2. How influential are these employee formations?
183
13. How is the influence of unions on your business?
184
14. How do you set...
1. Wages
2. Welfare Benefits?
(To what extent are they set internally? (insurance and pension schemes 
eg.), influence of state?)
185
l5 . What strategy does Esso Britain tend to pursue ....
( )  A strategy which achieves the most efficient utilization o f resources.
( )  A strategy which has legitimacy in the eyes o f society.
( )  A strategy which is acceptable to all stakeholders (i.e. in this context:
interest groups within ESSO (including shareholders and employees) at the 
national/international level).
186
Appendix HI: Interview Schedule for the Public Affairs
Manager
University o f St Andrews
Department of Management
The Effect o f the National Institutional Environment on Strategy Formulation: 
Comparative Case Studies o f ESSO in Britain, France and Germany ’
Sibylle Hanemann, Betriebswirtin (WA) in submission for the M.Phil in Management,
Economics and Politics
Supervisor; Dr. Sandra Nutley
January 1996
Intei-view-Schedule for the Inteiwiews with Managers of Esso 
Britain
Date:
Position: Public Relations Manager
Gender: j
I
I
Introduction |
- B rie f explanation o f  my C V  \
- Purpose o f  the analysis |
- Purpose o f  the interview (..to understand your business) I
The analysis of your answers will be more effective if I tape our conversation. 
Would you mind if I recorded this interview? All data will be treated as strictly 
confidential. You will receive a written out copy of the tape within the next 2 to 4 
weeks. Furthermore, the summaries of these interviews as well as the final version 
of my dissertation will be presented to PA. Thereby it will be ensured that no 
secret information be published. (IF AGREED WITH,, SET RECORDER UP)
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I. General Question Section
PREPARATION; TAPE
First, I would like to ask you some general questions regarding your business 
unit as well as your personal background.
1. Tell me briefly about your area of work.
(- Span o f control?)
188
2. How does it fit into Esso as a whole?
3. How long have you been in this position?
.................years.
4. How long have you been with Esso?
..................years.
5. Which kind of education did you pursue before/during your career
with Esso?
189 iI
II. Open Question Section
In the following, I would like to get some information regarding the 
relationships between
A. Esso - Exxon / Esso - Other Subsidiaries
B. Esso - Public
C. Esso - Government
A. Esso - Exxon / Esso - Other Subsidiaries
I. To what extent is Esso given guidelines by Exxon within which to
develop its corporate strategy?
I
2. If you compare Esso Britain with your sister companies in France and j
Germany, which differences come into your mind?
190
3. Do these differences lead to competitive (dis)advantages on your part?
191
4. Who are the main interest groups within Esso at the ...
4.1. national level
4.2. international level
B. Esso - Public
1. How would you describe the current national public opinion?
How does the public perceive the mineral oil sector and Esso in 
particular?
192
2. Are there any areas in your business where the British public opinion 
are in conflict with the guidelines of Exxon? What happens in these 
cases?
193
c .  Esso - Government
1. How do you rate the importance of the mineral oil sector within the
British economy?
2. What is the character of your relation to the government?
194
(3. What is the attitude of the British government towards you as 
multinational?)
195
III. Closed Question Section
1. Institutions Relative to Institutions in Other Environments 
(Which institutions are more important/Rating?)
• General National Institutions vs General International Institutions
The general national institutions have.,.
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the general international institutions.
• General National Institutions vs Sector-Specific Institutions
The general national institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the sector-specific institutions.
•  General National Institutions vs Multinational Institutions
The general national institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions.
•  General International Institutions vs Sector-Specific Institutions
The general international institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the sector-specific institutions.
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•  General International Institutions vs Multinational Institutions
The general international institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions. 
• Sector-Specific Institutions vs Multinational Institutions
The sector-specific institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions.
2. In the organizational literature, a number of statements can be found 
regarding the way organizations adjust to institutional pressures. ' 
Could you please tell me in which of the following situations this 
pattern of adjustment actually corresponds with the way you 
adjust your own strategy?
HAND HIM/HER THE SHEETS OVER
EXPLAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WAYS OF ADJUSTMENT
EXPLAIN HOW TO FILL SHEETS IN (RANKING ORDER IF 
POSSIBLE)
197
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3. As mentioned above, theorists in organizational analysis determine
different kinds of influence on the strategy formulation of a company/ 
of a strategic unit. Among others, there are
• The Institutional Environment
• The Technical Environment
• The Power and Politics Within the Organization
In this last section, we would like to find out how influential you 
perceive these categories of factors relative to one another when it comes 
to your strategy formulation.
GET CARDS OUT....
• TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT
Influence
5 4 3 2 1
Very strong Strong Moderate 
•  INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Weak None
Influence
5 4 3 2 1
Very strong Strong Moderate 
• POWER AND POLITICS
Weak None
Influence
5 4 3 2 1
Very strong Strong Moderate Weak None
201
4. — > ONLY IF ANSWERS TO QUESTION 3 NOT SATISFACTORY:
Which factors are more influential?
# Technical Environment vs Institutional Environment
The technical environment h a s ...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the institutional environment.
• Technical Environment vs
The technical environment h a s ...
Power & Politics
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than power &. politics within the 
organization.
•  Institutional Environment
The institutional environment h a s ...
vs Power & Politics
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than power & politics within the 
organization.
202
5. What strategy does Esso SAF tend to pursue ....
( )  A strategy which achieves the most efficient utilization o f resources.
( )  A strategy which has legitimacy in the eyes o f society.
( )  A strategy which is acceptable to all stakeholders (i.e. in this context:
interest groups within ESSO (including shareholders and employees) at the 
national/international level).
203
1.3.1. Among the management ..
1.3.2. Among the other employees
Appendix IV: ‘Information-Interview’ Schedule
University o f St Andrews
Department of Management
'The Effect o f the National Institutional Environment on Strategy Formulation: 
Comparative Case Studies o f ESSO in France, Britain and Germany ’
Sibylle Hanemann, Betriebswirtin (WA) in submission for the M.Phil in Management,
Economics and Politics
Supei*visor: Dr. Sandra Nutley
September 1995
Interview-Schedule for the ‘Info-Interview’ with the Esso Public 
Relations Department
This interview will be divided into two sections: A general and a specific question 
section. First, I would like to get some more information on ESSO A.G..
The analysis of your answers will be more effective if I tape our conversation. 
Would you mind if I recorded this interview? (IF NO, SET RECORDER UP)
I. General Question Section_____________________
1. Employees
1.1. What is the current size of Esso? (Number of employees)
1.2. What is the current yearly turnover of personnel?
1.3. How many employees of ESSO A.G. are sent from EXXON? j
204
1.4. What is the nature of the managers?
(trained vs untrained; specialistic vs generalistic)
2. Organizational Structure
2.1. Which is the basis upon which the business units are combined?
(Function, Product, Geographical Area, Market Segment)
2.2. What is the character of these business units? 
( e.g. profit centre)
2.2. How many hierarchy levels does Esso A.G. have?
205
2.3. What is the average span of control of managers of the business 
units?
3. Coordinating Mechanisms Among Business Units
( ) only at the management level
( ) through project teams consisting of managers or other employees or both
( ) other ...................................................................................................
4. Organizational Politics
4.1. Employees
4.1.1. Does codetermination exist in ESSO A.G ?
( ) Yes
( ) No
4.1.2. If yes, how are the employees organized?
206
4.1.3. How powerful are these employee formations within ESSO A.G.?
4.2. Shareholders
4.2.1. Who owns ESSO A.G.
Percentage
) banks 
) competitors 
) EXXON
) ....................
) ....................
) ....................
207
4.2.2. (IF NOT CLEAR FROM 4.2.1.)
Is ESSO A.G. largely owned by Germans or by Foreigners?
4.2.3. (IF NOT CLEAR FROM 4.2.1.)
Which group of shareholders is most influential?
5. How do you rate the importance of the mineral oil sector within the 
German economy?
208
IL Specific Question Section
1. Which institutions do you think affect the strategy of ESSO A.G.
1.1 ....within the General National Environment ?
1.2 within the General International Environment?
209
2. Which institutions are specific to the mineral oil sector?
3. Which rules/norms exist within the multinational corporation?
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4. How would you rate the institutions mentioned in the previous section 
regarding their influence on the strategy of ESSO A.G.?
4.1. Within the General National Environment
• Institution:................................................................................................................
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution; ...............................
Influence.......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
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» Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
® Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution: 
Influence......
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
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Influence.
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence.......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution: , ,
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak 
4.2. Within the General International Environment
None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution: 
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
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Institution;
Influence
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution;
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution: 
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
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4.3. Within the Sector-Specific Environment
• Institution:.........................................................
Influence
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution: ,
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution: 
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution;
Influence.......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution:
Influence.......
! 5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution: ....
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Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
9 Institution;
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate
4.4. Within the Multinational Environment
Weak None
Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
® Institution:
Influence.
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
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Institution
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
9 Institution: 
Influence......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
• Institution: 
Influence.......
5 4 3 2 1
Very Strong Strong Moderate Weak None
5. How do you rate the influence of institutions in one environment
relative to the institutions in an other environment on the strategy of 
ESSO A.G ?
• General National Institutions vs General International Institutions
The general national institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the general international institutions.
•  General National Institutions vs Sector-Specific Institutions
The general national institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the sector-specific institutions.
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® General National Institutions vs Multinational Institutions
The general national institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions.
• General International Institutions vs Sector-Specific Institutions
The general international institutions have...
much more more the same less much
less
influence on the strategy formulation than the sector-specific institutions.
• General International Institutions
The general international institutions have.
vs Multinational Institutions
much more more the same less much
less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions.
•  Sector-Specific Institutions vs Multinational Institutions
The sector-specific institutions have...
much more more the same less much less
influence on the strategy formulation than the multinational institutions.
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As mentioned in the outline sent to you, theorists in organizational analysis determine 
different kinds of influence on the strategy formulation of a company/of a strategic 
unit. Among others, there are
• The Institutional Environment
• The Technical Environment
• The Power & Politics Within the Corporation.
SHOW DIAGRAM
In the following section, I would like to get some more information on the 
latter two environments.
6. Which technical factors exist in the environments of ESSO that affect
its strategy
6.1. Within the General National Environment
Factor
Influence...)
Features (Nature,
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6.2, Within the General International Environment
Factor Features (Nature,
Influence...) ___
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6.3. Within the Sector-Specific Environment
Factor Features (Nature,
Influence...) ____________________ __________ _______
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6.4. Within the Multinational Environment
Factor Features (Nature,
Influence...) ____ _______
222
7. Who are the main interest groups within ESSO at the
7.1. National level
7.2. International level
223
8. Which of these groups do you consider as most powerful and why? II
8.1. At the national level... I
Group (Ranking list) Reason for power ■
224
8.2. At the international level...
Group (Ranking list)_______________________________ Reason for power
225
9. Which is the strategy that Esso pursues?
( )  A strategy which achieves the most efficient utilization o f resources.
( )  A strategy which has legitimacy in the eyes o f society.
( )  A strategy which is acceptable to all stakeholders (i.e. in this context all
interest groups within ESSO A.G., including employees and shareholders)
(  )  Other
226
10. In your opinion, is this (9.1/2) how ESSO presents itself to the public?
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Appendix V The General Environment of Esso UK Pic 
1 Economic Profile of Britain
For most of its post-war years Britain's economy has been characterised by a low 
level of productivity relative to its competitors, low rates of investment and 
economic growth, a lack of skilled labour and high levels of inflation. According to 
writers such as Wiener (1981) or Crafts (1992), these problems which became 
increasingly visible from the 1960s onwards were caused by institutional inertia 
rooted in the process of industrialisation through which Britain had gone a century 
before. Examples of this are the system of Industrial Relations, the centralised 
character of British policy-making as well as the system of education and training, 
as well as an overall focus on individualism and pragmatism.
The first post-war government, headed by the Labour party, broke with the long 
laissez-faire tradition of British economic policy by introducing an interventionist 
notion. This included the nationalisation of key industries and the overall 
transformation of Britain into a 'welfare state'. Subsequent governments did not 
change this overall interventionist stance thereby following a 'consensus policy'. 
This changed when Margaret Thatcher came to power as she was determined to 
reverse Britain's economic decline by way of decisive structural reforms. In the 
following years, the Thatcher government broke with the tradition of consensus as 
well as reduced the notion of a welfare state. Since 1979 numerous formerly state- 
owned companies have been privatised (eg. British Gas, British Coal, British 
Telecom), union power has largely been reduced and a strict monetary policy has 
been followed to keep inflation low (eg. Michie, 1992). Nevertheless, in the 1980s 
Britain experienced two recessions - the first from 1980 to 1982 caused by high 
interest rates coupled with a highly overvalued sterling and a world recession 
following the 1979 oil crisis. Firms, especially in the manufacturing sector, were 
forced to increase productivity by laying off workers and making more efficient use 
of their capital. Despite the thus achieved increase in productivity, investment and 
output growth in the manufacturing sector remained low. This weak national 
industrial output faced a rapid expansion of consumer demand. This resulted in a 
trade deficit and a high inflation rate which led to the second recession in 1989.
Since September 1992, the date of Britain's exclusion from the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism, the British economy has been recovering. The rate of
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unemployment was 8,2% in 1995 (Turner, 1996: 3)* which is low compared with 
Britain's European competitors. The growth in GDP was 3.8% in 1994, and public 
sector borrowing was reduced. Nevertheless, commentators criticise the still 
inherent structural weaknesses in the UK economy (Bharmal, 1994a; 1994b;The 
Economist, June 8, 1996) and the overall short-termist, stop-go nature of British 
policy making.
In this context, Britain's economy is still characterised by a low investment 
especially in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, productivity in absolute terms 
still lags behind countries like Japan, the United States, Germany and France (The 
Economist, May 28, 1994). In addition, investment in overall R&D as proportion 
of GDP is low and the economy is still lacking skilled labour. With regard to the 
latter the British government is attempting to reform the system of Education and 
Training. However, decisive reforms in this area would most likely end the present 
labour-cost advantage which Britain enjoys relative to its European neighbours, as 
more skilled labour would be more likely to demand higher wages and thus labour 
costs would increase.
Despite these conflicting ends of the British government, Britain has overall been 
deemed a relatively favourable environment for business, characterised by little 
labour legislation and low total labour costs as well as an overall non­
interventionist state system. With these features, Britain has attracted more foreign 
investors than most other European countries (OECD, 1995a).
2 British Energy Policy
The United Kingdom has large resources of oil, natural gas and coal. The 
importance of coal for the British economy has decreased considerably since the 
first major oil and gas findings in the North Sea. Gas and oil exploration and 
production form an important part of the British economy. In fact, the country is 
the sixth largest oil producer in the world (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1993). In 
'1994, overall primary fuel consumption was fully met by indigenous production' 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1995: 9). Accordingly, the energy 
independence of Britain is high, being 98.7% in 1992.
* During 1996 the unemployment rate has increased. However, as interviews were undertaken in 
1995/early 1996, reference will not further be made to more recent figures.
229
Up to the 1980s British energy policy was largely based upon the protection of 
domestic coal production. Three of the energy industries - coal, electricity and gas 
-were nationalised up to the 1980s and 1990s respectively. The justification for this 
policy was the goal of security of supply and diversification of sources of energy. 
After the discovery of huge oil and gas fields in the United Kingdom Continental 
Shelf the importance of coal for the British economy decreased considerably. The 
two major oil crises of the 1970s led the British government to change their policy 
towards encouraging the use of lighter, more economical oil products or other 
sources of energy, and advocating energy efficiency. Despite a halt in the 
increasing oil demand (see below) following the crises the overall support for oil 
and gas exploration and production did not decrease. Under the Thatcher 
Government, then, British Coal finally lost its influence on local energy policy, and 
plans to privatise the company were formed along with the privatisation of British 
Gas and the electricity industry.
Despite this development, competition is still restricted in the energy sector and 
since its privatisation the electricity industry as well as the gas industry have been 
subject to regular enquiries by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and 
OFGAS, the regulator for the gas industry, as well as by the respective electricity 
regulator.
As for the oil industry state presence was long ensured through the British National 
Oil Corporation (BNOC) from 1975 to the mid 1980s. Also the British Petroleum 
Company (BP) was state-owned. However, the state started selling the latter's 
shares in this company as early as 1979. In 1982, the downstream and upstream 
activities of BNOC were separated and later on privatised. Since the privatisation 
of these companies, the influence of the state on the oil industry has been exercised 
generally by way of licensing, environmental and safety controls and the fiscal 
framework (lEA, 1994a: 465). Oil prices generally follow the world markets. 
However, the government directs the consumption of certain oil products by way 
of taxation and in accordance with environmental and energy efficiency goals. An 
example of this is the higher level of excise duty for leaded fuel relative to unleaded 
fuel and diesel fuel. From April 1995, leaded petrol was subject to an excise duty 
of 36.1 pence per litre, and unleaded as well as diesel of 31.1 pence (Smith, 1995: 
100). In fact, this duty is meant to increase in the following years in line with 
British environmental goals. As Smith (ibid: 101-102) explains, 'the government (in 
Britain) has made a commitment, as part of its strategy to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions, to a steady annual increase in motorfuel duties, of 3% in real terms.'
230 I
This policy is a matter of great concern for the British oil industry. As Keith Taylor 
points out (in Esso UK pic, 1995b: 3), 'taxation on motor fuels (...) has increased 
by 30% over the past two years, and in the Chancellor's November Budget 
statement the duty on domestic and industrial heating oils and fuel oil was 
increased without any change in taxation on competing fuels. This trend towards 
increased levels of taxation on fuel products is a cause for concerns. ' In this 
context, the oil industry fears especially the decreasing international 
competitiveness of the UK due to additional costs.
3 The UK Oil Demand
Over the past 30 years, UK oil demand has experienced a fundamental change. 
Whilst the demand for oil increased steadily before the first oil crisis in 1973, this 
crisis and the 1979 crisis led to a decline in the demand for oil by about 1/5 from 
the early 1970s to about 83 million in mid 1995 (Esso UK, 1995a). Furthermore, 
the structure of demand has changed. These developments are a consequence of 
the oil price rises following the oil crises which led to the above explained re­
orientation in British energy policy. Whilst heavier fuels have largely been replaced 
by other sources of energy, oil products like petrol, diesel and aviation fuels, used 
in transport were not substitutable and have accordingly experienced steady 
growth. In this context, British energy policy has encouraged the increased use of 
environmentally friendly products (see above). Recent years have witnessed the 
increase in the demand for unleaded petrol and diesel fuel to the detriment of 
leaded petrol. In fact, the proportion of unleaded petrol has risen 'from a negligible 
share of total petrol sales in 1986 to about half of total sales in 1993' (Smith, 1995: 
109), and to about 61% in the first quarter of 1995 (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 1995: 62).
4 The Petroleum Industi*y and the British Economy
The mineral oil sector in the UK has a share of GNP of approximately 3-4% (Esso 
UK Public Relations Manager). The industry is clearly dominated by the North Sea 
oil production. Since the discovery of major oil fields in the United Kingdom 
Continental Shelf in the 1970s the upstream side of the British petroleum industry 
has contributed an important part to the UK economy as a whole. This especially in 
terms of its contribution to the UK's energy independence (see above) and trade. 
North Sea oil is of high quality as it is light and low in sulphur, and thus can be 
sold at high prices on the international markets. The export of North Sea crude has
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accordingly been very beneficial for the UK balance of trade. Furthermore, due to a 
variety of taxes regulating the offshore activities (such as the Petroleum Revenue 
Tax up to 1983 for all oil fields and since then only for the already existing ones) 
the upstream side of the oil business has been a significant revenue raiser for the 
government.
As for the downstream side of the oil business, the refining and marketing of oil 
products has long been established in the British market. Esso UK's forerunner, the 
Anglo-American Oil Company, was established as early as 1888. Also the 
downstream industry has led to fairly substantial revenues for the British state. In 
1990, 'motor fuel taxes (alone) accounted for 5% of total tax revenues in the UK' 
(Smith, 1995: 100).
The petroleum industry is a capital rather than labour-intensive industry. The 
overall number of employees in the petroleum industry has furthermore decreased 
largely since the 1970s when, as a reaction to the oil crises, oil companies 
rationalised their operations.
5 Actors and Current Issues in the UK Petroleum Market
Due to the characteristic features of the oil industry (see Appendix VII for details) 
the companies active in the upstream and downstream in the UK are primarily 
multinationals. Nevertheless, this might change in the longer term as several 
formerly state-owned refining-marketing companies such as Elf, Total, Statoil or 
Agip are increasing their share in the European market. Furthermore, several 
independent private companies exist which, however, hold a negligible share of the 
British market.
As far as the upstream is concerned, firms like Shell, Exxon, and BP have a large 
stake in the North Sea operations. In recent years, the North Sea industry has been 
subject to increasing difficulties rooted in the gradual depletion of existing oil and 
gas fields and the depressed world crude oil price. Since the oil price collapse in 
1986 when there was a huge surplus of crude oil on the world market, the price of 
crude oil has been subject to short term fluctuations. In 1994 oil prices averaged 
$15.8 a barrel (£ 10.3) a 10% decrease from 1993 (Esso UK pic, 1995b).
As for the downstream side, also this is clearly dominated by internationally active 
companies. In refining as well as retail, Esso, Shell and BP are at the top of the list
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of oil companies in Britain followed later on by multinationals like Mobil Oil or 
Gulf Oil. However, some independent companies are represented in the market as 
well as, in the retail sector, retail chains.
With regard to the latter, in recent years the development of hypermarkets has been 
of rising concern to the British oil industry. Hypermarkets are large supermarkets 
that sell petroleum products at a very low price (as so-called 'loss-leaders') to 
attract customers to their retail stores. Since 1990 the hypermarkets in Britain have 
experienced a threefold increase in market share and currently hold a 25% share of 
the British market (The Economist, January 27th, 1996:66).
As for the refining industry, the changes in oil demand have led to two major 
challenges for the oil industry. Firstly, the refineries face an increasing consumer 
preference for lighter oil products. Secondly, the overall decrease in oil demand has 
led to an excess capacity on the refining side and thus to increased competition 
worldwide. The latter results in very low refinery margins throughout the world 
including Europe. In Western Europe, there is an overcapacity of 10 refineries 
(approximately 10%), and in Britain alone the capacity is exceeded by two 
refineries.
The current difficulties of the European downstream industry have recently led BP 
and Mobil Oil to merge their refining and marketing operations in Europe. Whether 
this will be a trend throughout the European oil industry is not certain. 
Cooperations have as yet primarily been in the upstream part of the oil business 
(Petroleum Economist, April 1996: 38-39).
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Appendix VI The General Environment of Esso AG 
1 Economic Profile of Germany
From its establishment in 1949 until the German reunification in 1990, the Federal 
Republic of Germany was overall characterised by a superior economic 
performance relative to its European neighbours. Inflation was low, the German 
living standard was high with high wages and a comprehensive social security 
system. Despite a slow-down of economic growth during the 1970s and early 
1980s with recessions from 1974-75 and 1980-82, this performance was sustained 
up to 1990 when West Germany's GDP ranked fourth in the world after the United 
States, Japan and the former Soviet Union (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1993). 
However, during the 1980s already, structural weaknesses of the West German 
system became visible which were mainly rooted in the principle of consensus 
politics on which the German system is based (Hauser, 1995).
The Federal Republic of Germany was created in 1949 under the control of the 
Allied Forces USA, Great Britain and France. In order to prevent the system from 
being abused by a totalitarian power, as previously experienced, and to separate it 
clearly from the Communist notion, the Federal Republic became based on strong 
democratic principles. An underlying system of 'Social Market Economy' (Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft) 'combined elements of a market economy with strong labour 
market regulations, with worker co-determination in big companies, with a social 
security system based on social insurance principle and geared to maintaining the 
living standard in case of events that were recognized as social risks' (Hauser, 
1995:45). Furthermore, a system of consensus politics evolved where the 
economic actors such as the parties, trade unions, employers. Lander governments 
or the Federal Bank discuss and negotiate matters of common concern to ensure 
that all opinions be heard and integrated.
During the post-war years governments adhered to the principles of the social 
market economy and the development of policies by way of consensus among 
different parties involved. From the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s West 
Germany witnessed the 'German Economic Miracle' with an exceptional rise of 
GNP and product exports. As Germany is endowed with relatively few natural 
resources its economic activity became focused mainly on the production and 
export of goods 'which aimed to compete by offering advanced technical design, 
high quality and good 'after-sales' service' (Lane, 1989: 7). Within only a few
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decades Germany developed into a country with a high living standard 
characterised by high wages and an extensive system of social security, and an 
innovative and strong manufacturing sector primarily geared towards the export of 
products. However, resulting from the 1970s oil crises and the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, the country witnessed a slow-down of economic growth.
During this time period. West Germany experienced two recessions, from 1974-75 
and from 1981-82. Both recessions induced the industry to rationalise and 
modernise its production in order to keep up with the high-quality and costly image 
of their products. In fact, the focus on high quality became more and more a 
prerequisite for the success of a high-wage country like Germany. As the Council 
of Economic Advisers (Sachverstandigenrat) stated in 1981 (quoted in Ferner and 
Hyman, 1992: 221): '(...) A high-wage country (like Germany) cannot afford to fall 
back on second-hand innovation.'
During the 1980s the inherent structural weaknesses of Germany became 
increasingly visible. Increasing production costs due to excessive regulation and 
high taxes as well as labour costs, and the build up of a corpulent welfare-state 
proved to be an increasing impediment for business activities and threatened the 
competitiveness of German industry, the most important sector in the German 
economy. The discussion on Germany as a business location ('Wirtschaftsstandort 
Deutschland') became a prominent public issue, not just in the face of increasing 
global competition from low-wage economies of the developing world. From the 
mid-1980s, the government under Chancellor Kohl became committed to supply- 
side reforms encompassing deregulation, a business-oriented tax reform, and 
privatisation. However, the measures undertaken were not as far-reaching as first 
envisaged, partly due to the strong opposition by the unions. Nevertheless, West 
Germany experienced a new phase of growth resulting from the rationalisation of |
industrial production during the recession. j
i
In 1990, Germany was re-unified and the former German Democratic Republic j
(DDR) was fully integrated into the West German economy. The transformation of i
the command economy of East Germany into a social market economy proved |
harder than anticipated due to the underestimated backwardness of the East i
German economy which, in addition suffered from losing its main export markets I
of the crisis-ridden Eastern Bloc. Immense financial support has been necessary to |
modernise the production technology and infrastructure to encourage the |
development of a service sector and to change the organisation of industrial j
relations and labour processes (Ferner and Hyman, 1992: 224). Furthermore, there I
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have been considerable problems of unifying the peoples of the East and West, a 
task still not fully completed.
Since a recent recession from 1990-93 *, the German economy has been 
recovering, again helped by export growth and rationalisation. Although in 1994, 
the OECD recorded (1995b: 126) 'the first (...) absolute fall in economy-wide unit 
labour costs since the end of the war' several challenges to the German economy 
remain as firms become more internationalised, more knowledge-based firms 
become established, and the requirements of the new Lander still exist (OECD, 
1995b: 131).
Although inflation has been kept low, Germany is now lagging behind other 
countries in areas such as growth of business productivity, export market share and 
growth in GDP. Production is still high, as well as R&D as share of GDP, 
however, unemployment is higher than in Britain with 9.9% in early 1996 (The 
Economist, February 10th, 1996: 24). Most telling, however, is the fact that 
Germany has attracted the least foreign investment of European countries (OECD, 
1995b: 34). As the OECD (ibid.) states, 'competitiveness is among the factors 
affecting international direct investment flows. Foreign direct investment in 
Germany, already small, turned negative (.. .) in 1994'. Germany 'besides Japan, 
(...) is the only major OECD country to receive only negligible foreign direct 
investment.' In addition to this, 'almost 2/3 of manufacturing firms intend to 
expand outside Germany.' (OECD, 1995b: 37). The discussion of the 
competitiveness of German industry remains thus on top of the German policy 
agenda. The call for decisive structural reforms, in this context, has not ceased yet.
2 German Energy Policy
Germany is endowed with relatively few natural resources. Its main natural 
resources are brown coal (lignite), salt and potash. The indigenous oil production 
meets only 2% of national demand (Petroleum Review, 1995: 496). Accordingly, 
energy independence is low at 47.3%, compared with the OECD average of 74%, 
or for OECD Europe, 61% respectively (IEA, 1994b: 245).
The dependence of Germany on imports of oil and gas have for a long time had a 
considerable impact on its energy policy. Especially since the oil crises of the 1970s
* Germany experienced the economic recession later than its neighbours as the integration of the 
five new Lander led to a boom in demand for firms in the West
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the focus of energy policy has been on the diversification of sources of supply and 
sources of energy to ensure the security of supply, the increase in energy efficiency 
and the support of indigenous sources of energy, ie. coal, and more recently 
nuclear power. In addition, since 1990, the energy agenda has been dominated by 
the need to integrate the five new East German Lander with the main goal of 
privatising the formerly state-owned industry.
The overall aim of secure supply plays, however, a greater role for the government 
than the cost-effectiveness of energy supply (Brockhaus, 1991: 372). The support 
of domestic hard coal as well as the lack of competition in the gas and electricity 
markets do not comply with the principles of cost-eflfectivenesss and of market- 
oriented energy policy. Furthermore, the future of nuclear energy is at present an 
unresolved issue of German energy policy, due mainly to public pressure.
As far as the oil industry is concerned, in recent years, the industry has been taxed 
to an increasing extent. The government believes that high taxes and thus high 
energy prices encourage the implementation of energy efficiency measures mainly 
in the car industry as well as in the oil industry. As a consequence, the 
consumption of fuel oils is expected to decrease. Furthermore, the tax increases 
provide the state with further financial means needed to continue the restructuring 
of the East German Lander. Accordingly, taxes on gasoline were increased by 17% 
on 1 January 1994 and by 13% on diesel fuel. The taxation on leaded fuel is higher 
than on unleaded fuel. Also some restructuring in motor vehicle taxes were being 
considered where tax should be based on emission levels of cars rather than their 
engine size. In addition, fuel is subject to a Value Added Tax (VAT) of at present 
15%. Moreover, the oil industry is subject to comprehensive environmental 
regulation. In the area of refining alone, there are more than 2000 environment- 
related laws to be followed (Esso A.G., 1995c: 10). The costs for environmental 
protection in the Esso refinery at Karlsruhe account for 15% of total costs (ibid: 
13). According to a study by Chem Systems on behalf of the German Ministry of 
Economics in 1995, German refineries bear a cost disadvantage relative to their 
European competitors of three to four Deutsche Mark (approximately £1.30 to 
1.80) (Esso AG, 1995e). For a newly built petrol station, environmental costs 
amount to almost 20% of investment expenses' (Esso AG, 1996a: 18). Currently, 
the German government is considering the introduction of a so-called 'Eco-Tax' 
(Oko-Steuer) to be imposed on local energy industries. This measure is opposed 
strongly by the German Petroleum industry as it would render business in Germany 
too costly for the industry to stay in the country.
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3 The German Oil Demand
In the post-war years up to the 1970s the oil demand in Germany rose steadily as 
oil increasingly replaced coal as major source of energy. From 1950 to 1973 the oil 
demand increased from 4 million tonnes to 134 million tonnes (Siemer, 1995a; 16). 
This resulted in and was accompanied by a considerable expansion of the national 
oil industry. However, the oil crises of the 1970s reversed this development as 
increased oil prices induced governments to rethink and reformulate energy 
policies and to largely try and substitute oil for other, cheaper sources of energy. 
Furthermore, the use of lighter oil products was supported. The increased prices 
and the change in energy policy had an adverse effect on the consumption of 
mineral oil products. From 1973 to the beginning 1990s national oil demand fell by 
1/5 (ibid.). These developments led the German mineral oil industry - like that in 
the whole of Europe - to decrease capacity in the refining and marketing of 
products, and in turn to reduce the number of staff.
After 1986, the year of the international oil price collapse, the situation of the 
German oil industry improved to some extent, helped temporarily by the German 
unification and the resulting expansion of the German market by 1/4 (ibid.). 
However, the rising demand for oil in East Germany, largely a result of the 
substitution of traditionally used lignite for heating, as well as the increase in 
transport, can be expected to be exhausted by the end 1990s. After this date, the 
demand can be expected to be subject to the same development as that in West 
Germany. With regard to the latter, the consumption of mineral oil, now at just 
over 40%, is expected to roughly stay constant. This is due to the fact that the 
German population is likely to stagnate, and, in longer term, decrease; furthermore. 
West Germany is a highly developed country in which the demand for energy is 
nearly saturated and where the improvement of energy efficiency and the increasing 
consciousness to save energy leads to a reduction in demand. Lastly, only few 
energy intensive industry are likely to remain in Germany in medium-to long-term 
(ibid).
4 The Petroleum Industry and the German Economy
The mineral oil sector in Germany has a 1% share in the General Domestic Product 
(GDP). The importance of the mineral oil sector derives from mineral oil being the 
main source of energy in Germany with a share of over 40%, and the revenue it
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brings to the state via Mineral Oil Tax and VAT. In fact, the Mineral Oil Tax has a 
share of about 18% of the total German tax revenue (Mineralolwirtschaftsverband,
1996b:46). The German state has no shares in the mineral oil market.
The upstream activities of Germany are relatively minor only accounting for 2% of 
national demand. As for the downstream side of the oil business, the refining and 
marketing of oil products have been undertaken in Germany since the last century.
Esso AG's forerunner, the 'Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum-Gesellschaft' was 
established as early as 1890.
5 Actors and Current Issues in the German Petroleum Market
As the oil business is an international business (see Appendix VII), the companies 
operating in Germany are largely multinationals. Among these, the Deutsche Aral 
whose international headquarters are in Germany is the only 'really German' 
company, according to the Esso AG Public Relation Manager. Most 'foreign' 
multinationals, however, have been in the German market for about a century. The 
only company which is merely domestically represented is SRS which, however, 
has negligible market share.
As explained above, the German oil industry has to bear especially high 
environmental costs as compared with other countries. The Mineral Oil Tax is 
among the highest in Europe. Furthermore, Germany has high labour-costs and 
employment regulations. Accordingly, the current most prominent issue in the 
German Mineral Oil Industry is the industry's international competitiveness. The 
area presently most troubled in the German oil business is refining. In contrast to 
Britain, Hypermarkets do not yet play a dominant role in the German market.
As for the refining industry, the decrease in oil demand and the prospect of the 
latter's stagnation in the medium-term have led the refining industry to adjust by 
investing in facilities able to produce the lighter oil products that are in demand.
Furthermore, the fall in demand and the resulting overcapacity in Europe have 
squeezed refining margins. In addition to this situation, which the European i
refining industry faces as a whole, the German refining industry bears an additional 1
burden with above mentioned excessive regulations in the areas of the environment I
and labour.
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Appendix VII The Petroleum Industry
The purpose of this section is to outline the character of the petroleum or mineral 
oil industry focusing on its characteristic features as well as on its development and 
overall influence.
1 Features of the Oil Industry
1.1 International Character
International trade in oil is essential. In fact, 'petroleum is the single most important 
commodity in international trade, both by volume and by value' (British Petroleum 
Co. Ltd, 1977: 13). This is mainly due to the following:
Firstly, in the oil industry, the geographical distance between producers and 
consumers has traditionally been large. The major oil producing area still today is 
the Middle East, and the major consumers can currently be found among OECD 
countries, especially in Western Europe and North America.
Secondly, each crude oil explored is of different quality. Depending on the 
preference of the end-consumers, refineries have to obtain different crudes to 
ensure the development of finished products of a sufficient quality. As M. Brown 
(BP Exploration Co. Ltd, 1994: 37) explains: 'If you haven't got the right crude for 
your refineries then you must buy it in, and sell your own crude to those who 
prefer it.' The international trade of oil, however, does not merely take place on the 
commodity market. A substantial part of the oil explored is shifted around within 
and among the big multinational oil companies.
1.2 Dominance of Big Oil Companies
Since the beginning of the modern oil industry, the latter has been dominated by 
international oil companies, in particular by the Seven Majors, ie. Exxon, Chevron, 
Texaco, BP, Gulf Oil, Shell and Mobil. Apart from these, other types of oil 
companies have been established in the course of the century. These operate, for 
instance, within national borders, eg. Elf and Total in France or Aral in Germany or 
the nationalised companies in OPEC countries, or focusing on specific activities 
within the oil business, like independent refineries. The latter, however, have 
experienced very challenging times especially during the oil crises as unlike the
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integrated oil companies they were unable to diversity their risks being dependent 
on solely one activity. All in all, the national and independent companies have 
never attained the same importance and international dominance as the 'Seven 
Sisters', as the major oil companies are often called.
1.3 Roots of the ’Seven Sisters’
As early as 1880, the Standard Oil Trust which had been established by John D. 
Rockefeller only 10 years before, dominated 90% of the American refining 
capacity. Thanks to Rockefeller's expansive policy, his business grew to such an 
extent that in 1911, the US Supreme Court ordered the break up of the Standard 
Oil Imperium dividing the corporation into entities in accordance with state 
borders. This break up marked the beginning of three of the seven major oil 
companies; Exxon Corporation evolved from the Standard Oil Company (New 
Jersey), Mobil Oil Corporation developed in 1931 from the merger of the Standard 
Oil Company(New York) and the Vacuum Oil Company, and Chevron has its 
roots in the Standard Oil Company of California.
Texaco, formerly known as The Texas Company, as well as Gulf Oil evolved 
when the Mellon brothers found an oil well in Texas in January 1901. Within only a 
few years, both companies expanded greatly their product then being primarily 
gasoline for the newly developing automobile industry. Shell , or correctly. The 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group has two parent companies. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
and Shell Transport and Trading Co.. These first operated as rival organisations in 
the late 19th century but merged in 1903 and 1907 respectively. BP was 
established in 1909 as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It was the first company 
which developed the oil reserves of the Middle East. In 1954 the company changed 
its name to British Petroleum (BP).
These seven companies are known as the 'Seven Sisters', an expression first used 
by Enrico Mattei, first president of the Italian state energy group ENI.
1.4 Why Do Big Oil Companies Exist?
The oil business is very capital intensive and risky. Large investments are required 
by the oil companies before any returns ocur. The returns themselves, however, are 
subject to constant change.
241
Capital Intensity
Most stages of the oil business - on the upstream as well as on the downstream 
side - involve large investments before any returns ocur. Firstly, the exploration for 
petroleum is a costly process and does not always lead to success. Seismic surveys 
undertaken prior to the oil drilling can only determine rock formations under the 
surface that are favourable for oil deposits. The actual presence of oil can only be 
discovered by way of drilling. In this context, the chance of finding oil is 'no higher 
than one in ten' (BP Exploration Co. Ltd, 1994:10). Furthermore, not only the 
exploration for oil is costly, but also the installation of production facilities that 
follows if crude oil has been explored. Once the crude has been produced it is 
transported to refineries via pipelines or tankers. The building and running of a 
refinery requires large capital investments, especially if the refinery is not to be 
specialised solely on certain oil products. Finally, an extensive distribution network 
is required to supply the consumers with the products needed.
For most of these processes, especially the exploration, production and the 
refining, large and constant investments in technology and science are required to 
ensure the economically most efficient results and the meeting of the customers' 
needs.
Risks in the Oil Business
As any type of business, the oil business faces risks on the supply and on the 
demand side of their operations. Each chain of the oil business faces the risk of the 
changing availability of crude oil and/or finished oil products and of the varying 
demand for the latter. The following examples will show this:
As the chance to actually find oil is relatively low , an exploring company is never 
able to estimate confidently how much crude oil it will have available in the future. 
After the production, if the crude oil is traded on the international commodity 
markets, the prices of crudes are subject to the oil demand. As we could witness 
since the 1970s, the latter has undergone substantial changes and the present oil 
price is weak. A producing company can thus not be certain that the crude oil 
produced will provide the return required to cover the fixed cost that have arisen 
during exploration and production. Refineries run similar risks, as they first need to 
ensure that the right kinds of crudes are available at a competitive price, and after
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the products are finished, they are dependent on the demand for their products on 
the market.
Apart from these factors, however, there is one distinct feature of the oil business 
that renders it much more risky than most other businesses in the economy, and 
that is the political nature of oil. The availability of the latter is highly dependent 
on political stability in the producing countries . Not seldom, oil has been a major 
factor in political disputes and has even been a cause for war, as we could see 
during the Gulf War in 1990. Political conflicts in the producing countries have 
often led the consumer countries to impose sanctions on the former as a political 
means. Oil companies have to be able to cope with these political risk inherent in 
their business.
2 Features of the Oil Industry as a Result of Cost and Risks
2.1 High Vertical Integration
To reduce the risk of their operations and to ensure an overall satisfactory return, 
oil companies have traditionally tended to be highly vertically integrated. By this 
means they provide 'internal markets' at all stages of production up to the finished 
product. Downstream operations can then count on stable and guaranteed oil 
supplies to balance their refining and marketing needs; and the upstream side will 
have an outlet for its crudes. The risk can then be reduced and lies mainly in the 
finding of crude and the markets which are finally presented with the finished 
products.
As in the big oil companies, this integration takes place across borders, it has the 
additional advantage that market needs can be met on an international basis by 
providing affiliates with the crude oils that meet the needs of their markets best. 
Thereby, the multinationals attain an international optimum of resource allocation.
2.2 Large-Scale Operation
Furthermore, companies in the oil sector generally operate on a large-scale basis. 
Their unit costs can be reduced substantially through economies of scale. A fitting 
example of this notion is the increase in size of oil tankers up to the present 
'supertankers' or the set up of large-scale refineries.
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2.3 High Stock of Crude Oil
In order to be able to react to changes in the market more flexibly, oil companies 
generally hold a stock of crude higher than the current demand would require.
2.4 Cooperations
Moreover, the high risk involved in exploration, coupled with the requirements of 
large investments for the production of oil and finally the benefit of large-scale 
operations have led to close cooperations among oil companies. An example of this 
is the joint upstream operation of Shell and Esso UK in the North Sea and the 
close cooperations in OPEC countries by way of consortia before the 1973 oil 
crisis.
In addition, the contact between oil companies and the government is in general 
quite close as the availability of oil is one of the major concerns in today's politics.
2.5 Competition
The capital intensity of their business requires the oil companies to ensure a return 
to their investments high enough to cover their fix costs in the long-term. As a 
result, competition among oil companies has always been strong. Especially today 
in times of overcapacity, this fact and the weak oil prices lead to fierce 
competition.
3 The Development of the Petroleum Industry
Petroleum has been known to mankind since the antiquity. In those days bitumen, a 
form of petroleum, was used by ancient peoples to caulk ships or to build roads. 
However, the availability of bitumen was subject to it emerging on the surface 
through seepages, and it was no sooner than in 1859 that the drilling for oil began.
The history of the modern petroleum industry started with Edwin Drake who 
accidentally, drilling for salt, discovered oil near Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. 
The advantages of petroleum to other sources of energy were soon realised. 
Compared with the oil recovered from oil shale or the much used whale oil, 
petroleum was found in greater quantities and it thus represented a cheaper 
alternative to the former kinds of oil. Furthermore, its liquid nature made it more
244
economical to exploit than coal once the production facilities were installed. 
Finally, petroleum is easier to transport and contains some 50% more heat per unit 
of weight than coal (British Petroleum Co. Ltd, 1977: 13).
The main purpose of petroleum in the 1860s was to provide kerosene for fuel 
lamps, but as the industrial revolution went on more sophisticated refining 
processes were invented to produce various kinds of petroleum products for many 
different purposes. The expansion of the oil industry took first place mainly in the 
United States. However, by the end of the 19th century, the industry had spread 
worldwide with oil drilling being undertaken in Europe, the Middle East and East 
Asia.
The invention of the petrol engine in the beginning of the 20th century led to an 
increased demand for petroleum as it became the primary source of gasoline. The 
supreme position of petroleum to other sources of energy was enforced during the 
two world wars where it was used extensively by all parties for the running of 
battle ships, tanks, cars and aeroplanes. After World War II, the reconstruction and 
expansion especially of Western Europe states led to a further increase in the 
demand for oil. From the mid-fiflies until 1973 the oil consumption increased 
yearly by on average 7.5% (Matthies, 1990: 6).
The Oil Crisis o f 1973
The year 1973 brought about considerable changes for the oil industry. After 1945 
petroleum had been found increasingly in countries of the Eastern Hemisphere 
such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. 'By 1960 45% of the world's oil 
outside the USA and USSR was produced in the Middle East and over 50% of that 
internationally traded was exported from that area' (British Petroleum Co. Ltd, 
1977: 19). However, until the beginning 1970s, the exploration and production of 
petroleum lay primarily in the hands of the oil companies. Especially the seven 
majors had a large stake in the management of the world oil reserves. By 1971, 
United States oil concerns had either controlled or acquired rights associated with 
more than half the world's proven petroleum reserves' (Choucri, 1976: 31). The 
prominence of the oil companies in the upstream business was a consequence of 
their superiority - compared with the oil producing countries - in the fields of 
technology, knowledge and general skills as well as the capital they were able to 
provide for the exploration and production activities. In order to make use of the 
oil reserves within their borders, the oil producing countries thus had to rely on the
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big oil companies who in turn were able to gain increasing control over the oil 
resources and the latters' management. The companies mainly operated in 
collaboration with other oil companies in so-called 'consortia'. One example of this 
was the 'Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) which included BP, Shell, La Compagnie 
Française des Petroles (TOTAL), Exxon and Mobil. Each of these held a share in 
the territory stipulated in a concession agreement with the Iraquian State.
In the Middle East, the oil producing countries became more and more dissatisfied 
with the consortia as, although the 'ultimate ownership of petroleum resources (...) 
rested with the State (...)' by way of concession agreements, the companies were 
'permitted (...) to establish their own development programmes, levels of 
production and export and, critically, their own pricing policy' (British Petroleum 
Co. Ltd, 1977: 19). With regard to the latter, 'posted prices' were set by the 
companies at which crude oil was available for sale on the market, This price also 
represented the basis on which royalties and taxes to producing governments were 
calculated.
When due to a surplus of production in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis 1956/57, 
the market price of oil fell posted prices were reduced accordingly. This meant a 
sharp decrease in revenue for the producing countries. As a reaction, the countries 
of the middle East set up the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in 1960, established to 'coordinate the petroleum policies of its members 
and to provide the member states with technical and economic aid' (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 1993: 345). According to Choucri (1976: 39) OPEC emerged as an 
institutionalized response to a changing petroleum market and to the greater 
negotiating capabilities of exporting states. The highly concentrated structure of 
the industry, its vertical integration, and the nature of the concession system all 
proved ready targets for the dissatisfaction of the producer governments with their 
role in the petroleum market and their share of profits accorded to them by the oil 
companies'.
Thirteen years later, the policy of the OPEC members led to the first big oil crisis 
of the 20th century. In the beginning 1970s, the governments of oil producing 
countries introduced new laws and regulations according to which the formerly 
industry-controlled oil production became nationalised and either governed by the 
state or state-owned companies. This meant the end of control by international oil 
companies ' over the development, production and price of the bulk of the world's 
internationally traded oil' (British Petroleum Co. Ltd., 1977: 19). In 1973, the
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OPEC members agreed on raising their prices for crude oil by 70%. Another price 
rise followed at the end of the same year, this time by another 130%. The price 
increase was used as a political weapon against the Western countries who 
supported Israel against its Arab neighbours in the Yom Kippur War of October 
1973. An embargo on oil shipments to the United States and The Netherlands 
followed. The political crises in Iran in 1979 brought about further dramatic oil 
price increases. In the years up to 1980 the oil prices were raised from US $ 3.00 
in 1973 to $ 30.00 in 1980 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1993).
The crude oil price increases of the 1970s coupled with the nationalisation of oil 
exploration and production in OPEC member states brought about considerable 
changes for the consuming countries, for oil consumption in general as well as for 
the international petroleum industry.
4 Effects on the Consuming Countries
The events of 1973 showed the consuming countries that a complete dependence 
on oil supplies from OPEC members could prove problematic. In the following 
years, the consuming countries thus adjusted their energy policies. Their main aim 
became to minimise the dependence on OPEC countries and diversify in general 
the risks of oil supply as well as to make the most efficient use of energy available 
at present. The main notions of the new policies are briefly outlined below:
4.1 Energy Efficiency
The consumers, mainly member states of the OECD, became advocates of the 
efficient use of energy . The use of heavy fuel oils was decreased in favour of 
cheaper and more efficient sources of energy like gas, coal or lighter oil products. 
Where possible, oil products were substituted completely by alternative sources of 
energy. Further efficiency was achieved through investments in the areas of 
technology.
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4.2 Cooperation among Consuming Countries
In 1974, the International Energy Agency (lEA) was established within the 
framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). The IE A has 21 members among which are Britain, France and Germany 
as well as the United States. The basic aims of the IE A, which characterise well 
the main concerns of the OECD members, are defined as follows (International 
Energy Agency, 1991: 2):
'i) co-operation among lEA participating countries to reduce excessive dependence 
on oil through energy conservation, development of alternative energy sources and 
energy research and development;
ii) an information system on the international oil market as well as consultation 
with oil companies;
iii) co-operation with oil producing and other oil consuming countries with a view 
to developing a stable international energy trade as well as the rational 
management and use of world energy resources in the interest of all countries;
iv) a plan to prepare Participating Countries against the risk of a major disruption 
of oil supplies and to share available oil in the event of an emergency.'
4.3 Search for Oil Outside OPEC
New areas of oil exploration and production were investigated and established to 
diversify the risks of oil supply. A major improvement was the development of oil 
fields in the North Sea in the 1970s. In this context, the oil exploration in the North 
Sea rose from 0% of the world production in 1973 to 6% in 1988 . All in all, the 
non-OPEC countries extended their oil production from 1973 to 1988 by all 
together 676 Mio t'(Mattthies, 1990:12), which represents a 51% increase within 
that time period. OPEC countries, in contrast, reduced their share in the world oil 
exploration from 1547.7 Million tonnes to 1030.5 million tonnes, which is a 
decrease of 33.5%.
5 Effects on Oil Consumption
Energy consumption in general is dependent on the level of population, economic 
growth, energy policy, the absolute and relative prices for energy and the 
technological developments as a means to measure the use of energy. The demand 
for oil in this context is subject to its price relative to other sources of energy. The
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events of the 1970s had considerable effects on both the energy consumption in 
general and the demand for oil in particular:
Whereas world oil demand had witnessed an annual increase of on average 7.5% 
until 1973, after 1973, the annual increase fell to 2% until 1979 when the oil prices 
experienced a second big rise (Matthies, 1990: 6). After the latter, oil demand 
decreased until 1986 when due to a lack in production discipline among OPEC 
members the oil price collapsed. Since then, the oil consumption has increased 
slowly again, albeit to a lesser extent during the Gulf War and in 1994 lay at 67 
million barrels per day. All together, since 1976, the demand for oil has increased 
by 14%. In this context, it has to be mentioned that in non-OECD countries the 
energy consumption and the oil consumption accordingly hav risen more rapidly 
than in OECD countries (Shell International, 1995:1-3).
Apart from a decrease in oil consumption and energy consumption in general the 
structure of the oil and energy demand has changed. Within the range of oil 
products, the demand for lighter products such as gasoline or kerosine has 
increased whereas heavier fuels have been substituted by alternative sources of 
energy. Especially the demand for gas has experienced a considerable growth of 
65% from 1976 to 1994, compared with an increase in demand for coal of 47%, 
and in demand for oil of 14% within the same time period (Shell International, 
1995:1).
6 Effects Within the Oil Industry
6.1 Disintegration of the Petroleum Industry and Integration in OPEC- 
States
As immediate consequence, the major oil companies faced a situation of partly 
disintegration and a high dependence on OPEC states for their crude oil supply. 
The politically unstable character of the OPEC countries increased the risks on the 
supply side. The considerable increase in oil prices forced the companies to 
rationalise and implement more efficient processes.
Whilst the western oil companies faced disintegration, a process of integration took 
place in the oil producing countries of OPEC. Before 1970, the refining capacity 
had primarily been located in the western countries. After 1973, the OPEC 
members started building up their own downstream operations.
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Nevertheless, the major oil companies have remained vertically integrated 
(Matthies, 1990: 39). Their exploration and production activities are now mainly 
situated outside OPEC. Some of them cooperate as well with OPEC member 
states. This especially, as some of the members of OPEC have realised that 
cooperations with oil companies ensure a safe outlet for their crudes and products. 
Saudi Arabia, for instance, has already acquired refinery capacity in joint ventures 
with oil companies (Matthies, 1990: 24). According to Matthies, this development 
might lead to closer cooperation of OPEC members with consumer countries. In 
addition, however, it might result in an overall disintegration of OPEC whose 
members have witnessed mutual disagreements since the existence of this 
institution.
6.2 Refining Overcapacity and the Need for Investment
On the refining side, the falling oil demand following the oil price increase has led 
to a refining overcapacity worldwide. As a result, refining margins are very low 
and competition is fierce. In addition, refineries had to adapt to the changing 
demand structure by investing in facilites able to produce the lighter oil products 
that are in demand.
7 An Outlook - Energy Consumption and the Demand for Mineral Oil
Despite the considerable increase in demand for gas, mineral oil is expected to 
'remain the major source of energy for at least the next 25 years' (Shell 
International, 1995: 1). As far as the consuming countries are concerned the rise of 
major consumers outside Western Europe and the United States can be expected. 
Especially Latin America and Asia are likely to increase their worldwide share in 
the energy consumption and the demand for mineral oil (The Economist, June 18th 
1994: Survey 'Energy').
Although after the oil crises of the 1970s other oil reserves have increasingly been 
explored, eg. in the North Sea, the prominence of the East in oil exploration and 
production is not likely to change in the long- term. However, increasing 
cooperation with OPEC members might indicate a more stable oil supply 
(Matthies, 1990).
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Appendix VIII The Exxon Corporation
1 Histoi-y
The history of Exxon Corporation dates back to January 1870. It was then that the 
Standard Oil Company of Ohio was established by John D. Rockefeller. The 
company expanded rapidly, thanks to Rockefeller's expansive and innovative 
business policies. By 1880, the company owned 90% of the American refining 
capacity. In 1882, the Standard Oil Trust was founded one company of which was 
Standard Oil (New Jersey), later to become Exxon. In 1899 Exxon's forerunner 
became 'the holding company for all companies previously grouped in the trust' 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1993). In the following years, the trust experienced 
increasing legal attacks due to its dominance of the US-American market. In 1911, 
the US Supreme Court finally ordered the break-up of the Standard Oil Imperium. 
Subsequently, Standard Oil (New Jersey) divested itself of 33 of its American 
subsidiaries. Nevertheless, it kept its interest abroad in Britain, Germany and 
Canada and expanded into various other countries within the following years. In 
the mid-1920s Standard Oil (New Jersey) first used the phonetic version of its 
initials, that is, 'Esso' for some of its brands. However, other Standard Oil 
companies induced the American courts to barr the use of the Esso brand in several 
states. Outside the United States, though, Esso became a major name for Standard 
Oil (New Jersey)'s affiliates and their products. In 1972, Standard Oil (New Jersey) 
finally changed its name to 'Exxon'.
Today, Exxon Corporation operates in the United States and over 100 countries 
worldwide (Exxon Corporation, 1994: 1). The corporation is the largest US-based 
integrated petroleum company, with large-scale operations in all areas of the 
petroleum business and related areas of the energy sector such as coal, minerals 
and power. Finally, the company has a major worldwide petrochemical business 
(Exxon Chemical). Exxon has 86,000 employees worldwide of whom 55,000 are 
employed outside the United States (Exxon Corporation, 1994) The headquarters 
of Exxon are situated in Irving, Texas.
2 The Organisation Structure of Exxon
Exxon Corporation has a matrix organisation structure. Its operations are divided 
according to functions and geographical responsibilities respectively. Underneath 
the board of directors, various advisory committees exist for several areas of the
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business. Examples of this are the Executive Committee which is responsible for 
the selection of executive managers or the Compensation Committee which advises 
the corporation on remuneration policies etc. Below this level is the board that 
actually leads the business. Also the board which is headed by the president has 
advisory committees, the Management Committee and the Compensation and 
Executive Development Committee. Apart from these, the board has several 
subordinated service functions like the secretary, the Environment and Safety 
Department or the Tax Department. Down to this level, Exxon employs 
approximately 250 people. Below this level, finally come the geographically and 
ftinctionally divided worldwide business functions.
As for the geographically divided business areas, Exxon U.S.A. is responsible for 
all business activities in the States, Exxon Imperial is responsible for Canada and 
Exxon Company International (ECI) is responsible for the activities in the rest of 
the world, i.e. outside North America. Concerning the functional business areas, 
there are Exxon Research and Engineering, Exxon Chemical, Exxon Coal and 
Minerals and Exxon Exploration. Each of these subdivisions has a president and 
further advisory committees and staff functions respectively.
Exxon Company International (ECI)
The activities of ECI are further subdivided geographically; there is a division for 
Australia/The Far East, Central and South America, The Middle East/Africa, and 
Europe. Also in the European division, activities are divided further according to 
geographical responsibilities. The responsibilites of the companies that are analysed 
in this study are as follows:
Esso UK Pic responsible for all activities in Britain and
Ireland;
Esso AG Central Europe responsible for all activities in Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, Poland, Hungary, Czechia and 
Slovakia.
Within these companies, activities are divided according to products and services 
respectively.
The overall organisation structure of Exxon Corporation is depicted in Figure 5.0 
in a simplified way.
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Figure 5.0 The Overall Organisation Structure of Exxon Corporation
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3 Exxon Business Goals
As defined by Exxon (Exxon Corporation, 1993: 6), the company's 'continuing
objective is to be the world's premier petroleum company and to provide 
shareholders a secure investment with a superior return.' At present, this policy is 
further emphasised by a worldwide policy goal 'World Class 2,000' according to 
which the company want to reach world class standard in all its operations by the 
turn of the century. To achieve this goal, Exxon strives for excellent performance
in all areas of its business* . In detail, this implies:
3.1 Operational Excellence
'Exxon is dedicated to safe, reliable and efficient operations that are compatible 
with the balanced environmental and economic needs of the countries in which it 
operates' (Exxon Corporation, 1993: 6).
The concept of safety of operations is considered vital not only to fulfil the needs 
of the communities but also to protect the 'health and safety of employees and 
customers' (Exxon Corporation, 1995: 4). Furthermore, this aim comprises the 
supply of quality products and services to customers.
The information in the following sections is based on Exxon brochures and official reports.
253
Exxon achieves this goal by way of company-wide safety projects and standards, 
and by devoting a large part of its R&D expenditures on safety, technology and 
environmental protection. An example of this is the implementation of the 
Operations Integrity Management System (DIMS) which helps to ensure 'that all 
elements of a sound operation are continually addressed' (Exxon Corporation, 
1995: 4). Furthermore, Exxon has various oil spill response teams all over the 
world which in the case of spills help reduce the environmental damage caused. 
Moreover, Exxon is committed to reducing emissions by eg improving energy 
efficiency or participating in US-wide émission-réduction programmes. In addition, 
Exxon tries to develop new products which can reduce environmental damage, like 
air emissions, cost-effectively and undertakes investments in refineries so that they 
can produce more environmentally friendly products. In the United States and 
Europe, Exxon takes part in cooperations with governments to improve engine and 
fuel technology to define 'cost-effective routes to environmental protection' (Exxon 
Corporation, 1995). Finally, in various refineries, a programm to reduce waste was 
introduced in 1992/93.
3.2 Investment Selectivity
Exxon follows a very strict investment policy to ensure the highest possible 
worldwide return. In selecting where to invest they follow very high investment 
standards which are standardised throughout the corporation. Thereby the 
company determines 'whether (new investments) will be sound economically even 
under adverse conditions' (Exxon Corporation, 1993: 6).
3.3 Asset Management
Exxon has rigorous criteria for their asset management. Assets are assessed and 
evaluated continuously and those that are not longer considered strategic are 
divested. By these means Exxon ensures that the assets under its management 
generate an overall satisfactory return. Examples of this policy are the overall 
reduction of staff from 104,000 in 1990 to 86,000 in 1994 representing a decrease 
of over 17%.
3.4 Technological Leadership
Exxon devotes a large part of its capital to the R&D of new technology. In all 
areas of its business the change of technology follows a fast pace and only by
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constantly attempting to stay ahead of technological advances, technological 
leadership can be ensured.
The expertise in R&D lies with the Exxon affiliate Exxon Research & Engineering 
that is also responsible for the worldwide coordination of R&D activities and the 
transfer of R&D results. Exxon Research and Engineering integrate ideas from 
Exxon affiliates worldwide in their programme and ensure that the results of the 
latter are implemented on a large scale basis. Apart from ideas developed during 
the work processes, Exxon draws its technological leadership from R&D 
specialists who contribute their knowledge to the R&D procedures. Apart from 
Exxon Research & Engineering, several Exxon research centres exist throughout 
the world (for example, the Esso Research Centre at Abingdon, UK) that 
contribute their knowledge and results.
3.5 Sound Financing
Exxon follows a conservative and strict financial management which is visible in 
the asset management and the selection of investments but also in the financing 
side (The Economist, March 1994: 83). This has led to the company's 'triple-A- 
credit rating (Exxon Corporation, 1994: 1). Low-cost financing and flexibility are 
top priorities within the Exxon financial management. The latter is especially 
important as investment opportunities might arise that require large sums of money 
at short notice.
3.6 Flexibility and Objectivity
Management style throughout the Exxon Corporation is characterised by flexibility 
to the changing environment, in which the company operates and by objectivity in 
the evaluation of business decisions and results. Business conduct is revised 
constantly and mistakes are taken as an incentive for future improvement.
3.7 Highly Qualified People
Exxon understands that the 'success of (its) strategies, organisations and operations 
depends on the company's employees' (Exxon Corporation, 1993: 6). Great 
emphasis is put on the recruitment of highly qualified staff as well as on their 
ongoing training and development. Furthermore, Exxon is an equal opportunies 
employer 'in all aspects of the employment relationship including recruitment, work
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assignments, selection for training, transfer and promotion' (Exxon 
Corporation, 1993: 6). A means to motivate its employees is to promote 
management from within the company. Most managers enjoy a life-long career 
with the corporation.
Approximately half of the employees in managerial, supervisory or professional 
functions have a scientific or technical background.
4 Exxon Ethics
Exxon places great emphasis on the fact that the achievement of above business 
goals are made on the basis of ethical standards. Exxon's ethics is based on 
integrity, honesty, fairness and individual responsibility. The compliance with 
the business ethics is a major concern throughout the corporation, worldwide. 
Every year, Exxon employees sign statements of compliance with the ethics.
5 Management at Exxon
Exxon places great emphasis on the delegation of responsibility to its divisions 
and affiliates. As the company states 'the authority given to line managers is an 
important feature of Exxon's organization and management philosophy' 
(Exxon Corporation, 1993: 5). Nevertheless, the compliance of affiliates and 
divisions with the company's rules and strategic guidelines is ensured by 
providing them with 'broad policy guidance (...) by senior management under 
the general direction of Exxon's board of directors' (Exxon Corporation, 1993: 
5). In addition, the business policy as outlined previously is engraved in the 
activities and operations tlnoughout the organisation. Indeed, as Mr Raymond, 
the present chairman points out, the ideal of cost-efficiency 'is built into the 
thought process. People understand it... and they know that they'll be judged on 
that basis' (The Economist, March 5, 1994: 84). The judging takes place by way 
of 'obsessive auditing at every level' (ibid). Every year at least, the strategies 
and performance of affiliates and divisions aie reviewed.
In this context, the auditing process is undertaken in a 'bottom-up approach'. 
Within affiliates and divisions , business unit managers present their strategies - 
formerly developed in cooperation with their subordinates - to their local 
boards. On the basis of the business unit strategies, a corporate strategy is 
developed which the board subsequently presents to their superiors in the
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United States. In the case of the Euopean Exxon affiliates, the auditing function 
at Exxon is undertaken by Exxon Company International (ECI) at New York, 
ECI then puts together the various strategies of all affiliates outside the United 
States and presents these to the board at Irving. At headquarters, the strategies 
and performance of divisions and affiliates are finally reviewed by the chief 
executive officer who in cooperation with his management committee devotes 
special attention to the ’1) long-range business strategy and related financial 
plans and capital budgets; 2) operating results; 3) the identification and 
development of human resources and their effective use throughout Exxon' 
(Exxon Corporation, 1993: 6).
Investment strategies of affiliates and divisions are decided on the basis of a 
ranking list encompassing all investments suggested by affiliates and divisions 
worldwide. Only those projects are chosen that promise superior returns. Apart 
from this, investments and strategies for activities that cross geographical and 
functional lines are generally coordinated and determined at headquarters.
Within the strategic framework set at headquarters and under regular control by 
the superiors, it is left to the affiliates' and/or divisions' discretion to 'design and 
implement their own plans and programs to fit the special conditions of their 
geographic regions or business functions' (Exxon Corporation, 1993: 5).
An example of this is the employment policy. Exxon puts great emphasis on 
keeping the local identity of its divisions and affiliates. As the company points 
out: 'Each of (the) units follows its country's laws and is staffed primarily by its 
country's citizens' (Exxon Corporation, 1993: 2). More than 98% of Exxon 
employees are 'citizens of the countries where they work' (ibid).
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